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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines cholera vaccination policy in a developing country context 
based on a combination of epidemiological and microeconomic data representing private demand 
for purchasing vaccinations, cost of illness, cost of vaccination, and herd protection impacts of 
vaccination. The dissertation incorporates data from Matlab, Bangladesh. Matlab’s population is 
subdivided into four distinct population groups based on variation in disease burden and age. 
Mathematical optimization is used to solve for the socially optimal prices across population 
groups that maximize either 1) societal net benefits or 2) the number of DALYs saved across 
subject to a budget constraint. This analysis demonstrates that is optimal to charge the lowest 
prices to children in high incidence villages and the highest prices to adults in average incidence 
villages. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the use of cross-subsidies has only a small impact on 
program outcomes including both net societal benefits and total DALYs saved (e.g., adults who 
purchase vaccines in average incidence villages would pay more per vaccine to subsidize children 
in high incidence villages).  This analysis shows that cross-subsidies may be less useful for 
scenarios in which the herd protection impacts of vaccination are similar across population 
groups. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 This dissertation develops new models to aid in improving vaccine policy in developing 
countries. The goal of the dissertation is to improve vaccine policy in light of the challenging 
health problems and scarce financial resources available in developing countries. The new models 
incorporate empirical data for private demand and the epidemiology of cholera vaccination herd 
protection. The rural Matlab, Bangladesh area is used as a case study to illustrate the models. A 
number of studies about the epidemiology of cholera have been conducted at this site. In addition, 
I led a study to estimate private household demand for cholera vaccinations in 2005. 
One objective of this dissertation examines the reliability of monetary estimates of 
vaccination benefit, which are often controversial. Specifically I compare independent estimates 
of vaccine benefits: direct willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates for cholera vaccines compared to 
additive estimates of the private cost of illness (COI) estimates plus valuations for reductions in 
non-specific mortality risk. The value of generic mortality risk reduction is estimated from a 
separate contingent valuation scenario included with the cholera vaccination household demand 
survey conducted in Matlab in 2005.  
The overall average WTP for children’s vaccination is US$1.6.If children are split into two 
groups, the average WTP for vaccinations for 1-5 year olds is US$2.4 compared to US$1.2 for 
older children age 5-17 years. Thus, WTP is considerably greater for younger children who also 
face a higher baseline risk of death from diarrhea. The expected private COI savings for 3 years 
of vaccine protection are about US$0.04 for young children and US$0.02 for school-age children. 
These values are about 1-2% of the estimated private WTP as estimated from my contingent 
valuation survey. This suggests that private COI savings in isolation are a poor estimate of the 
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private benefits of vaccination. Ex ante mortality risk reduction benefits are estimated to be 
US$1.70 for young children and US$0.24 for older children. These are equivalent to 70% of WTP 
estimates for young children and 20% of WTP estimates for school-age children. Thus, the 
vaccine WTP estimates are very close to the COI + mortality risk reduction benefits for young 
children. There is some discrepancy for older children who appear to face a very small risk of 
cholera mortality. It should be noted that the COI + mortality risk estimates neglect the cost of 
pain and suffering for those that contract cholera. The fear of suffering may lead to increased 
WTP for cholera vaccination for older children despite the small mortality risk. 
Another objective of this dissertation is to incorporate empirical private demand and herd 
protection data into cost benefit and cost utility models that consider multiple subgroups. The 
newly developed optimization models should allow for a more thorough evaluation than is 
possible with the commonly used approach in which price (and thereby coverage rates) are fixed. 
These optimization models can examine the potential for cross-subsidies to improve program 
efficiency both in consideration of social net benefits and in consideration of health impacts based 
on the number of disability adjusted life years (DALYs) saved given similar budget constraints. 
Specifically, I split the population into four subgroups: 1) adults in average incidence villages, 2) 
children in average incidence villages, 3) adults in high incidence villages and 4) children in high 
incidence villages. These models can then be solved for a set of four user fees that would 
maximize either net benefits or total DALYs saved given a revenue constraint.  
A third objective of this dissertation is to examine the advantages and disadvantages of 
cost-benefit analysis relative to cost utility analysis, especially in accounting for herd protection 
effects. Judging from published literature, it appears that cost utility analysis is often preferred to 
cost benefit analysis, probably because it is difficult and controversial to monetize mortality risk 
reduction and avoided pain and suffering.  
I examined a number of different pricing models for vaccination programs. These include 
simple models in which all four groups are charged the same price and optimized models in 
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which different subgroups are charged different prices. The optimized models attempt to 
maximize either net societal benefits or total DALYs saved. The net societal benefit curve is 
almost flat over the range of likely prices, US$1.00 to US$3.00, for a cholera vaccination 
program in Matlab. Over this range of prices, net societal benefits vary between US$200,000 and 
US$220,000. Thus, there is very little difference in the absolute maximum net benefits, 
US$220,000, and the maximum net societal benefits possible from a revenue neutral program, 
US$210, 000. A public or donor contribution of US$32,000 could be used to boost net societal 
benefits by about US$5,000, a 2% change.  
The optimal prices that maximize net societal benefits tend to fall within tightly bound 
ranges around the marginal cost of vaccination. As a result, the prices for each of the four groups 
would typically fall within US$1 of one another when societal net benefits are maximized. This 
occurs because the demand functions are found to be independent of incidence differences across 
villages. Since demand functions drive the calculation of direct and indirect benefits, the 
difference in optimal prices result solely from small differences in herd protection effects and 
public COI savings. However, public COI savings tend to be small relative to direct and indirect 
benefits. In the deterministic model, it is assumed that herd protection effects are the same for 
vaccinating adults or children. Thus, the targeting of vaccinations across age groups is 
unnecessary for maximizing herd protection. 
Program outcomes are very similar for models that maximize DALYs saved. Relative to 
net benefit maximization models, the optimal prices derived from models that maximize DALYs 
show more variability across subgroups. The optimal prices for groups with high incidence tend 
to be smaller (i.e. for children relative to adults and for high incidence villages relative to average 
incidence villages). As a result, predicted coverage rates at optimal prices are greater for groups 
in which the numbers of cases avoided per vaccination are greater. However, the population-
average coverage rates remain about the same. Thus, herd protection effects, which accrue 
equally to vaccinated and unvaccinated persons, are assumed to be independent of who is 
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vaccinated. As a result, there are very small differences in the numbers of DALYs saved for the 
net benefit maximization model versus the DALY maximization model, despite the differences in 
optimal prices. Monte Carlo Simulation results indicate that the differences in net societal 
benefits or DALYs saved for the Net Benefit or DALY models are less than 10% across a range 
of 500 independent parameter draws.  
The uncertainty in optimal pricing is driven primarily by uncertainty in the fixed and 
variable costs of vaccination programs. If program costs are greater than expected, it would be 
necessary to charge all subgroups higher prices in order to maintain revenue neutrality. When 
higher prices are charged, coverage rates decline, herd protection effects are diminished, and 
fewer cholera cases are avoided. Thus, variation in societal net benefits and DALYs are also 
strongly impacted by uncertainty in program costs. Uncertainty in net societal benefits is also 
driven by uncertainty in demand function parameters. If demand is greater than expected, net 
societal benefits increase because cholera protection is perceived to be more valuable to the 
community. The uncertainty in DALYs saved is primarily driven by variability in case fatality 
and incidence rates, such that more DALYs are saved when incidence and case fatality rates are 
greater. It is believed that cholera case fatality rates may be lower in Matlab relative to other rural 
communities because Matlab’s ICDDR,B hospital is available to provide high quality treatment. 
If case fatality rate were greater than 1%, it is likely that cholera vaccination in the Matlab area 
could be considered ‘very cost-effective’ based on World Bank Standards, but only at modest 
coverage rates (20-40%). At higher coverage rates, the cost per DALY saved would be higher due 
to diminishing returns to scale of herd protection.  
It is possible to increase the number of DALYs saved if external funding is available. 
However, the marginal cost per DALY saved tends to be high. The cost per DALY saved varies 
depending on the coverage rate of the program. At very low coverage rates, the average cost per 
vaccination is very high because fixed costs are spread across a small number of vaccinated 
individuals. As a result, the cost per DALY saved is also high. As coverage increases, the cost per 
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DALY saved decreases as more people become vaccinated and fixed costs are spread across a 
larger number of vaccination recipients. The cost per DALY is minimized when the average price 
charged is about US$3 and the average coverage rate is about 20%. As coverage rates increase 
beyond 20% the average cost per DALY saved decreases. This is because of the diminishing 
returns to scale of herd protection. This dissertation provides useful insight into planning 
vaccination programs in rural areas of developing countries. 
  
 
 
1 Description of Policy Problem 
1.1 Introduction 
As more and more new vaccines and other health interventions are developed, public 
health ministries and international donor agencies face increasingly difficult decisions for 
investing limited resources to improve health in less developed countries. One approach to 
increasing the adoption of new vaccines at limited cost to government and donors is to charge 
user fees for vaccinations. This would allow recipients to contribute to the cost of the vaccination 
program. However, the imposition of user fees would reduce vaccination coverage rates because 
some people would be either unwilling or unable to purchase vaccinations.  
When determining user fees, it is important to consider that vaccinations have both public 
good and private good aspects. Recipients have a physiological response to vaccination, leading 
to increased immunity to disease. This is the private good aspect; the physiologic response is 
often exclusive to those who receive the vaccine. Since these recipients are less likely to become 
ill, they are less likely to expose family members and other community contacts to disease. As 
vaccination coverage rates increase, disease prevalence declines and unvaccinated persons are 
less likely to encounter infected persons or other disease vectors in the community (i.e. there is a 
herd protection effect). This is the public good aspect since each individual vaccination has an 
impact on the indirect protection for the community. For vaccinations with less than 100% 
efficacy, vaccinated persons would also benefit from herd protection.  
Cost benefit analysis and cost utility analysis are typically used to evaluate the economic 
attractiveness of vaccination programs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, 
which will be discussed in this dissertation. However, when demonstrated in the literature, most 
authors assume that vaccination coverage rates are pre-determined and that economic 
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attractiveness must be determined for these pre-determined coverage rates (e.g., free or 
mandatory provision as part of mass vaccination or infant vaccination programs). This 
dissertation attempts to evaluate how the choice of user fees (and implicitly the choice of 
coverage rates) impacts cost benefit and cost utility metrics commonly used to judge the 
economic attractiveness of vaccination programs.  
The goal is to improve the allocation of scarce resources for a prospective vaccination 
programs in a developing country. My analysis focuses on how empirical price-coverage and 
indirect protection-coverage relationships can be used to optimize the setting of vaccination user 
fees. Empirical data from a number of cholera vaccination studies conducted in rural Matlab, 
Bangladesh are used to demonstrate these models. Empirical estimates of household demand for 
cholera vaccinations are based on a contingent valuation survey conducted in 2005. Empirical 
estimates of coverage-indirect protection relationships are based on recent studies of cholera 
incidence following a 1985 vaccination trial that was conducted in Matlab. These studies found 
that incidence rates for both vaccinated and unvaccinated subgroups were inversely correlated 
with vaccination coverage rates (Ali et al., 2005; Ali et al., 2008). Thus, unvaccinated persons 
that lived in areas with high coverage rates were considerably less likely to contract cholera than 
unvaccinated persons who lived in areas with low coverage rates. In addition, an empirical model 
of coverage versus expected incidence was developed for cholera vaccination in the Matlab area 
(Longini et al., 2007).  
My dissertation incorporates both price-coverage and coverage-incidence expressions 
into cost-benefit and cost utility models to solve for socially optimal prices. While I focus on 
examples using cholera vaccination data from Matlab, I believe that these models should be 
illustrative of potential approaches for other locations and for different vaccines. I examine both 
cost benefit and cost utility approaches to identify if different policy models influence either the 
theoretically optimal prices or the expected program outcomes that would result from those 
prices. 
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For cost benefit models, health outcomes must be expressed as monetary benefit 
estimates via a welfare-theoretic approach. For cost utility analysis, health outcomes are 
expressed as non-monetary health utility units based on the number of life years and disability-
impaired years saved via the intervention. Both types of benefit measures can then be compared 
to program costs. In the absence of herd protection, the change in disease morbidity per 
vaccination delivered is constant (given a population with homogenous incidence). However, in 
the presence of herd protection, the change in disease morbidity is no longer a constant function 
of coverage. Thus, it may be possible to use price-coverage relationships in combination with 
coverage-herd protection relationships to solve for socially optimal coverage rates. For each 
model, I assume that vaccination programs face budget constraints that limit government or donor 
contributions to program financing.  
This dissertation aims to answer three distinct, but related questions. First, how do private 
vaccine willingness-to-pay estimates compare with other economic estimates of disease 
prevention based on ex ante reductions in private treatment costs and mortality risk? I use the 
results of two contingent valuation surveys to answer this question. I calculate average 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) per vaccination by age group from the household cholera vaccination 
demand survey. An alternative vaccination benefit estimate can be calculated from separate 
studies that estimated cholera incidence, private cost of illness and willingness-to-pay for 
mortality risk reduction. This value of mortality risk reduction is estimated from a survey of 
willingness-to-pay to reduce mortality risk for each household’s youngest child.  
Second, how can cost utility methods be used to incorporate herd protection effects to 
optimize vaccination policy making? To answer this question, I use existing cost utility methods 
but I attempt to maximize the number of DALYs rather than simply estimating an average cost 
per DALY. I used standardized methods ((WHO), 2003) to convert changes in incidence to 
changes in disability adjusted life years (DALY). The number of life years lost depends on 
incidence rates and case fatality rates by age group. Since cholera does not cause long term 
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disability (e.g., blindness or paralysis), the disability impact is calculated from the average 
duration of disease and a weight that represents the degree of incapacitation experienced. When 
comparing different health interventions, an average cost per DALY saved is often used as the 
definitive metric. In an appendix, I demonstrate how to calculate average and marginal costs per 
changes in DALYs saved as functions of coverage to demonstrate how variation in coverage rates 
impacts cost utility. In addition, I solve for a set of optimal prices for specified population 
subgroups that maximize the number of DALYs saved in the community. 
Third, given a common set of constraints and model input parameters, how different are 
the hypothetical socially optimal outcomes derived from cost benefit versus cost utility analyses? 
A related question is what are the underlying causes of differences in the hypothetical socially 
optimal outcomes from cost benefit and cost utility analyses? To answer these questions, I create 
optimization models that maximize either social net benefits or DALYs saved for a given revenue 
constraint. The optimization models solve for a set of prices to be charged to each of four 
different subgroups. The societal net benefits are calculated from the sum of expected WTP 
benefits and discounted public treatment cost savings less program costs. The net revenue 
constraint is the difference between program costs and the sum of sales revenue and discounted 
public treatment cost savings. Both of these models incorporate herd protection versus coverage 
functions in addition to price versus coverage functions. By solving each of these optimization 
problems, it is possible to identify how the choice of outcome measure affects decision making. 
This type of comprehensive vaccination policy analysis is not always conducted prior to 
making decisions about introducing new vaccines. DeRoeck et al (2005) interviewed policy 
makers in seven Asian countries to understand their views on vaccines against cholera and other 
enteric disease. Policy makers in Bangladesh and other countries reported that they did not place 
a high priority on providing cholera vaccines to areas with high endemic incidence rates. They 
cited a number of reasons for this preference, including 1) the success of oral rehydration solution 
(ORS) also known as oral rehydration therapy in reducing cholera mortality, 2) a desire to spend 
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limited resources on water and sanitation infrastructure or other health interventions (e.g. Hib and 
hepatitis B vaccines) that are believed to have greater potential for reducing childhood mortality, 
3) the limited duration and effectiveness of cholera vaccines, 4) the higher cost of cholera 
vaccines relative to Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI) vaccines, and 5) the inability to 
administer the cholera vaccine as part of the existing EPI schedule. Policy makers may also fail to 
consider whether private spending might help offset the cost of vaccination programs (via 
charging user fees). In addition, empirical evidence of herd protection from cholera vaccination 
was not yet available when policy makers were interviewed for DeRoeck’s report. 
The policy makers’ opinions of cholera vaccines demonstrate the need to consider 
Bangladeshi health policy in light of very limited financial resources, which are insufficient to 
adopt every newly-developed health intervention. As increasingly more vaccines and other 
interventions are developed, policy makers should take care to consider both herd protection-
induced efficiencies and private willingness-to-pay considerations when forming health policy. 
Planning should be flexible enough to allow increasing localization of planning efforts and 
freedom for household decision makers to invest in their favored interventions. 
The models developed in my dissertation differ from more common approaches to 
vaccine policy for developing countries, which traditionally revolve around simple binary 
decisions about whether or not to introduce specific vaccines. In low income countries, it is also 
often assumed that these vaccines must be provided free of charge because residents’ budgets are 
too tightly constrained to spend money on preventive efforts. However, the provision of free 
vaccines places a large burden on already strained health ministry budgets and reduces 
prospective purchasers’ abilities to assess their own local health priorities. It is uncommon for 
policy makers to consider charging user fees or how to determine what amounts should be 
charged. 
Recently economists have been researching private demand for newly developed 
vaccines. Their studies use surveys that present respondents with a carefully described 
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hypothetical vaccine and ask how many vaccines would be purchased for the respondent’s 
household. This allows researchers to estimate demand functions for vaccination purchases and 
also provides direct monetary estimates of the private value of vaccination (e.g., Canh et al., 
2006; Cook et al., 2006; Lucas et al., 2007; Islam et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2008; Whittington et al., 
2009).  
Longini et al. (2007) developed an epidemiological model of the cholera vaccination 
coverage-incidence relationship in Matlab and reported the expected incidence reduction as a 
function of coverage (relative to a baseline scenario without vaccination). At a vaccine coverage 
rate of 30%, they predicted that probability of cholera infection would decrease by 90% for 
vaccinated persons and by 70% for unvaccinated persons. If coverage were increased to 50%, risk 
of infection would further decrease, by 97% for vaccinated persons and by 89% for unvaccinated 
persons. These findings demonstrate that the impact per vaccine varies as a function of coverage 
and that the attractiveness of cholera vaccination almost certainly depends on the coverage rate. 
Because of this nonlinear relationship between coverage and vaccination impact, common 
economic modeling approaches that rely on a single point-coverage estimate may not be well 
suited to policy making.  
By combining private demand and epidemiological data, I can develop more helpful 
economic models that demonstrate the impact of user fees on program outcomes. The work 
included this dissertation makes an important contribution to the literature in a number of ways: 
• It provides the first estimate of WTP to reduce the mortality risk of children in a 
developing country; 
• It is one of the first attempts to include private demand and herd protection data 
into a vaccination policy model for a specific location; 
• It demonstrates a new method of cost utility modeling, namely I define the 
marginal cost per DALY saved, which is a function of coverage 
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• It is the first to examine how to set user fees in consideration of multiple 
subgroups with independent vaccine demand functions, incidences, cost of 
illness, and impacts on herd protection. (The use of cross-subsidies in the 
presence of herd protection has not been previously considered).   
 
1.2 Dissertation goals 
The goal of this dissertation is to provide policy models and recommendations to improve 
vaccination decision making in developing countries. This is accomplished through the 
development of new vaccination policy models that aim to better understand the tradeoffs 
involved in charging user fees for vaccinations in less developed countries, using Matlab, 
Bangladesh as an example. The framework developed in this dissertation should be applicable to 
policy makers working on other vaccines and in other countries. The dissertation focuses on data 
collected for a cholera vaccination program in the Matlab, Bangladesh area. This site was chosen 
because of an opportunity to conduct empirical research in the area and the availability of 
empirical data for cholera vaccination herd protection effects from a 1985 trial (Ali et al., 2005; 
Longini Jr. et al., 2007). The area may consider a cholera vaccination program as a medium term 
preventative measure prior to future water and wastewater infrastructure improvements. Thus, 
one objective of the dissertation is to develop models that improve understanding of the inter-
relationships between price, coverage, and health outcomes for a potential set of cholera 
vaccination policies. While these models are demonstrated with Matlab data, I believe that the 
underlying models will prove to be broadly applicable for other vaccines and in other locations. 
The recommendations derived from these models may provide a template for other rural 
communities in Bangladesh and other countries that suffer from endemic cholera; however, I 
caution that differences in social, cultural, economic, and environmental conditions must be taken 
into consideration prior to extrapolation.  
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In this dissertation I attempt to incorporate empirical private demand and herd protection 
data into cost benefit and cost utility models that consider multiple subgroups. The models should 
allow for a much more thorough evaluation than is possible with the commonly used approach in 
which price (and thereby coverage rates) are fixed. In addition, I demonstrate that the marginal 
cost per DALY saved is strongly dependent on the coverage rate achieved. This demonstrates the 
importance of considering target coverage rates after deciding whether to conduct the vaccination 
program. The optimization models can examine the potential for cross-subsidies to improve 
program efficiency both in consideration of social net benefits and in consideration of DALYs 
saved given similar net revenue constraints. Specifically, I split the population into four 
subgroups: 1) adults in average incidence villages, 2) children in average incidence villages, 3) 
adults in high incidence villages and 4) children in high incidence villages.1  
In addition to the development of new localized vaccination policy models, this 
dissertation examines a number of additional objectives that aim at improving the current state of 
the art in developing economic analyses of vaccines and the collection of the data necessary to 
inform vaccine policy. A third objective of this dissertation examines the reliability of vaccination 
benefit estimates, which are often controversial. Specifically I compare independent estimates of 
vaccine benefits: direct WTP estimates for cholera vaccines compared to additive estimates of the 
private cost of illness estimates plus valuations for reductions in non-specific mortality risk. The 
value of generic mortality risk reduction is estimated from a separate contingent valuation 
scenario included with the cholera vaccination household demand survey conducted in Matlab in 
2005.  
                                                 
1The Matlab case study is unique because of the amount of data available. It is unusual to have detailed data 
for private vaccine demand, herd protection epidemiology, and even disease incidence in other locations. In 
fact, it would be prohibitively expensive to collect these data prior to determining vaccine policy at all 
locations for all diseases. However, I believe it is possible to apply some of the lessons learned from this 
dissertation in a variety of contexts.  
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An additional objective of this dissertation is to examine the advantages and disadvantages 
of cost-benefit analysis relative to cost utility analysis, especially in accounting for herd 
protection effects. Judging from published literature, it appears that cost utility analysis is often 
preferred to cost benefit analysis, probably because it is difficult and controversial to monetize 
mortality risk reduction and avoided pain and suffering. This dissertation examines how different 
outcomes arise from cost benefit versus cost utility analyses. Further, I examine what conditions 
would lead to differences in optimal pricing for cost benefit versus cost utility analysis.  
It is important to note that I approach cost utility analysis differently in that I attempt to 
maximize the number of DALYs saved given a revenue constraint (rather than simply calculate 
the costs and saved DALYs for a pre-specified intervention. For cost benefit analysis, the 
difference between benefits and costs is defined as the net benefits. After determining an optimal 
allocation for a specific intervention, policy makers should attempt to maximize either net 
benefits or DALYs saved across interventions. At present, vaccine policy decisions in developing 
countries are generally limited to allocating resources across interventions. Little attention is 
typically given to program design within a particular intervention. This issue has been raised by a 
number of authors (Philipson, 1996; Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003; Francis, 2004; Boulier et al., 
2007); however, I am unaware of any attempts to use empirical demand data to design 
vaccination programs.  
Another objective of this dissertation is to define a marginal cost per DALY function that 
varies as a function of coverage. As shown by Longini et al. (2007), the marginal changes in 
incidence are highly variable. It is possible to reduce incidence of unvaccinated persons by 70% 
by increasing cholera vaccination coverage from 0% to 30%; however, a further increase in 
coverage from 30% to 50% only increases effective protection for unvaccinated persons from 
70% to 89%. Thus, it is important to quantify not just the average cost per DALY saved, but also 
the marginal cost per DALY saved. This will help prevent wasting resources on additional 
vaccinations, once an acceptable threshold of protection has been achieved. 
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1.3 Summary of the dissertation’s contribution  
This chapter highlights my dissertation’s important and novel contributions to the 
literature. First, the study incorporates a large data set of cholera vaccine benefits for a rural, 
cholera-endemic setting. This combination of data sources has not been available for any previous 
evaluation at a single location. Many economic evaluations of vaccine programs miss important 
private economic benefits such as increased productivity and reductions in risk of death or pain 
and suffering. In addition, most economic models are hindered because program planners do not 
include price-coverage relationships. I can estimate these relationships from the results of the 
stated preference studies. The estimated demand curves can also be used to calculate total 
willingness-to-pay for the community. The Matlab study site is unique in that very specific data 
on different causes of mortality are available to inform policy.  Unlike other vaccination policy 
studies, all of these data are available at a single location and thus benefit transfer models are not 
necessary. 
Second, value of statistical life estimates are notoriously difficult to obtain because of 
difficulties in educating respondents about the very small risks of deaths faced and the ability of 
the proposed intervention to reduce those already small risks of death. This study (Maskery et al., 
2008) is only the second known attempt to elicit estimates in a rural area of a developing country 
(Mahmud, 2009) and the first to elicit estimates of parents’ willingness-to-pay to reduce their 
children’s risk of death. In addition, cholera vaccine WTP estimates are compared to cholera cost 
of illness and generic mortality risk reduction estimates to test for consistency. 
Third, the economic model developed in this dissertation is believed to be one of the first 
to account for both the heterogeneous demand and herd protection. Most economic models that 
incorporate herd protection have assumed that cholera vaccination benefits are the same for 
everyone in the community (Brito et al., 1991; Francis, 1997; Francis, 2004; Boulier et al., 2007). 
I also contributed in the development of a simplified model (Cook et al., 2009). This article uses 
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empirical private vaccine demand and epidemiological data to examine vaccination outcomes for 
Kolkata, India. This article uses a different method for calculating direct and indirect vaccination 
benefits and assumes a single demand function and incidence for the entire population. My model 
includes consideration for separate incidence and demand functions for each of four subgroups. 
The Cook et al. article is discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.  
Fourth, I think my dissertation provides one of the first attempts to examine 
vaccination program optimization with different objectives, namely the maximization of 
net benefits versus the maximization of DALYs saved given a common revenue 
constraint. 
  
 
2 Background 
This chapter includes background information of the biology of cholera, information about 
available cholera vaccines, a comparison of vaccination programs relative to water and sanitation 
programs, and the Matlab study site. A more thorough review of economic and epidemiological 
vaccine research is included as Chapter 3. 
 
2.1 Cholera  
Appropriate vaccination policies depend on the epidemiology of disease. Cholera is an 
endemic and epidemic diarrheal disease that primarily strikes low income persons in certain parts 
of the developing world. It is endemic where the local climate is conducive to the survival of 
vibrio cholerae outside of human hosts. Epidemic cholera may also strike communities with 
poor-quality water and sanitation infrastructure, which allows the disease to spread from person 
to person even though the natural environment is not conducive to survival of the causative 
bacteria.  The Matlab community suffers from endemic cholera.  
The primary symptoms of cholera include intense, watery diarrhea, fever, and rapid 
dehydration.  It is easily treated by quickly re-hydrating the patient with oral rehydration solution 
(ORS) or IV fluids. The severe dehydration caused by cholera can kill patients within 24-48 
hours; however, the introduction of ORS has reduced the case fatality rate (CFR) to less than 1% 
in areas with high quality treatment (Ryan et al., 2000; Sack, 2003).  
Ali et al. (2002) constructed a spatial map of cholera risks in the Matlab area and 
observed that the risk of dying from cholera increased with distance from the nearest health 
clinic. Thus, vaccinations may be especially useful in reducing mortality risk in areas that lack 
convenient access to health clinics. In the Matlab area, the centralized ICDDR,B diarrhea hospital 
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treats the majority of severe cholera cases. This hospital is unique in that it has tested all diarrhea 
patients that presented cholera symptoms and has maintained surveillance records for almost 40 
years (Longini Jr. et al., 2002). Historically, cholera incidence in the Matlab area has been highly 
variable. Cholera incidence data for the Matlab area are examined in detail in Section 5.1. 
The bacteria that causes cholera live in coastal estuarine waters in association with 
phytoplankton; high temperatures and algal blooms have been associated with its transmission 
into humans and subsequent outbreaks (Schaecter et al., 1998). The bacteria that causes cholera is 
Vibrio cholerae, which has 2 major serogroups (O1 and O139). The O1 serogroup has two 
biotypes (classical and El Tor), each of which has 2 major serotypes (Ogawa and Inaba). Usually, 
one of the two serotypes is responsible for the majority of epidemic cases in any geographic area, 
but the two serotypes usually replace one another over time in an endemic area. The change in 
serotype is believed to depend on the immune status of the population (Longini Jr. et al., 2002). 
The epidemiology of cholera is dependent on both the bacteria that cause the disease and 
the water and sanitation infrastructure. If communities had properly functioning, self-contained 
indoor piped water and sewerage, it would be uncommon for cholera to be transmitted across 
households. In Matlab, however, most bathing is performed in nearby ponds, which are shared by 
small groups of households. Emch et al. (2009) have shown that cholera vaccination herd 
protection effects are highly localized among households sharing these ponds. Since cholera 
infection requires the ingestion of a large number of bacteria, even small changes in local 
incidence via vaccination may help to inhibit transmission to unvaccinated persons by reducing 
the concentration of vibrio cholerae in any particular pond.  
 
2.2 Vaccines 
This dissertation examines the next generation whole-cell-killed cholera vaccines (either 
with or without a recombinant b-subunit).  This vaccine is delivered orally in two doses. It was 
originally believed to have about 65% direct efficacy for three years (Clemens et al., 1990a); 
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however, after accounting for herd protection, the vaccine has been found to have a 65% direct 
efficacy (Longini et al., 2007) at least in the first year. The next generation whole cell vaccines 
have not been proven safe in infants less than 1 year of age.  There is another next-generation 
cholera vaccine -- a live-attenuated vaccine (CVD103-HgR) – but the data on effectiveness and 
safety is less established than for the next-generation oral whole-cell killed vaccines. Research 
into the whole-cell-killed vaccine is ongoing with recent trials in Vietnam, Beira, Mozambique, 
and Kolkata, India (Thiem et al., 2003; Lucas et al., 2005; Cavallier et al., 2006; Thiem et al., 
2006). The Kolkata trial is the only one to use the International Vaccine Institute’s newly 
developed vaccine, which is being made available for technology transfer to producers in less 
developed countries. 
 
2.3 Comparing vaccines with water and sanitation improvements 
Most households in the Matlab area retrieve their potable water from shallow hand 
pumps located near their homes. These shallow tube wells have helped to reduce all-cause 
diarrheal disease, but have also exposed the population to hazardous concentrations of arsenic 
naturally found in shallow Bangladeshi aquifers. Exposure to arsenic has led to chronic health 
problems over the past 20 years. Basic pit latrines and hanging latrines are used for urination and 
defecation throughout the area. These latrines have also helped reduce diarrheal disease, but are 
less than ideal. Some hanging latrines introduce pathogens directly into bathing areas and the 
shallow pit latrines may not effectively remove pathogens from the source water of the shallow 
tube wells. 
While these water and sanitation facilities are an improvement over the use of surface 
water and open defecation practices, they are only the first step to reducing water borne illness. 
The next developmental step would be the construction of large scale water and sanitation 
infrastructure. Cholera vaccines are unnecessary in wealthier countries because of advanced water 
and wastewater treatment, better hygiene practices, and an overall higher standard of living.  The 
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next steps in major water and wastewater infrastructure would be an expensive network of pipes 
to carry treated, clean water to households and transport wastewater away from households. If 
properly operated and maintained, this new system should improve health, assuming that hygiene 
practices simultaneously improve. Disease incidence can be further improved with the ultimate 
construction of wastewater treatment facilities that would remove pathogens and other pollutants 
prior to discharge into Bangladeshi streams or rivers. This step would reduce exposure to 
pathogens during bathing or play in local water bodies. Thus, long term infrastructure 
improvements would likely have a great impact on public health, but these require significant 
financial commitments, at least on the order of US$20 per month per household. The necessary 
local, national, or international financial resources will not likely become available over the next 
20 years given that the average monthly household income in the area is only about US$75 per 
month. 
Point-of-use treatment is considerably less expensive than the construction of new 
infrastructure and may be used to reduce diarrheal disease from multiple types of bacteria and 
viruses. Point-of-use treatment may incorporate one of many different technologies including 
some type of water filter, disinfecting additive (e.g., chlorine), or sedimentation additive. 
Considering that Matlab suffers natural arsenic contamination, sedimentation additives may be 
preferred if reagents are selected to precipitate and remove this arsenic. There have been some 
point-of-use treatment pilot programs in the Matlab area, and some of the survey respondents 
continue to employ point-of-use treatment devices. Accurate effectiveness data for point-of-use 
treatment in Matlab are not available, but other studies have demonstrated a 30-50% decrease in 
all-diarrhea incidence at costs of about $15 to $50 per household per year (Fewtrell et al., 2005; 
Brown et al., 2007; Sobsey et al., 2008). The effectiveness of point of use treatment has not been 
measured Jeuland and Whittington (2009) compared generic investments into point-of-use 
treatment versus cholera vaccination in low income countries. They concluded that point-of-use 
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treatment is often more cost effective, but that results vary across locations depending on the 
incidences of disease.  
The microbiological quality of water from hand pumps has not been rigorously 
investigated across the Matlab study area, but it is widely believed that cholera is more likely to 
be spread through contaminated food sources or bathing areas (St. Louis et al., 1990; Emch et al., 
2009). Cholera infection requires a large dose of the infecting bacteria, which is unlikely to be 
present in tube well water. It is important to note that point-of-use treatment should reduce other 
types of diarrheal disease in addition to cholera, which is an important consideration in 
comparing investments. However, these devices require considerably greater effort to properly 
use and maintain. Cholera vaccination reduces cholera incidence, but would have no impact on 
other diarrheal disease. After receiving the required two doses, vaccinated individuals will be 
protected for 2-4 years, but should continue to avoid contaminated water sources that cause other 
diseases. In addition, cholera vaccination leads to reduced cholera exposure for both vaccinated 
and unvaccinated individuals in the immediate area. Thus, it is also important to adjust for herd 
protection when comparing investments, although, point-of-use treatment devices may also have 
indirect protection benefits. The examination of point-of-use treatment is not a focus area for this 
dissertation, but it is important to consider this alternative when developing health policy in 
Matlab and other localities. 
 
2.4 Description of Study Site 
Centered on the town of Matlab, the study area lies some 55 km southwest of Dhaka and 
has a population of approximately 224,000 ((ICDDRB) 2005). The ICDDR,B operates a hospital 
in Matlab town whose services include free treatment to anyone with diarrhea; this hospital treats 
most of the serious diarrhea cases in the area. ICDDR,B also provides basic health services to 
approximately 111,000 people in Matlab town and 67 outlying villages. Once a month, 
ICDDR,B’s Health and Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS) gathers information from 
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each person in the ICDDR,B service area as well as from an additional 113,000 people in 75 
other nearby villages who receive basic health care services from government facilities. 
ICDDR,B has collected this information for more than 40 years. Over the years, a number of 
health intervention studies have been conducted in both the ICDDR,B and government service 
areas.   
The HDSS data include annual mortality rates for a number of causes by age group, as 
summarized in Table 2.1 (ICDDRB 2002, 2003, 2004). The most common causes of death differ 
by age group. For children less than 1 year of age, respiratory disease is the most likely cause of 
death; next most common are diarrhea and nutritional deficiency. For children age 1 to 4, 
drowning is the most likely cause of death; next are diarrhea and respiratory disease. Mortality 
rates drop significantly for children age 5 to 9 years relative to younger children. Mortality rates 
for children age 10 to 19 drop again by half relative to children age 5 to 9 and are six times less 
than among children age 1 to 4 years. In comparison to the United States, mortality rates in the 
Matlab area are about 6.5 times greater for children less than one year of age, about 14 times 
greater for children age 1 to 4 years and about 5 times greater for children age 5 to 14 years 
((NCHS) 2005). The mortality rates for older children and young adults are similar for the two 
countries. 
I collected data for the sociodemographic characteristics of sample households that 
participated in a 2005 contingent valuation survey that estimated household willingness to pay for 
cholera vaccinations and willingness to pay for mortality risk reductions for households’ youngest 
children. The survey is described in more detail in Chapter 4. Some household socioeconomic 
data from the survey are summarized here. These data only include households with at least one 
child less than 18 years of age, and located within two hours (via traditional transportation 
options) of the ICDDR,B hospital. The average household size is about 5.8 persons, including, on 
average, 0.1 infants less than one year old, 0.7 young children (1 to 5 years), and 1.7 school-age 
children (6 to17 years). The average respondent age was about 40 years and the youngest child 
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was 6.5 years old, and about 50% of the children were less than 5 years of age. The gender split 
for the sample is almost even. Many of the adult males leave the area to pursue employment in 
the national capital of Dhaka or in other countries because of a lack of economic opportunity.  
The respondents had attained an average of about 3.6 years of education; about 35% of the 
sample reported that they had never attended school. Average monthly household income is about 
US$75 and median income was US$60. A frequency distribution of average household income 
per month is shown in Figure 2.1. This figure shows that most households earned between US$35 
and US$75 per month, although a small fraction earned considerably more. Thirty nine percent of 
respondents received electricity directly at their house from a grid. A few other respondents had 
installed solar panels or used large batteries because of the lack of electrical supply to their 
village.  
The primary source of drinking water for most respondents was hand pumps. About 60% 
of respondents shared a hand pump with their neighbors; another 30% had their own. Only 3% 
used surface water. Because of the widespread use of hand pumps, nearly all households (92%) 
surveyed did not boil their drinking water, though some did treat water with bleach (5%), via 
sedimentation with alum (4%) or with filters made of cloth, ceramic, sand, or composite material 
(7%).  The respondents primarily used improved pit, unimproved pit, and hanging latrines for 
waste removal, the latter two of which may promote increased prevalence in the environment of 
the bacteria that cause cholera. People in the Matlab area have had previous experience with 
cholera vaccines, including the new-generation oral vaccines and a combined typhoid, 
paratyphoid A and B, and cholera injectable vaccine. Currently, no cholera vaccine is available in 
the area. Seven major cholera vaccine field trials were conducted in Matlab between 1963 and 
1989. Between 1963 and 1968, there were 5 trials of injectable vaccines: whole-cell, serotype-
specific, and purified antigens. The combined vaccine was discontinued in the 1970s because of 
side effects which included pain, swelling, redness, and fever and because recipients were often 
unable to work for several days after vaccination.  In 1974, there was a sixth trial of a toxoid 
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vaccine. The seventh and final trial estimated the effectiveness of oral cholera vaccines similar to 
the vaccine analyzed in this dissertation (Longini Jr. et al., 2002). ICDDR,B’s 1985 field trial 
administered two oral cholera vaccines and a placebo. More than 62,000 people took three doses, 
approximately 27,000 took one or two doses, and about 31,000 were absent or refused to 
participate (Clemens et al., 1990). Although the vaccination program only targeted children and 
mothers, significant herd protection effects were observed even at modest coverage rates (Ali et 
al., 2005; Longini Jr. et al., 2007). Empirical herd protection data from Matlab is examined in 
more detail in Section 3.5.  
 
Figure 2.1. Frequency distribution of average monthly income per household 
In my 2005 survey about 31% of the respondents had reported receiving the oral cholera 
vaccine during the 1985 trial. Most respondents, 90%, reported that they were satisfied with the 
vaccines received by themselves and their family members. They thought that most of the 
vaccinated persons in their households (72%, including themselves and other members), were 
sufficiently recently immunized to still have some protection against cholera infection. In 
addition to their experiences with the oral cholera and cholera-typhoid combined vaccines, people 
in the Matlab area have had access to vaccines from the EPI program. The free EPI vaccines for 
children include those against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, measles, and tuberculosis. EPI 
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also provides tetanus vaccines for women of child bearing age (14 to 49 years) ((IVD), 2005). 
ICDDR,B’s community health workers distribute the EPI vaccines throughout the Matlab area 
once per month. The private market for vaccines in the area is minimal, with only a few 
pharmacies in Matlab town providing tetanus vaccines (US$0.30–$1.34, Tk 20–Tk 90) and rabies 
vaccines (US$5.95–$6.40, Tk 400–Tk 430).  Nationwide, Levin et al. (1999) report that the 
private sector only accounts for about 2% of vaccines delivered in Bangladesh. 
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Table 2.1. Average annual number of deaths for children in Matlab area by cause (based on data 
from HDSS annual reports ((ICDDRB), 2003; (ICDDRB), 2004; (ICDDRB), 2005) 
Age range <1 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 Total 
(Population) (5,764) (21,024) (24,985) (27,024) (23,944) (102,741) 
 
      
Disease related             
Respiratory 70 8.7 2.0 1.0 1.3 83 
Diarrhea 17 9.3 2.0 1.0 0 29 
Cancer 0.0 2.0 1.3 2.0 0.7 6.0 
Infectious 7.0 2.7 1.0 1.3 1.3 13 
Nutritional 12 4.3 1.3 1.0 0.3 19 
Gastro-intestinal 2.3 0.3 1.0 0.7 1.0 5.3 
Cardio-vascular 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.7 1.3 
Neonatal 130 0 0 0 0 130 
Avg. no. deaths due to disease 245 34 14 11 9 314 
Rate of death  
(per 1,000 children per year)a 43 1.6 0.57 0.41 0.39 3.1 
Accidents, Injuries 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Drowning 3.3 49 8.0 1.3 0.7 63 
Homicide/Suicide 1.0 1.0 0.3 1.0 3.0 6.0 
Other accident 2.3 1.3 2.0 2.3 1.3 9.3 
Avg. no. deaths due to accident/injurya 17 58 16 8 9 108 
Rate of deatha  
(per 1,000 children per year)  2.9 2.8 0.6 0.31 0.38 1.1 
Other/Unknown 19.7  13.3  11.0  7.4  8.0  59  
Avg. no. of deaths (all causes) 260 92 30 19 18 420 
Rate of death (all causes) 
(per 1,000 children per year) 45 4.4 1.2 0.72 0.77 4.1 
 
      
Rate of death in United Statesb 
(per 1,000 children per year) 6.8 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.65 0.3 
       
a
 Deaths attributed to other/unknown were split evenly between disease and accident/injury. 
b
 Data taken from NCHS (2005)
  
 
 
 
3 Review of related literature 
Policy analysis typically involves the application of natural and social science to public 
decision making (Friedman, 2002). This dissertation focuses primarily on the application of 
economics and epidemiology to public vaccination. Economics is the study of the efficient 
allocation of scarce resources. Epidemiology is the study of how disease is transmitted throughout 
a community. This chapter summarizes the current state of economics and epidemiology research 
for public vaccination programs.  
This chapter is subdivided into seven sections. It begins with a discussion of the most 
common approaches to the economic modeling of vaccination programs and their limitations. The 
next two sections examine studies that can be used to monetize vaccine benefits, either directly or 
indirectly. Section 3.2 summarizes existing stated preference studies of cholera vaccination in 
developing countries. Section 3.3 summarizes the value of statistical life literature with an 
emphasis on studies conducted in developing countries and studies that estimated value of 
statistical life for children. Section 3.4 summarizes existing economic analyses of cholera 
vaccination policy. Empirical estimates of cholera vaccination herd protection are described in 
Section 3.5. The final section (3.6) evaluates the economic epidemiology literature, which merges 
epidemiological disease spread information with economic theories of behavioral responses to 
changes in the risk of becoming ill (i.e. changes in averting behaviors in response to changes in 
disease prevalence). These insights aid the development of a long term vaccine policy model that 
incorporates changes in vaccine demand after prospective purchasers have observed herd 
protection effects.  
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3.1 Common approaches to economic evaluation of vaccine programs 
 As more and more new vaccines and other health interventions are developed, public 
health practitioners and international donor agencies face increasingly difficult decisions for 
investing limited resources to improve health in poor countries. Economic analyses of the costs 
and benefits of various interventions are one approach to prioritizing these interventions. Many 
vaccines have a considerably longer duration than the cholera vaccine or protect against diseases 
that are especially dangerous for infants. For these vaccines, it is usually optimal to vaccinate 
children as young as possible. In contrast, cholera, typhoid, influenza, and other short-duration 
vaccines require a more nuanced approach in which it may be necessary to identify which age 
groups should be vaccinated to optimize impacts. For short-duration vaccines with herd 
protection or herd immunity effects, analysis is further complicated by the need to consider the 
indirect protection provided by vaccinating different age groups.  
Prior to examining modeling approaches, it is illustrative to define the various types of 
vaccine costs and benefits. All vaccine interventions potentially offer five principal private 
benefits and three public benefits. The five private direct protection benefits result from a 
reduction in the risk of contracting cholera and accrue directly to vaccinated individuals:  
(1) avoided direct medical treatment costs, such as medicine and doctor fees,  
(2) avoided productivity losses (e.g., wages, school, housework) for patients and 
their caretakers,  
(3) avoided disutility of enduring the pain and suffering of illness,  
(4) reduced risk of death from illness, and  
(5) reduced expenditures on activities or products that would specifically decrease 
the risk of contracting the disease that is prevented by vaccination. 
These benefits represent the private hardships caused by cholera symptoms. In addition to the 
private benefits of direct protection, vaccination leads to public benefits that accrue to the entire 
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community in which the vaccinated persons reside. These public benefits result from reduced 
public expenditure or via indirect protection: 
(6) reduced government expenditure on subsidized treatment for the disease 
prevented,  
(7) indirect protection (a decrease in disease risk resulting from reduced exposure to 
infected community members or other disease vectors), and 
(8) macroeconomic benefits due to increased tourism or trade that may result from a 
decrease in cholera prevalence. 
The indirect protection benefits (7) are essentially the same as the direct protection benefits 
identified in (1-5), except that the decrease in hardships results from reduced exposure to disease 
(indirect protection) rather than direct vaccine protection. Thus, indirect protection benefits 
accrue to the whole community while direct protection benefits only accrue to vaccinated 
persons. The government treatment cost savings (6) represent the government contribution to 
subsidized treatment at public clinics, which can vary between 0-100% of total treatment costs. 
The macroeconomic benefits would accrue if tourism or trade increased as a result of a decline in 
cholera incidence. The seafood industry may be especially affected by presence of cholera in 
Bangladesh. It is unlikely that macroeconomic benefits would result if cholera vaccination were 
limited to the Matlab area exclusively. 
Vaccination costs include… 
(1) manufacturing costs, 
(2) transportation costs from manufacturing sites to local distribution sites, 
(3) refrigeration and storage costs at distribution sites 
(4) building rental or construction costs (if cholera vaccination cannot be absorbed 
into existing vaccination infrastructure), 
(5) Labor costs to administer vaccines to recipients. 
In addition to provider costs, vaccine recipients incur the following costs… 
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(6) productivity and leisure losses due to time spent traveling to and waiting at the 
clinic, 
(7) transportation costs if buses, cars or other vehicles are used,  
(8) pain and suffering caused by vaccine side effects or injections. 
Any vaccine user fees paid are considered to be a transfer payment from vaccine recipients to 
providers. The average cost per vaccinated individual is the sum of the average provider and 
recipient costs.  
While there are many economic analyses of vaccines available in published literature, 
few incorporate private vaccine demand functions or herd protection-coverage relationships. The 
journal, Pharmacoeconomics, is devoted to economic analyses of health interventions including 
vaccines. An excellent review of research in developing countries has been compiled by Walker 
and Fox-Rushby (2001). There is considerable heterogeneity in the methods used to conduct 
economic analyses. Methodological discrepancies primarily arise from difficulties in benefit 
estimation and/or a lack of the data necessary to conduct analyses. It may be impossible to 
explicitly account for all the costs and benefits of a vaccination program; however, there is no 
consensus in practice as to which costs or benefits must be included or how to quantify them. The 
remainder of this section examines the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches to the 
economic modeling of vaccination programs. The most common methods include cost 
effectiveness analysis, cost minimization analysis, cost utility analysis, and cost benefit analysis, 
listed in order of increasing complexity.  
Cost effectiveness analysis is the simplest method, and requires estimates of 1) the 
provider costs and 2) the public health outcomes of the vaccination programs.2 Programs are 
assessed based on the expected cost per unit change in health outcomes. Examples of cost 
                                                 
2In this section, I use cost utility analysis to refer to analyses that examine the cost per disability adjusted 
life years. This is because the DALY is a utility-based or subjectively determined unit. In contrast, deaths 
and cases are objective units of measurement, which I refer to as cost effectiveness analysis. In the 
literature, cost effectiveness analysis and cost utility analysis are often used interchangeably. 
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effectiveness metrics include the cost per case avoided, the cost per death avoided, or the cost per 
hospital-day avoided. After calculating the cost per outcome, the least costly health interventions 
are prioritized. However, these metrics typically omit important benefits. The cost per case 
avoided metric omits differences in the severity of disease. The cost per death avoided metric 
neglects the impacts of long term disability and the economic benefits associated with reduced 
pain and suffering. The primary advantage of cost effectiveness analysis is simplicity due to the 
avoidance of assigning monetary or utility values to health outcomes, an often controversial 
endeavor. 
Cost minimization analysis evaluates health interventions based solely on a comparison 
of expected vaccination provider costs and expected public treatment cost savings. Vaccination 
programs are deemed worthwhile if expected treatment cost savings exceed expected vaccination 
costs. Obviously, this approach completely ignores the private benefits and costs of vaccination. 
This approach is also poorly suited for countries that do not use public funds to subsidize 
treatment, especially if potential vaccine recipients do not have insurance. The advantage for this 
approach is again simplicity; only the public sector benefits and costs need to be quantified.   
Over time cost effectiveness analysis and cost minimization analysis have become less 
common in the published literature, primarily because of the limitations mentioned above. 
Presently, cost benefit analysis and cost utility analysis are preferred because of their more 
comprehensive treatment of vaccination benefits. Cost utility analysis typically estimates the cost 
per change in a standardized utility measure such as the cost per disability adjusted life year 
(DALY) saved. A DALY is defined as the discounted sum of the life-years lost to premature 
mortality and the severity-adjusted mental and physical disutility of disease (Russel et al., 1996; 
(WHO), 2003).  
The World Health Organization has developed a standardized set of guidelines for 
estimating the number of DALYs saved by a particular intervention ((WHO), 2003). This 
approach can be described in four steps. The first step sums the expected number of life years 
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saved by the intervention, which depends on the disease mortality rate, the effectiveness of the 
intervention, and the age distribution of lives saved (i.e. such that remaining life expectancy is 
greater for children than for adults). The second step sums the amount of time patients experience 
the symptoms of disease, including long term disability for chronic illnesses or for disabilities 
that persist after an illness is cured. The third step incorporates a scaling factor that assesses 
quality of life impairments caused by the disease in addition to long term disability caused by 
disease. This scaling factor is designed such that slight discomfort is rated close to zero, and 
complete incapacitation (such as coma or chronic excruciating pain) would be rated close to one. 
The scaling factor is typically determined based on surveys that ask respondents how they would 
trade off a greater number of years spent with the disease (or the disability caused by the disease) 
relative to a smaller number of years spent healthy (Ware Jr., 1987; Broome, 1993; Guyatt et al., 
1993; Russel et al., 1996). For example, would the respondent prefer to live 5 more years with 
ovarian cancer or 3 more years in perfect health? Finally, the life years saved and the disability 
adjusted life years saved are discounted depending on 1) when the intervention’s effects occur 
and 2) the future life span of the person saved. Thus, the calculation employs adjustments for life 
expectancy, future time, and severity of impairment caused by disease. Severity weights for some 
diseases are maintained by the World Health Organization to ensure consistency across studies. 
(Fox-Rushby and Hanson, 2001; (WHO), 2003). A DALY weight of 0.105 is cited for diarrhea, 
although there is no cholera-specific DALY weight. 
Though considerable effort has been put into this approach, published papers exhibit 
significant discrepancies in the way DALYs are calculated (Szucs, 2005; Beutels et al., 2007). 
These discrepancies include the use of different severity, discount, and/or age weights. Some 
studies subtract public and private treatment cost savings from the provider cost, resulting in a net 
cost calculation. Many cost utility analyses have omitted herd immunity effects entirely (Beutels 
et al., 2002; Beutels et al., 2007; Cook et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2009). Other analyses incorporate 
herd protection data from other sites for a pre-specified coverage rate (Armstrong et al., 2007; 
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Lee et al., 2007; Lloyd et al., 2007; Jeuland et al., 2009). The confusion caused by differences in 
approach is often compounded by the authors’ omissions of the assumptions they made in their 
calculations, making it difficult to draw conclusions across studies (Walker and Fox-Rushby, 
2000; Beutels et al., 2007). Critics of the methodology also point to issues with the theoretical 
validity of the DALY as a welfare measure (Bala and Zarkin, 2000; Dolan and Edlin, 2002). For 
example, there is no way to examine how health preferences change over time, health status, or 
income (Klose, 2003).  
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) requires monetization of the costs and benefits of a 
vaccination program. A vaccine program would pass a cost-benefit test if total benefits exceed 
total costs. A benefit-cost ratio can also be calculated by dividing total benefits by total costs. 
This ratio can be used to prioritize interventions, such that those with the highest ratios would be 
pursued first. The assignment of monetary values to benefits is both difficult and controversial 
(Klose, 2003). Returning to the numbered list of benefits, estimation of public and private 
expenditure on treatment (1 and 6 above) is relatively straight-forward and non-controversial 
(e.g., (Cookson et al., 1997; Fischer et al., 2005). The estimation of productivity gains (2 above) 
adds another layer of complexity, but is still common (e.g., Bahl et al., 2004; Cropper et al., 
2004). Reductions in treatment expenditures and productivity losses can be estimated from 
surveys with patients and reviews of public facilities’ operating records. The expected annual cost 
of illness per person can be estimated by multiplying the average cost of illness per case by the 
change in disease incidence resulting from the health intervention. It is straightforward to 
monetize these benefits, which would represent a lower bound estimate of intervention benefits.  
Private averting expenditures (5 above) can also be estimated from surveys. In contrast to 
COI studies, it would be important to also interview previously uninfected persons. It may be 
difficult to isolate averting expenditures for cholera relative to other types of diarrhea. After 
receiving a cholera vaccination, it would be unwise for recipients to stop attempting to avoid non-
cholera diarrhea. 
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Valuations for reductions in pain and suffering or mortality risk reductions (3 and 4 
above) are both cognitively and empirically difficult. In addition, attempts to value mortality risk 
reduction have often been challenged on moral and ethical grounds by authors who believe it is 
immoral to attempt to assign values to human life, even on a statistical basis (Heinzerling, 1998; 
Heinzerling, 1999; Heinzerling, 2000). Much of this objection applies to the governmental 
regulation of the environment, in which persons have no say about the deleterious impacts on 
their health. Thus, controversy may be reduced for preventative health programs that aim to 
improve health of participants in contrast to environmental degradation, which harms health of 
affected persons. The estimation of indirect protection benefits (7 above) is often complicated by 
a lack of empirical epidemiological data. 
Many published economic evaluations of vaccine programs in developing countries have 
been mislabeled as CBA, when in fact, the authors used a cost minimization analysis (i.e. they 
assess whether vaccines were more or less costly than ex ante public treatment expenditure). In 
their review, Walker and Fox-Rushby (2000) found that 13 of 23 evaluations labeled as CBA 
were actually cost minimization analyses (i.e. these studies only calculated benefit number 6 from 
the list above). Thus, vaccination programs were only deemed worthwhile if they saved money 
from the health provider context. Any program that is cost-saving from the provider perspective 
would definitely pass a benefit-cost test. However, it is also possible for a program to pass a 
social benefit-cost test even if it is not cost-saving from the provider perspective. Thus, these 
studies should not be labeled as CBA. At best, they might confuse the audience. At worst, the 
omission of these benefits can introduce considerable bias in the conclusions drawn (Fox-Rushby 
and Hanson, 2001). For example, if mortality risk and/or pain and suffering considerations are 
omitted from an analysis of a disease with high case fatality rates or long term disability rates, 
benefit estimates would be greatly underestimated.  
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3.2 Stated preference studies of cholera vaccines in developing countries 
In the previous section, I report that most monetary estimates of vaccine benefits are 
incomplete. Cholera vaccines are sparsely available in cholera endemic areas. Historically, 
cholera vaccines have been provided in vaccine trials or free of charge in developing countries. 
The use of stated preference studies to estimate vaccine benefits is a relatively new approach in 
the literature. The two most common types of stated preference studies are contingent valuation 
(CV) and stated choice surveys. CV studies typically use surveys to assess whether respondents 
would be willing to purchase a carefully defined vaccine at a specific price. The design of the 
valuation scenario must ensure that respondents understand the important attributes of the specific 
vaccine. In addition, respondents must be encouraged to consider the purchase decision as 
realistically as possible relative to their existing budget constraints (Arrow et al., 1993; Carson, 
2000). The valuation can be based on a yes/no response to a single price or a series of prices. The 
use of a single price is more representative of a real world purchasing decision, while a series of 
prices allows for a more tightly bound estimate of the valuation for each person (Alberini, 1995). 
If the single price approach is used, the researcher will randomly (exogenously) assign one of a 
carefully designed set of prices to each respondent. The use of CV allows the researcher to 
estimate a household demand curve as a function of price for the vaccine. This demand curve can 
then be used to calculate an average willingness-to-pay for vaccines based on consumer surplus 
estimates.  
Historically, stated preference studies have been used by environmental economists to 
value the public benefits or costs of changes in environmental quality (Carson, 2000). The use of 
CV for health interventions has recently become more common, although many health 
economists still favor the cost utility approach (Dolan and Edlin, 2002; Klose, 2003; Lancsar and 
Savage, 2004). In fact, most economists dismiss stated preference estimates because respondents 
are not bound to follow through on their stated responses (Arrow et al., 1993; Carson, 2000). 
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Vaccine CV surveys may inquire about demand for the respondent only (e.g., 
(Whittington et al., 2002; Whittington et al., 2003), the respondent’s household (e.g., Cropper et 
al., 2004; Canh et al., 2006; Islam et al., 2008; Lucas et al., 2007), one of the respondent’s 
children (e.g., Hsu et al., 2003; Prosser et al., 2004), or all children in the community (e.g., 
Prosser et al., 2004). Theoretically, analysis is most straightforward for estimating the 
respondent’s own WTP because there are no constituency concerns about purchases for others. In 
contrast, household demand studies are complicated by the fact that decision-makers would be 
required to make valuations based on the preferences of others.  
Surveys that measure WTP for cholera vaccines would be inclusive of all four types of 
the private benefits identified in Section 3.1. Respondents should consider all of these benefits 
when stating whether or not they would purchase at the offered price. If CV estimates of WTP for 
vaccines are accurate, this approach is better than attempting to estimate each benefit separately. 
Comparisons of WTP and COI estimates are available in some articles. Since COI estimates 
exclude valuations for reduced pain and suffering and reduced mortality risk, WTP estimates 
should be greater than COI estimates. For example, household WTP estimates for a 100% 
effective, 1-year duration malaria vaccine were about twice as great as the expected household 
COI in Tigray, Ethiopia (Cropper et al., 2004). In one study, Hsu et al. (2003) estimated that 
WTP for a varicella vaccine was actually less than their estimate of private COI; however, their 
survey only included recovered patients and it was unclear for whom the vaccine would be 
purchased. Note that varicella (or chickenpox) patients achieve lifetime immunity after recovery; 
thus, there is no need to purchase vaccines for children that have already suffered from the 
disease. It should also be noted that varicella symptoms are much more severe and mortality risk 
is greater if contracted later in life. Since vaccine effectiveness wanes with time, prospective 
purchasers may prefer that their children contract the disease while young to acquire lifetime 
immunity and avoid the more severe symptoms that would be experienced if contracted later in 
life.  
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My research group has conducted a number of CV studies of cholera vaccine demand, 
several of which have been published in the literature (Lucas et al., 2007; Islam et al., 2008; Kim 
et al., 2008; Whittington et al., 2009). These studies were conducted as part of the International 
Vaccine Institute’s Diseases of the Most Impoverished (DOMI) multidisciplinary examination of 
cholera and typhoid disease burden and attitudes toward vaccination. I am not aware of any other 
cholera vaccine WTP estimates. The results of the cholera vaccine studies are summarized in 
Table 3.1. Incidence was highest in Beira, Mozambique and lowest in Hue, Vietnam. In Hue, 
public vaccination programs in 1998 and 2000 achieved 75-80% coverage of residents, and 
reduced incidence to almost zero during the period from 2000 to 2003 (Thiem et al., 2006). A 
vaccine trial was also undertaken in the bairro of Esturro in Beira, Mozambique in 2003. The trial 
covered 57% of the bairro and conferred 75-85% protection for recipients in the first 6 months. 
Thus, respondents in these studies should have previous experience with cholera vaccines.  It is 
unclear how the trials may have influenced WTP estimates; trial participants may expect free 
vaccines or they might suspect that their trial vaccines are still providing protection, which would 
have rendered another vaccine unnecessary. 
The Beira and Kolkata private demand studies incorporated a time-to-think approach for 
survey respondents. This methodology uses a series of two interviews to allow respondents to 
spend overnight considering their purchasing decision. This has reduced demand relative to 
standard treatment among DOMI studies, and contributed to the lower WTP estimate for Beira 
(Cook et al., 2006; Islam et al., 2008; Lucas et al., 2007; Whittington et al., 2009). The Hue study 
collected data in a single interview. Thus, it is difficult to directly compare Hue estimates with 
Beira and Kolkata results. The Hue estimate is greater than that for Kolkata or Beira. This could 
suggest that income is more important than incidence. However, it is important to note that the 
Hue study was conducted during the first cholera outbreak after the successful vaccination 
campaigns in 1998 and 2000. This might have led respondents to believe a cholera epidemic was 
in progress. 
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Table 3.1. Comparison of ex ante COI and WTP estimates from DOMI project sites 
Location Annual 
incidence 
(1/1000)a 
Annual ex-ante COI 
(US$) a 
WTP per 
person (US$) 
Time-to-
think (y/n) 
Self reported 
annual 
household 
income (US$) 
b
 
Private Public 
Hue, Vietnam NA c NA NA $7.4 d N $1,200 
Kolkata, India 1.6  0.02 NA $2.7 e Y $700 
Beira, 
Mozambique 
2.4 0.08 0.11 $1.4 f Y $800 
a  Data taken from Poulos et al. (2008) 
b All income measures are from the WTP studies. Estimates from COI studies would be biased if the 
infected population is significantly different than the rest of the population. 
c Large scale cholera vaccine programs were conducted in 1998 and 2000. As a result, cholera incidence 
was reduced to near zero for a number of years prior to an outbreak in 2003. There were not enough cases 
to generate COI or incidence estimates. 
d Data taken from Kim et al. (2008) 
e Data taken from Whittington et al. (2009) 
f Data taken from Lucas et al. (2008) 
 
Both private ex ante COI and private WTP estimates are available for Beira and Kolkata, 
India. The estimated WTP was about 150 times greater than annual COI in Kolkata and about 20 
times greater in Beira. Together, these results suggest that private COI estimates compose a small 
fraction of total private benefits. The Hue study included four different cholera vaccine scenarios, 
which varied in expected efficacy and duration. These included (1) the baseline 50% effective, 3-
year duration vaccine, (2) a 70% effective, 3-year vaccine, (3) a 70% effective, 20-year vaccine, 
and (4) a 99% effective, 20-year vaccine. The order from 1 to 4 should rank the various vaccines 
in terms of desirability as longer lasting and more efficacious vaccines should provide more value 
to consumers. However, there was only a slight increase in stated household WTP (US$40 for the 
least desirable vaccine compared to US$50 for the most desirable vaccine) (Kim et al., 2008). 
This might suggest that some respondents had trouble understanding their interviewers’ 
descriptions of vaccine effectiveness and duration. It could also suggest a very high discount rate 
for future protection. 
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The stated choice approach is the other common type of stated preference survey. In 
stated choice surveys, respondents typically are presented with 4 or more pair-wise sets of 
alternative vaccines and are asked to choose which one of the pair they would prefer. The choices 
sets are variable in attributes (e.g., price, effectiveness, duration, side effects, and convenience of 
vaccine receipt). By analyzing the repeated choice tasks, researchers can quantify the value of 
vaccine attributes based on tradeoffs between attributes and vaccine prices (Hall et al., 2002; 
Cook et al., 2006). The Cook et al. (2006) stated choice study was performed in the same areas of 
Hue as the Kim et al. (2008) cholera vaccine CV study. This study allowed for comparisons 
between respondent valuations for cholera and typhoid vaccines with varying attributes. They 
found that cholera vaccines are preferred to typhoid vaccines and that vaccine effectiveness was a 
more important attribute than duration. The Cook et al. WTP estimate for a 50% effective cholera 
vaccines was close to zero, which was much less than the estimate from the CV study.  Since all 
WTP estimates in the stated choice experiment are evaluated relative to other choices, it is 
difficult to directly compare estimates. In contrast to the CV results for individually presented 
vaccines, this might suggest that prospective purchasers would spend considerably more on a 
more effective vaccine.  
There has been little effort to estimate vaccine demand under varying incidence rates. In 
Table 3.1, there is some variance in incidence rates, but there are also important differences in 
socioeconomic status, cultural beliefs, and health system operation. There are some studies that 
examine influenza, pneumococcal, and/or measles vaccine uptake rates relative to disease 
incidence or mortality rates in previous years. However, it is not possible to generate WTP 
estimates from these studies because the price was not variable. In Section 3.6, I examine these 
studies as part of the economic epidemiology literature review. It is important to note that I am 
not aware of any attempts to estimate the indirect protection benefits of vaccinations relative to 
direct protection benefits.  
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3.3 Review of value of statistical life literature 
It is usually preferable to directly estimate benefits for the vaccine of interest as 
demonstrated in Section 3.2. However, this requires considerable effort to obtain separate 
estimates in each location of interest. In Section 3.1, I identified five primary private benefits of 
vaccination, including mortality risk reduction. If I can estimate a generic value for the population 
average willingness-to-pay to reduce mortality risk, this generic value could be standardized 
across interventions based on the magnitude of risk reduction. Private COI estimates are already 
available for Matlab. I can compare the direct cholera vaccine WTP estimates to the value of ex 
ante COI plus a generic mortality risk reduction WTP estimate after adjusting the generic risk to 
the cholera-specific risk.  In this section, I examine the mortality risk reduction WTP research.  
A number of studies in the developed world have attempted to estimate the value of 
reduced mortality risk (for excellent reviews, see (Hammitt and Graham, 1999; Mrozek and 
Taylor, 2002; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003; Blomquist, 2004). Three methods commonly employed for 
this purpose include (1) hedonic wage or compensated wage studies, which measure how 
employees trade off higher wages for riskier jobs; (2) stated-preference techniques, which use 
surveys to ask how much respondents would pay for hypothetical products that could reduce risk 
of death; and (3) averting-expenditure studies, which examine how much people spend in time 
and money on products that reduce risk of death (e.g., seatbelt and bicycle helmet use, car safety).  
The hedonic wage literature is the most widely implemented of the three approaches and 
includes studies in some less developed countries. However, results are generally limited to male 
blue collar workers facing risk of death by accident. The averting-expenditure studies include 
some estimates of parents’ values for risk reductions for their children, but the method is limited 
by risk misperception and difficulties in valuing the non-monetary disutility of averting behaviors 
(e.g. time expenditure and discomfort from helmets, seat belts, and car seats). Estimates from 
stated preference studies are also available for some less developed countries and avoid some of 
the limitations of hedonic wage and averting expenditure product studies. However, these may 
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introduce bias if respondents are not properly informed of risk magnitudes and because people are 
not bound to actually pay for the hypothetical risk intervention.3 
The average WTP per person divided by the magnitude of risk reduction per person is the 
normalized value of a statistical life (VSL) or population total WTP per expected life saved. The 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has used a VSL of US$6.1 million 
when monetizing the value of reduced mortality risk in its analyses of air pollution programs 
(Alberini et al., 2004a). In Europe, Environment Directorates-General adjusts VSL benefits for 
age, health, and cause of death and uses a central VSL measure of €1 million (Alberini et al., 
2004a). Mortality risk reductions often contribute the main benefits of health and environmental 
initiatives; VSL estimates from less developed countries would be useful for conducting cost 
benefit analyses.  
Table 1 presents results from illustrative hedonic wage, stated preference, and averting 
expenditure studies, with special emphasis on meta analyses, studies conducted in developing 
countries and of parents’ valuations for reducing their children’s mortality risks. If available, I 
report the magnitude and type of risk reduction considered, average or median annual household 
income, as well as a ratio of VSL to annual household income. The VSL to income ratio is useful 
for identifying trends in VSL amongst high and low income countries and for identifying outliers. 
Generally, the highest VSL estimates (both in value and ratio) have been obtained from 
hedonic wage studies. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) provides the most comprehensive review of 
existing work and reported that the median VSL in the United States was (year 2000) US$7 
million based on the most reliable studies. Thus far, very few hedonic wage VSL studies focus on 
                                                 
3Knetsch (2004) points out an important distinction between these methods. The hedonic wage studies 
measure willingness to accept (WTA) increased mortality risk in exchange for higher wages. In contrast, 
the stated preference and averting expenditure methods measure willingness-to-pay (WTP) to reduce 
mortality risk. WTA measures are bound by the maximum wages or minimum risk available; WTP 
estimates are bound by family income. In general, VSL estimates based on hedonic wage studies (i.e., 
WTA measures) tend to be higher than those based on stated preference and averting behavior studies (i.e., 
WTP measures), although exceptions do exist. 
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the developing world, although there were three estimates for India and another for Taiwan. The 
VSL estimates from the United States are significantly higher than those from India, which range 
from US$150,000 to 360,000 in 1991 USD (Simon et al., 1999) to US$3 million in 1990 USD 
(Shanmugam, 2001). Liu, Hammitt and Liu (1997) provided an estimate of US$150,000 to 
360,000 in US$1986 based on a study in Taiwan. The VSL to wage ratio for the Indian studies, 
especially those by Shanmugam, are much higher than most others in Table 1. Both Viscusi and 
Aldy (2003) and Mrozek and Taylor (2002) report income elasticity of VSL estimates in the 
range of 0.45 to 0.6 based on a review of international studies. The estimates from Simon et al. 
and Liu et al. appear to be consistent with such estimates of the income elasticity of VSL (this is 
not true of Shanmugam’s studies4). 
Mount et al. (2001) use a model that examined family composition in the context of 
tradeoffs between car safety and automobile purchase price and maintenance cost to estimate 
families’ WTP to reduce mortality risks for all members, and then to calculate average VSLs by 
age group. They generate roughly equivalent VSL estimates for parents and children of (1997) 
US$2.6 to $7.7 million. Carlin and Sandy (1991) and Blomquist, Miller and Levy (1996) examine 
parents purchases and uses of child car safety seats to examine VSLs for children. Carlin and 
Sandy’s estimate is much lower because they do not attempt to place a monetary value on the 
time and disutility costs to parents when placing children in the car seats.5 Additionally, 
Blomquist et al. provide a comparison between adults and children and report slightly higher VSL 
estimates for children less than 5 years of age compared to other age groups. Jenkins, Owens and 
                                                 
4Shanmugam (2001) extended the work in Shanmugam (2000) by adjusting for individuals’ abilities to 
select their jobs based on the assumption that some may have unobserved attributes that allow them to work 
more efficiently in risky occupations. Using a different econometric procedure, his VSL estimate increased 
about three-fold to US$3.0 million. This approaches the US estimates and demonstrated the sensitivity of 
results to underlying model assumptions.  
 
5Because all states have passed laws requiring child safety restraints (either carriers or booster seats) for 
children 4 years of age or less, I can infer that the public agrees that the societal value of mortality risk 
reductions provided by car seats exceeds their costs. 
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Wiggins (2001) estimate lower bounds for VSL based on aggregate data for bicycle helmet 
purchases, prices, and uses. Their VSL estimates are slightly higher for adults, although it is 
important to note that helmet prices tend to be considerably greater for adults than for children.6 
The VSL-to-annual-income ratios for the averting behavior studies (for a summary of 
averting behavior studies conducted in the United States, refer to Blomquist (2004)) are generally 
lower than the median US hedonic wage estimate from Viscusi and Aldy (2003). However, the 
ratios from studies that attempt to account for the disutility of using safety equipment and make 
adjustments for perceived versus actual risk (e.g., Blomquist et al., 1996; Mount et al., 2001) tend 
to be higher and approach estimates from hedonic wage literature. Although definitive 
conclusions cannot be drawn from these few studies, it appears that VSL estimates for children 
are quite similar in magnitude to those for adults. 
 Relative to the hedonic wage and averting behavior studies discussed above, the stated 
preference VSL estimates tend to exhibit more variation and depend on the magnitude of risk 
reduction presented in the hypothetic scenario. The North American and European scenarios from 
Alberini et al. (2004a) and Alberini, Hunt, and Markandya (2004b) present a “general purpose” 
scenario in which the hypothetical product reduce risk of death from all causes. The US VSL 
estimates from (Alberini et al., 2004a) are lower than those reported for other methods as 
summarized in reviews by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Blomquist (2004) above.  
In contrast to the “general purpose” studies, with the exception of Mahmud (2009), the 
studies from less developed countries are based on hypothetical products/interventions that would 
reduce risk from one specific cause of death. While the use of specific interventions (e.g., air 
pollution, SARS, etc.) present a more realistic contingent valuation scenario, the baseline 
mortality risk from one cause necessarily become much smaller relative to risk from all causes. It 
                                                 
6The range of prices for youth helmets is US$9 to $40 compared to US$25-135 for adults. Because of the 
large difference in price for the two age groups, it is hard to estimate accurately the difference in WTP for 
mortality risk reduction for children in comparison to adults. These estimates are also very sensitive to 
assumptions regarding the useful life of a helmet, the amount of protection provided by helmets, and the 
allocation of the helmet’s value between injury prevention and death prevention. 
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is more difficult to communicate a small change in risk compared to the larger general risk 
scenarios. In addition, the use of specific causes of death might influence results if those causes 
are dreaded, like cancer, or somewhat avoidable, like traffic accidents (Subramanian and Cropper, 
2000). Thus, there is a tradeoff between providing a more realistic CV scenario and an easier to 
understand change in mortality risk when choosing between general and specific intervention 
scenarios. 
Bhattacharya, et al. (2007) estimate VSL for commuters in Delhi, India to reduce their 
risk of death from road traffic accidents. As might be expected, they find that people who 
commute to work have the highest WTP for improved safety and estimated VSL at about 
PPP$150,000 (US$30,000). The ratio of VSL to average household income (US$3,000) in Delhi 
is low relative to most of the other studies, but within the general range. The study by Mahmud 
(2009) is the only known stated preference study for mortality risk reductions from Bangladesh 
and is the only study from a rural area. It is based on a CV scenario for which the hypothetical 
intervention (a series of vaccinations) reduces a respondent’s baseline risk of death from all 
causes by either 25% or 50%. This is a much larger change in baseline risk than for any of the 
other studies. In addition, the scenario required an up-front payment for five years of protection, 
while other studies used an annual payment mechanism. The use of the large change in baseline 
risk in addition to the 5-year up-front payment requirements are probably major factors in the 
very small VSL estimates from that study, US$1,300 to 2,500 in US$2003. The VSL-to-annual-
income ratio of 1 to 2 is by far the smallest ratio observed from any of the studies reported in 
Table 3.2. 
 Table 3.2. Summary of relevant literature for VSL hedonic wage and stated preference studies 
Researcher Location, date, and data source 
 
Average risk      
(10-5) 
Average annual  
wage (US$) 
VSL estimate 
 (US$) 
VSL to annual 
wage ratio ($/$) 
Hedonic Wage Studies      
Viscusi and Aldy 2003 US subsample, 2000a 0.1 – 2 30,000 7 million 230 
Summary of studiesa     
Liu et al. 1997 Taiwan, 1982-1986 2.25 - 3.82 4,100 - 5,100 135,000 - 600,000 33 - 130 
 Taiwan Labor Force Survey     
Simon et al. 1999 India, 1985-1991 1.5 1,150 150,000 - 360,000 130 - 310 
 Occupational Wage Survey and 
Annual Survey of Industry 
    
Shanmugam 2000 Madras, India, 1987-1990 1.0 600 0.75 - 1 million 1,250 - 1,700 
 Survey of blue-collar workers     
Shanmugam 2001 Madras, India ,1987-1990 1.0 600 3 million 5,000 
 Survey of blue-collar workers     
Averting Behavior Studies      
Blomquist 2004 US subsample, 2000 Not reported 30,000 c 1.7 - 7 million 60 - 240 
 Summary of studies b     
Mount et al. 2001 US hedonic study of 1997 vehicle  7 - 50d 34,000 3.4 - 6.4 million 100 - 190 
 fatality rates and costs (adults)     
Mount et al. 2001 US hedonic study of 1997 vehicle  7 - 50d 34,000 2.6 - 7.7 million 75 - 230 
 fatality rates and costs (children)     
Blomquist et al. 1996 Adult car seat belt use  5 22,000 1.7 - 2.8 million 75 - 130 
 with time and disutility costs, 1983     
Blomquist et al. 1996 Child seat use (under 5 years of age)  10 22,000 2.3 - 3.7 million 100 - 160 
45
 
 Researcher Location, date, and data source 
 
Average risk      
(10-5) 
Average annual  
wage (US$) 
VSL estimate 
 (US$) 
VSL to annual 
wage ratio ($/$) 
 with time and disutility costs, 1983     
Carlin and Sandy 1991 US, 1985 IN survey of child car 10 23,000 c 430,000 - 550,000 19 - 24 
 seat use; crash safety data in WA     
Jenkins et al. 2001 US, 1997, aggregate bicycle helmet  0.55 37,000 c 2.0 - 4.0 million 54 - 108 
 price, use, and protection (adult)  (lower bound)   
Jenkins et al. 2001 US, 1997, aggregate bicycle helmet  0.4-0.6 37,000 c 1.1 - 2.7 million 30 - 70 
 price, use, and protection (children)  (lower bound)   
Stated Preference Studies      
      
Alberini et al. 2004a Canada, 1999 and US, 2000 1 47,000 - 53,000 0.9 - 1.5 million 19 - 28 
 General 5 47,000 - 53,000 3.7 - 4.8 million 79 - 90 
Alberini et al. 2004b UK, Italy, France, 2002 1 41,000 2.5 million 60 
 General 5 41,000 1.1 million 28 
Vassanadumrongdee and  Bangkok, 2003 0.3 9,000 1.4 - 1.5 million 150 - 170 
Matsuoka 2005 Traffic accidents and air pollution 0.6 9,000 0.9 million 100 
Bhattacharya, Alberini, and  Delhi, 2005  4 – 30 3,000 30,000 10 
Cropper 2007 Traffic accidents     
Hammitt and Liu 2004 Taiwan, 2001 0.2 - 0.8e 14,000 0.5 - 2.2 millione 36 - 160 
 Lung and liver cancer/ non-cancer     
Liu et al. 2005 Taiwan and Taipei, 2003 0.18 13,000 - 21,000 4.7 - 11 million 220 - 850 
 SARS 0.6 13,000 - 21,000 2.8 - 6 million 130 - 460 
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 Researcher Location, date, and data source 
 
Average risk      
(10-5) 
Average annual  
wage (US$) 
VSL estimate 
 (US$) 
VSL to annual 
wage ratio ($/$) 
 
Mahmud 2009 
Bangladesh, 2003 7.5 - 45f 1,200 2,300 2 
 General 15 - 90f 1,200 1,300 1 
      
a Viscusi and Aldy compile a number of studies. The risk reduction, average wage and VSL are ranges shown after conversion to 2000 US$. 
b Blomquist compiles a number of studies. The risk reduction, average wage and VSL are ranges shown after conversion to 2000 US$ 
c Average household income is not reported in the study. The income reported in the table is taken from (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2004). 
d Risk of death is calculated based on the sum of risks from 1-car, 2-car, and multi-car crashes. The differences in risk are based on the average risk for 
different categories of vehicles. 
e Estimated VSL is calculated by average VSL for 2 in 100,000 and 8 in 100,000 risk reductions. Separate estimates for each magnitude of risk 
reduction are not available. Only median VSL values are reported 
f The risk reduction used was either 25% or 50% of the baseline risk by age group. Hence, different age groups received different magnitude 
reductions. Estimates based on subjective risk were also made, but I only include estimates for objective risk. 
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Vassanadumrongdee and Matsuoka (2005) provide VSL estimates from Bangkok, 
Thailand and find no statistically significant difference in VSL estimates for reducing risk from 
traffic accidents compared to air pollution-related cancer. In contrast, Hammitt and Liu (2004) 
find a reduction in cancer risk is preferred to a change in risk from accidental death. Liu et al. 
(2005) present very high VSL estimates based on reduction of mortality risk from SARS; 
however, the surveys were performed during an epidemic, which may have resulted in great 
uncertainty regarding the future incidence of disease.  
The ratios of VSL to annual household income tend to be lower for the stated preference 
studies relative to other methods, with the exception of the SARS study. The ratios also appear to 
be sensitive to the magnitude of risk reduction; the use of smaller hypothetical risk reductions 
results in larger VSL estimates within a given study.  The only stated preference study that 
examines parents’ willingness-to-pay to reduce their children’s risk of death is from the United 
States (Dickie and Gerking, 2003; Dickie and Gerking, 2006).7 This dissertation reports the first 
stated preference estimates of parents’ WTP to reduce their child’s risk of death from a less 
developed country.  
 
3.4 Cholera vaccine economic evaluations 
This section examines eight economic evaluations of cholera vaccines, which are 
summarized in Table 3.2.8 The first five evaluations were performed prior to the DOMI project 
                                                 
7Dickie and Gerking (2003) tested parents’ WTP for protective sunscreen that would reduce morbidity and 
mortality risks of skin cancer for themselves and their children in the US. They found that parents were 
willing to pay about twice as much to protect their children than to protect themselves. In addition, they 
found that parents’ stated WTP was about twenty times greater for mortality risk reduction than for non-
fatal skin cancer risk reduction. They could not develop a VSL estimate comparable to those above, 
because of the latent nature of mortality risk from skin cancer, especially for children. The results from this 
study are similar to two studies that examine parents’ WTP to avoid an episode of illness for their children. 
Liu et al. (2000) and Dickie and Messman (2004) both found that parents were willing to pay more for one 
of their children to avoid an episode of illness than for themselves. In both studies, WTP was about twice as 
high for very young children as for their parents; the ratio decreased with age of the children. 
 
8The first five studies were initially identified in Cook (2007). Each of these studies have been 
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and are more simplistic than the DOMI analyses. Of these five, there are two cost effectiveness 
analyses, two cost minimization analyses, and a single cost utility analysis. None of these 
analyses account for herd protection. The last three studies include DOMI study results and are 
considerably more thorough. Each of these studies accounts for herd protection and two out of 
three incorporate private demand considerations. The remainder of this section provides more 
detail regarding each study. 
MacPherson and Tonkin (1992) report the cost-effectiveness of vaccinating North 
Americans traveling to cholera endemic areas based on a 50%-effective whole-cell killed vaccine 
that costs C$28 per fully vaccinated person in (1992 US$). Further, they assume that some 
recipients would have adverse reactions to the vaccine including fever, malaise, and headache. 
Their estimates are based on a 1 in 500,000 risk of contracting cholera for travelers for which 
there would be a 1% case fatality rate. They find that preventing one case in travelers costs C$28 
million, and recommend that travelers not be vaccinated. Given the 1% fatality rate, it would cost 
C$2.8 billion to save one life, which is greater than any of the estimates presented in Section 3.3. 
They suggest that the vaccine might be cost-effective for some travelers to very high risk 
epidemic areas (e.g., a doctor working in an area with an epidemic). This study is not 
representative for residents of the Matlab area.  
Naficy et al. (1998) provide a cost effectiveness analysis of four different strategies for 
controlling cholera based on epidemic simulations in a hypothetical refugee camp in sub-Saharan 
Africa:  (1) pre-emptive treatment set up at inception of the camp; (2) reactive treatment set up 
after an outbreak is identified; (3) pre-emptive vaccination with a whole-cell killed vaccine; (4) 
reactive vaccination; and various combinations of these four strategies. This study makes no 
attempt to monetize the vaccine’s private benefits. They find that the most cost-effective strategy 
(i.e. lowest cost per case avoided or death avoided) is pre-emptive treatment. Adding pre-emptive 
vaccination would become more cost effective than treatment alone if the cost per delivered dose 
                                                                                                                                                 
independently summarized and reviewed for this dissertation. 
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were less than US$0.16 per dose, which is not possible for any existing cholera vaccine. While 
adding vaccination to preemptive treatment costs more per case or death avoided, it also prevents 
more deaths. They report that it would cost $1,700 per additional death avoided, which is quite 
reasonable compared to the VSL estimates in Table 3.1. In general, it may be difficult to compare 
refugee settings with endemic settings because the incidence and mortality rates tend to be much 
greater for refugees. 
Murray et al. (1998) examine the cost-effectiveness of the whole-cell killed vaccine both 
for a hypothetical refugee population with epidemic cholera and a hypothetical community with 
endemic cholera. They compare vaccination to a post-infection treatment strategy and a 
theoretical water and sanitation improvement. Water and sanitation improvement is found to be 
more cost effective than vaccination in both settings. This conclusion is dependent on the 
assumptions they have made. They assume that the cholera vaccine would cost US$6.26 per fully 
vaccinated person, and that the annual cost of water + sanitation + hygiene education would be 
US$17 per capita (both estimates in 1990 dollars). Their estimates also assume that cholera 
incidence is about 0.3% of the total diarrhea incidence in an endemic setting and about 2% in an 
epidemic refugee setting. In addition, they assume that cholera mortality is about 10% of all 
diarrhea mortality in the endemic setting and about 40% in the epidemic setting (both without 
treatment). They find that combining a treatment strategy with water and sanitation improvements 
is the most cost-effective strategy.  
I note that the cost effectiveness of vaccination compared to water and sanitation 
interventions generally depends on the difference between cholera mortality and all-diarrhea 
mortality. If cholera mortality is a large fraction of all diarrhea mortality, cholera vaccination will 
appear to be a better investment. For locations in which cholera mortality is a small fraction of 
diarrhea mortality, it would not make sense to prioritize cholera vaccination before other 
interventions that would reduce all types of diarrheal disease. 
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Using the Matlab area as an example, Sack (2003) compares the cost effectiveness of 
cholera treatment versus vaccination by performing break-even analyses of the cost per cholera 
death avoided using different incidence rates and vaccination costs. Sack estimates that the 
treatment cost per death avoided is about US$350 (based on a 20% case fatality rate without 
treatment versus 0.5% with treatment). He reports that vaccines might be more cost effective than 
the provision of free treatment if per capita vaccine cost were less than US$1 or if annual 
incidence exceeded 1 in 1,000. However, this analysis ignores the disutility and financial costs of 
illness prevented through vaccination. Also, it may not be necessary to choose between 
vaccination and treatment. Instead, one could assess the marginal benefit of adding vaccination 
efforts to existing treatment programs.   
The fifth study evaluates the retroactive use of a live oral vaccine (CVD 103-HgR) during 
the 1992 cholera outbreak in Argentina (Cookson et al., 1997).  Although the study is labeled as a 
cost-benefit analysis, the authors only consider the avoided public costs of treatment in benefit 
calculations. Thus, this analysis is really a cost minimization analysis. The public COI estimates 
of direct medical treatment were very high (US$602 per case) during the Argentina outbreak 
because their public health system was ill-prepared for the outbreak. The authors find that a 75% 
effective, 3-year vaccine that costs US$1.50 per fully vaccinated person would be cost-saving 
from the government’s perspective. These results are of limited applicability to the situation in 
rural Bangladesh because the public COI per case is about 30 times less in Matlab (COI estimates 
are presented in section 4.3). One reason for the discrepancy is the inclusion of “managerial 
costs” for bimonthly helicopter trips used by medical staff to travel to the outbreak area in the 
Argentine public COI estimate. Helicopter flights would not be needed in the Matlab area, where 
local treatment is readily available.  
The sixth study undertakes a cost-benefit analysis of cholera vaccination in Beira, 
Mozambique (Jeuland et al., 2009). This study is based on similar assumptions as the work 
included in this dissertation. Specifically, private willingness-to-pay, incidence, and public cost of 
52 
illness data were collected for Beira and Matlab as part of the DOMI series of studies. Further, 
the authors incorporated herd protection into their analysis by assuming that the pattern of herd 
protection observed for Matlab would be similar to that expected in Beira. The Beira estimates for 
WTP, incidence, and public COI are similar in magnitude to those I found for Matlab (see 
Chapter 6 for Matlab estimates).  
The authors make parametric assumptions regarding WTP for indirect protection to 
perform cost benefit analyses of three types of programs: school-based vaccination of children 
age 5-14 years, expanded school-based vaccination of children age 1-14 years, and mass 
vaccination of all ages greater than 1 year. For each type of program, the authors investigate the 
implementation of 3 user fees: free, US$1, and US$2.2. The authors estimate benefit-cost ratios in 
a range from 0.9 to 4.7, depending on program type, user fee, and whether herd protection was 
incorporated. The programs with the highest benefit-cost ratios target all children age 1-14 years, 
but omit adults. In addition, programs with higher user fees tend to have higher benefit-cost ratio 
because 1) public COI savings tend to be small relative to program costs, 2) WTP per person 
estimates increase as the price charged increases, and 3) monetary estimates of herd protection 
benefits are greater at lower coverage rates. The authors also conduct a sensitivity analysis and 
report that child vaccinations are very unlikely to fail a benefit-cost test even under worst case 
conditions.  
Next, I summarize the findings of a seventh article that I worked on. Our article performs 
a cost benefit analysis of a cholera vaccination program in Kolkata, India and determines an 
optimal user fee (Cook et al., 2009). The data used to conduct this analysis were taken from the 
DOMI studies performed in Kolkata, India. We found that the social benefits of vaccination were 
much greater than the private benefits at low coverage rates (i.e. when the vaccine is sold at high 
prices). Thus, partial subsidies should be used to attain maximum social benefits. We also 
considered a pair of second-best policies in case it was not possible to determine the optimal price 
prior to initiation of the program, namely free provision and full-cost pricing. In the Kolkata case, 
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full-cost pricing would lead to greater net societal benefits than free vaccination. Free provision 
would lead to the vaccination of too many persons. The marginal impact of an additional vaccine 
on community incidence decreased with coverage and would be very small at the high coverage 
rates that would result from free vaccination.  
Finally, the eighth study is a cost utility analysis of four sites that were included in the 
DOMI cholera studies: Matlab, Beira, Mozambique, Kolkata, India, and N. Jakarta, Indonesia. 
The data used for Matlab should be about the same as the input data used in this dissertation. Like 
the Beira cost-benefit analysis, the authors examine three age-based vaccination programs: 
school-based vaccination of 5-14 year old, expanded school-based vaccination of 1-14 year olds, 
and mass vaccination of all ages greater than 1 year. Programs with lower coverage rates (e.g., 
school children only) have lower costs per DALY saved because the marginal herd protection 
effect per vaccine is greatest at low coverage rates. Programs are deemed to be ‘very cost 
effective’ if the cost per DALY is less than annual GDP). If herd protection effects are ignored, 
none of the vaccination programs would be considered ‘very cost effective’. However, when herd 
protection effects are considered, school-age vaccination programs in Matlab, Kolkata, and Beira 
would be considered ‘very cost effective’. Thus, the inclusion or exclusion of herd protection 
effects have a dramatic impact on cost effectiveness. Since the herd protection effect per vaccine 
delivered tends to be greatest at low coverage rates in endemic areas, cost effectiveness 
measurements depend on the number of people vaccinated and who is targeted. For Matlab 
specifically, school-based programs for either 5-14 year olds or 1-14 year olds would be right at 
the ‘very cost effective threshold’, while the cost per DALY saved for universal vaccination 
would be about 50% greater than the threshold. 
 
  
 Table 3.3. Summary of cholera economic evaluation studiesa 
Study Vaccine type Perspective Setting Key assumptions Conclusions 
MacPherson 
and Tomkin 
(1992) 
Whole-cell killed, 
50% effective 
Cost 
effectiveness 
(per case and per 
death) 
North 
American 
travelers 
Incidence 1/500K, CFR 1%, 
Vaccine Cost C$28 
C$28 million per case 
avoided, not recommended 
for travelers unless incidence 
increases to 1/200 
Cookson et al 
(1997) 
Live CVD 103-HgR, 
75% eff for 3 years 
Cost 
minimization 
Argentina Medical costs per case US$602, 
Incidence 2.5/1000, Vaccine cost 
US$1.50 
Vaccination program would 
be cost-saving from public 
sector financial perspective 
Naficy et al 
(1998) 
Whole cell killed; 80% 
eff for first 6 months, 
50% 6mos – 2 years 
Cost-
effectiveness 
(per case and 
death) 
Hypothetical 
refugee camp 
Vaccine cost $1.00; Pr[outbreak]= 
80%; incidence if outbreak = 
37/1000 
Setting up treatment facilities 
at inception of camp most 
cost-effective strategy; could 
be supplemented with 
vaccination if cost <US$0.22 
per dose  
Murray et al 
(1998) 
Whole cell killed; 50% 
eff for children and 
70% eff for adults for 
1 yr 
Cost 
effectiveness 
(per case and 
death) 
Cost utility (per 
DALY) 
Hypothetical 
refugee camp 
and endemic 
areas 
Incidence 8/1000 in outbreak, 0.3 – 
3/1000 in endemic; vaccine cost 
US$6.3 (epidemic) or US$5.2 
(endemic) per immunized person; 
outpatient COI US$4.7 per case; 
hospital COI $47 per case; W&S 
improvements US$12 per person 
per year, reduce cholera    
Combining treatment with 
water and sanitation 
improvements most cost 
effective strategy.  Add 
vaccines only if cost per FIP 
falls below US$0.76 
Sack (2001) Whole cell killed; 75% 
effective for 3 years 
adults, 25% for 3 years 
for children <5 
Cost 
minimization 
Hypothetical 
endemic area 
Incidence 4/1000 - 20/1000; varied 
total vaccine costs between US$0.4 
and US$6.4 
Vaccines cost-effective in 
endemic areas only if cost 
below $0.40 and incidence > 
1 /1000 
Jeuland et al. 
(2009) 
Oral killed whole-
cell vaccine (rBS-
WC) 
Cost benefit Beira, 
Mozambique 
Vaccine cost US$0.80 – 4.00, 
Incidence 1.4 – 18 cases per 1000, 
Public COI US$0-30, Private WTP 
US$0.7-3.20, Vaccine effectiveness 
60% for 3 years, Herd protection is 
similar to that observed in Matlab 
Vaccination program is 
likely to pass benefit-cost if 
children are targeted or if 
user fees are charged 
because WTP is higher for 
child vaccinations and herd 
protection reduces risk for 
unvaccinated. 
Cook et al. 
(2009) 
Oral killed whole-
cell vaccine (rBS-
WC) 
Cost benefit Kolkata, India Vaccine cost US$2.40, Vaccine 
effectiveness 50% for 3 years, 
Incidence 1.6 cases per 1000, 
Vaccination program is 
likely to pass benefit-cost. 
Net societal benefits are 
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 Public COI US$15, Private WTP 
US$2.30, Herd protection is similar 
to that observed in Matlab 
 
maximized at price less than 
average cost. 
Jeuland et al. 
(2009) 
Oral killed whole-
cell vaccine (rBS-
WC) 
Cost utility Matlab, 
Bangladesh; 
Kolkata, India; 
N. Jakarta, 
Indonesia; 
Beira, 
Mozambique 
Vaccine cost US$2.20-3.20, 
Incidence 0.9 – 8.8 cases per 1000, 
Public COI US$17-34, Vaccine 
effectiveness 60% for 3 years, Case 
fatality rate 1%; Herd protection is 
similar to that observed in Matlab 
When herd protection is 
considered, vaccination is 
‘very cost effective’ for 
school-based programs in 
Matlab, Beira, and Kolkata. 
When herd protection is 
ignored or when adults are 
included in the vaccination 
program, it is unlikely that 
programs would be ‘very 
cost effective.’ 
a The layout of this table, as well as some of the data, is taken from (Cook, 2007) 
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In summary, while a number of studies have attempted to examine the economic 
attractiveness of cholera vaccines, many are limited relative to the analyses included in this 
dissertation. Of the non-DOMI studies, none considered any private benefits, much less the 
private demand for cholera vaccines or the herd protection impacts. It is very unlikely that any of 
these studies would have had access to detailed private demand or herd protection data. The 
DOMI studies tend to be much more similar to the work included in this dissertation. I have been 
involved at various levels on these studies; however, I expand upon these previous works.9 
 
3.5 Cholera epidemiology and impact of herd protection 
The first four sections of this chapter focus on the economics of vaccination policy. This 
section focuses on the epidemiology of cholera vaccination. Many vaccination programs provide 
indirect protection from disease as well as direct protection. Indirect protection effects are 
generally categorized as either herd protection or herd immunity effects. Herd immunity involves 
the transfer of live immunologic agents from vaccine recipients to non-recipients. Herd immunity 
only results from the use of vaccines that incorporate live bacteria or viruses. Herd protection 
indirectly reduces exposure to disease by reducing the number of susceptible persons that could 
otherwise spread disease if they were not vaccinated. Since the vaccine used in the Matlab trial 
                                                 
9Compared to the Kolkata cost-benefit model that uses a single estimate for incidence and a single price 
function for demand, this dissertation uses models that consider four different sub-populations with 
separate incidences and demand functions. In addition, the Kolkata cost-benefit model uses a different 
methodology for calculating indirect vaccination benefits, which incorporates an adjusted VSL estimates 
and expected case fatality rates. Because this approach uses different accounting methods for direct and 
indirect benefits, the total benefit calculation depends on how benefits are calculated, not just how many 
people are vaccinated. 
There are also a number of differences between the Beira cost benefit study and this dissertation. The Beira 
cost benefit study omits any consideration of cost utility metrics, while this dissertation compares outcomes 
from cost utility and cost benefit analyses. Second, the Beira cost benefit analysis does not consider the 
herd protection benefits that would result from the reduced risk experienced by vaccinated persons, (i.e. 
herd protection benefits only accrue to unvaccinated persons). Third, this study does not solve for optimal 
prices. Rather, prices are assumed. 
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was a whole cell killed vaccine, there was no herd immunity effect; there was only a herd 
protection effect.10   
At this point, it is useful to define some basic epidemiological concepts. Epidemiologists 
have historically been interested in determining the “critical threshold” vaccine coverage rates 
that “break the chain of transmission”. The critical threshold (Xc) is based on the relationship (1 - 
1/R) where R
 
is the infectivity or reproductive rate of infection (i.e. the expected number of 
additional cases per infected individual). Illnesses with larger values of R require higher coverage 
rates to achieve the critical threshold. The initial reproductive rate, Ro, is a function of the biology 
of the disease (i.e. the ease of transmission from infected to susceptible individuals), the 
population density, average age at which infection occurs, and other socio-behavioral factors of 
transmission. After the initiation of an outbreak, the reproductive rate, R, declines from R0 as 
individuals recover from disease and acquire temporary immunity (Fine, 1993). The reproductive 
rate can also be reduced by initiating a vaccination program. This reduces the number of 
susceptible persons by conferring partial or full immunity to some fraction of the population. The 
reduction in reproductive rate decreases disease prevalence in the community. The decrease in 
prevalence reduces disease exposure: both direct contacts with infected individuals and contacts 
with disease vectors that propagate from infected individuals.  
Experimental epidemiology studies on rats in the 1930s first demonstrated the effects of 
herd immunity and protection for limiting or eradicating disease. Most efforts by epidemiologists 
have focused on highly-communicable diseases, which can have drastic impacts in short periods 
of time (e.g., smallpox and polio).  According to Fine’s (1993) review of the literature, there have 
been studies on critical thresholds for vaccination programs against smallpox, measles (the most 
studied disease of the group), rubella, mumps, diphtheria, tetanus, poliomyelitis, influenza, 
malaria and tuberculosis.  
                                                 
10This section draws from Anderson, 1990, Anderson and May, 1985, Gordis, 2000, and Fine, 1993. 
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A recent natural experiment offered an opportunity to examine the herd protection 
impacts of a school-based mandatory influenza vaccination program. The authors examine 
influenza mortality in elderly adults before and after the program (Reichert et al., 2001). They 
report that one excess influenza death of an elderly adult was averted for every 400 vaccinations 
of school children. Another study reports a 42% reduction in respiratory illnesses in the members 
of households with a flu-vaccinated child compared to households in which none of the children 
were vaccinated (Hurwitz et al., 2000). There is also evidence that intra-household herd 
protection would reduce incidence in non-vaccinated family members (Patel et al., 2005; Longini 
Jr. et al., 2007). Intra-family herd protection is especially important for diseases that are primarily 
spread via direct personal contact (such as influenza and varicella).  
The basic model used to represent the epidemiology of disease spread is shown in Figure 
3.1. In this model, there are five basic categories to represent the population. These categories are 
summarized as susceptible (S), infected (I), recovered (R), exposed (E), and passively immune 
(M). The susceptible population may or may not become infected after exposure. The infected 
population may either recover from disease or die. The recovered group will become immune for 
at least a short time. Depending on the disease, the recovered individuals either achieve lifetime 
immunity or become susceptible again. When children are born, they may receive passive 
immunity from their mothers, although they become susceptible again in time (Hethcote, 2000).  
 
Figure 3.1. The general transfer diagram for the MSEIR model with the passively immune class M, 
the susceptible class S, the exposed class E, the infective class I, and the recovered class R (taken 
from Hethcote, 2000) 
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Any herd protection model must accurately capture the epidemiological factors 
associated with the spread and severity of disease as well as the effectiveness and duration of 
vaccine protection. For diseases like hepatitis A and varicella, infected individuals experience 
lifetime immunity after recovering from the illness. Recovered individuals should not be 
vaccinated because they already have immunity. These diseases are also unique in that disease 
symptoms are considerably more severe if the disease is contracted later in life. The varicella 
vaccine could actually increase varicella mortality because it does not confer lifetime immunity. 
As a result, adult mortality could increase after the vaccine is introduced. As varicella vaccine 
effectiveness wanes later in life, more adults would be susceptible because fewer adults would 
have developed lifetime immunity as children (Brisson and Edmunds, 2002; Brisson and 
Edmunds, 2003). 
Next, I explore some of these considerations as they relate to cholera. The Vibrio 
cholerae species requires a specific tropical environment to survive endemically outside human 
hosts.11 The global cholera incidence is mostly confined to a small number of locations where 
cholera is endemic. The bacteria are often present in the environment on a year round basis, 
although most cases occur during periodical outbreaks that emerge at specific times of the year. 
In areas where cholera is present, most individuals will have acquired some degree of immunity 
to infection. However, recovered cholera patients cannot acquire lifetime immunity to the disease 
(Longini et al., 2007), possibly because of changes in the dominant phenotype. Because the 
bacteria can survive outside human hosts, it would not be possible to eradicate cholera in a 
manner similar to smallpox. Although cholera can be spread via direct contact with infected 
individuals (Hartley et al., 2006), cholera is primarily acquired from ingesting contaminated food 
and water. During the seasonal outbreaks in Bangladesh, the bacteria are amplified by humans’ 
who excrete high concentrations of the bacteria near local ponds (Huq et al., 2005).  
                                                 
11Vibrio cholerae can also be transported to non-endemic areas by infected persons or contaminated food 
sources, but the bacteria will not survive indefinitely outside human hosts. 
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Beginning in 2005, a group of epidemiologists and geographers re-examined the cholera 
vaccine efficacy data from the 1985 trial (Ali et al., 2005; Emch et al., 2006; Ali et al., 2008; 
Longini Jr. et al., 2007). They found strong evidence of herd protection effects, which were 
ignored in the original efficacy calculations. Indirect protection was modeled based on coverage 
rates in the areas surrounding individual neighborhood clusters of about 5-15 households, locally 
referred to as baris. Coverage rates and incidences are averaged across overlapping circles of area 
with 0.5 km or 2 km radii centered on each bari. The incidence for unvaccinated persons was 
inversely correlated with coverage rates across these overlapping circles. Children less than 2 
years of age were excluded from the trial, but also experienced herd protection. This is important 
because young children typically experience higher incidence rates compared to other age groups. 
For young children, herd protection effects are significantly correlated with the coverage of adult 
women, but not with the coverage of other children. The authors do not report if the coverage of 
women is also disproportionately important for other age groups (Ali et al., 2008).  
Since cholera vaccines are less than 100% effective, both vaccinated and unvaccinated 
persons benefit from herd protection. Indirect protection for both vaccinated and unvaccinated 
persons depends on vaccine coverage rates. As the vaccine coverage rate increases, the number of 
susceptible persons in the community decreases, retarding disease spread. As a result, exposure to 
infected persons and their associated disease vectors decreases and incidence rates decline for the 
vaccinated and unvaccinated subpopulations. 
Longini et al. (2007) expanded the analysis by Ali et al. (2005; 2008) to estimate 
empirically the relationship between coverage and vaccine protection in Matlab. The results from 
their analysis are summarized in 5 data points from 10-90% coverage. I fit an exponential 
function to these data points for the vaccinated and unvaccinated subgroups, as shown in Figure 
3.2. The expected percentage reduction in incidence for vaccinated and unvaccinated persons is 
plotted relative to a baseline in which nobody is vaccinated. I note that the authors extrapolate 
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herd protection effects for adult males who were excluded from the trial. They do not report if 
adult males are treated differently than females in the epidemiological model.  
According to Longini’s model, the total effectiveness of vaccination is the total impact of 
the indirect protection resulting from herd protection and direct protection of vaccinated 
individuals. Unvaccinated persons only experience indirect protection, while vaccinated persons 
benefit from both indirect and direct protection. The direct protection for vaccinated persons 
reduces incidence by 65% relative to the unvaccinated group at any coverage rate. The indirect 
protection varies with the coverage rate, and is demonstrated by the increase in protection for 
unvaccinated persons. Indirect protection for unvaccinated persons increases quickly from zero 
when nobody is vaccinated to 30% protection at 10% coverage to 90% protection at 50% 
coverage. The total protection for vaccinated persons is the product of indirect protection and 
direct protection (i.e. 65%). The difference in the magnitude of risk reduction for vaccinated 
versus unvaccinated persons becomes smaller and smaller as coverage increases and the 
incidence in unvaccinated persons decreases. These vertical lines labeled MPrB10, MPrB30, and 
MPrB50 in Figure 3.2 demonstrate the magnitude of differences in incidences between vaccinated 
and unvaccinated subgroups at 10%, 30%, and 50% coverage rates respectively. The magnitude 
of the change in incidence, MPrB, is correlated with the private value of vaccination to the last 
person vaccinated (i.e. the marginal private benefit of vaccination).  
Similarly, I assume that the marginal change in indirect protection benefits is represented 
by MPuB in Figure 3.2. Thus, the marginal value of indirect protection is correlated with the 
slopes of the incidence curves. As coverage increases, the marginal value of indirect protection 
per vaccine decreases from MPuB10 to MPuB30 to MPuB50. Indirect protection benefits accrue to 
the entire community, while the private benefit of direct protection only accrues to vaccine 
purchasers.  
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Figure 3.2. Direct and indirect protection as a function of coverage (extrapolated from Longini et al. 
2007) 
Longini et al. (2007) also report the expected number of cases avoided per 1,000 vaccines 
delivered, which is shown in 3.3.12 The number of cases avoided per 1,000 vaccines decreases as 
a function of coverage from 40 cases avoided per 1,000 vaccines at 10% coverage to 13 cases per 
1,000 vaccines at 90% coverage. If the cost per vaccine delivered is assumed to be constant, the 
cost per case avoided would be an increasing function of coverage.  
                                                 
12This figure is based on cholera epidemiology observed in 1985. Cholera incidence estimates are currently 
much lower, which may result in different epidemiology. 
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Figure 3.3. Cases avoided per 1,000 vaccines 
 Emch et al. (2009) examined the relationship between herd protection and coverage at 
smaller scales. Specifically, they examined relationships across environmentally connected baris, 
i.e. baris connected by common water bodies. Thus, unvaccinated persons that are 
environmentally connected to neighbors with high coverage rates are much less likely to contract 
cholera than unvaccinated persons connected to neighbors with low coverage rates. The authors 
report that their revised methodology is more precise than their earlier efforts reported in Ali et al. 
(2005). This suggests that discrete localized coverage rates are more important for calculating 
herd protection effects than an overall population average. In the extreme case, more cases would 
be avoided if 50% of each bari is vaccinated than if half of the baris achieved 100% coverage and 
the other half achieved zero coverage. 
 
3.6 Economic epidemiology research 
In the previous sections, I separately examine the economics and epidemiology of cholera 
vaccination. In this section, I first review how herd protection has been applied to cost utility 
analysis. Next, I review how epidemiologists would optimize vaccination programs without 
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consideration for private demand. Finally, I summarize how other researchers have attempted to 
integrate economics and epidemiology into a more comprehensive analysis of health 
interventions.  
Many cost utility analyses have omitted herd immunity effects (Beutels et al., 2002; 
Beutels et al., 2007; Cook et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2009). Other analyses incorporate herd 
protection data from other sites for a pre-specified coverage rate, often between 70% and 90% for 
a targeted group (Welte et al., 2004; Armstrong et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2007; Lloyd et al., 2007).13 
A majority of vaccination analyses are undertaken for infant vaccination programs. In these cases, 
population coverage rates increase over time as successive cohorts of infants participate. Herd 
protection effects are then estimated as population coverage rates gradually increase with time 
from the initiation of the vaccination program. Vaccination benefits are aggregated based on 
incidence reductions for both vaccine recipients and for non-recipients. Notably, it is almost 
always assumed that more than 70% of eligible infants would be vaccinated under the newly 
implemented vaccination program. The accounting for herd protection effects can reduce the cost 
per DALY saved considerably, especially when incidence is indirectly reduced for elderly age 
groups who are most at risk from disease mortality (Lee et al., 2007; Lloyd et al., 2007).  
While cost utility analysis is useful to prioritize projects and to identify low-value 
projects, it typically assumes that coverage rates are predetermined. When accounting for herd 
protection, it is useful to examine how coverage rates would affect cost utility metrics. Thus, this 
dissertation focuses on more flexible applications of cost utility analysis that may be used in 
comparison with cost benefit analysis.  
Epidemiologists have examined how to optimally distribute a limited number of vaccines 
throughout a community. Epidemiological optimization models often assume that the initial 
supply of vaccines is limited, and that everyone would want to receive a vaccine if available. The 
                                                 
13Both the Jeuland et al. and Cook et al. analyses examine three scenarios in which different groups receive 
vaccinations: 1) young children less than 5 years of age, 2) all children less than 14 years of age, and 3) 
universal vaccination of all age groups. 
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optimal allocation depends on the epidemiology of the disease; there is no single approach that 
would apply to all vaccines (i.e. optimal influenza vaccination policy is likely to differ from 
optimal cholera vaccination policy). In one of the first epidemiology-based optimization analyses, 
Longini et al. (1978) examine how to allocate influenza vaccines during an epidemic. More recent 
examinations have considered the optimal distribution of vaccines in the aftermath of a bio-terror 
attack (Becker and Starczak, 1997; Longini Jr. et al., 2004) or if vaccine supply is insufficient due 
to production issues (Patel et al., 2005). In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, Longini et al. (2004) 
find that it is important to target the vaccine to people that have already come into direct contact 
with infected individuals (or are likely to have direct contact). If influenza vaccine supply is 
limited by production problems, Patel et al. (2005) find that it is optimal to prioritize school 
children before other age groups because the influenza reproductive rate for school children tends 
to be much greater than for other age groups. Even though elderly adults are more susceptible to 
influenza mortality, the prioritization of school children has a greater impact on elderly mortality 
rates because influenza vaccines are considerably less than 100% effective. Another study 
examines the optimal distribution of vaccines for an illness that is primarily spread through intra-
household contacts (rather than inter-household contacts) (Becker and Starczak, 1997). They 
conclude that the optimal distribution should leave the same number of susceptible individuals in 
every household, regardless of household size (i.e. coverage rates should be greater in households 
with more members). 
Finally, I examine published articles that merge private demand considerations with 
epidemiological modeling. The joint application of economics and epidemiology theory to public 
health problems is commonly referred to as epidemiological economics. This is a relatively new 
discipline; most of the seminal articles were written in the 1990s (e.g., Geoffard and Philipson, 
1996; Philipson, 1996; Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003). The DOMI economic studies of cholera 
vaccination that were presented in Section 3.4 would also qualify as epidemiological economics. 
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The inclusion of herd protection effects into economic models of vaccination programs 
has been examined by a number of authors (e.g., (Brito et al., 1991; Francis, 1997; Francis, 2004; 
Boulier et al., 2007). Brito et al. (1991) examine the optimal tax or subsidy required to achieve 
the socially optimal vaccine coverage rate. They assume that 1) vaccines are 100% effective, 2) 
benefits are homogenous across the community, and 3) that costs vary across the community. 
They also prove that compulsory vaccination is always non-optimal compared to a tax/subsidy 
scheme. Francis (1997; 2004) expands upon this work by incorporating a common mathematical 
model of epidemic disease spread, the susceptible-infected-recovered model (see the box model 
in Figure 3.1). This dynamic model is applicable to epidemic disease spread, for which 
prevalence increases until the number of susceptible individuals is offset by the number of 
recovered (i.e. immune) individuals. At this point, prevalence begins to decline back to zero. 
Unlike Brito, Francis assumes that both vaccine costs and benefits are homogenous across the 
community. Francis solves for a threshold prevalence such that 1) when prevalence is below the 
threshold, no one is vaccinated and 2) when prevalence is above the threshold, everyone is 
vaccinated. Francis also examines a static equilibrium for which an optimal price is derived. 
Boulier et al. (2007) also employ the SIR model, but focus on how SIR parameters affect the 
optimal coverage rates. They also assume homogenous vaccine benefits and costs in the 
community. The optimal coverage rate depends primarily on the infectiousness of disease. 
While Francis and Boulier et al. clarify how common epidemiological parameters affect 
optimal vaccination coverage for different diseases, their methodology does not show how to 
incorporate heterogeneous demand data into the model. My model is one of the first to include 
empirical vaccine demand data into a herd protection policy model (i.e. heterogeneous benefits). 
Since I assume that benefits are heterogeneous, only those with the greatest WTP choose to 
purchase vaccines as prices increase.  
Other authors have examined how demand for preventative health products changes 
relative to changes in disease prevalence. This relationship is defined as prevalence elasticity or 
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incidence elasticity (Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003). Prevalence elasticity is typically measured 
based on survey panel data in conjunction with disease prevalence data. The survey data are used 
to estimate private usage of vaccines or other preventative products. The health data includes 
disease incidence or disease mortality rates. Researchers have examined the cross-sectional and 
longitudinal usage of condoms in response to changes in AIDS prevalence by county in the 
United States. They find that even small changes in risk can increase condom use substantially 
and suggest that epidemiologists should account for behavioral changes in their models of disease 
spread (Ahituv et al., 1996). Geoffard and Philipson (1996) use a mathematical epidemiology 
model in connection with behavioral response assumptions to identify a threshold prevalence for 
HIV; people would engage in permissive behavior below this threshold prevalence and protective 
behavior above this threshold. This threshold prevalence increases with the cost of protection and 
the discount rate, and decreases with the cost of infection and the probability of transmission 
upon exposure.  
Philipson (1996) examines how long parents would wait to vaccinate their children with a 
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine as a function of measles prevalence.14 Around 1989-1990 a 
large measles outbreak occurred in the United States, the extent of which varied from state to 
state. At the time different states had promoted different levels of subsidies and other efforts to 
encourage early vaccination. Philipson reports that the public efforts to promote vaccination had 
very little effect on the age of uptake, while local prevalence of measles had an extremely large 
effect. The AIDS and measles studies suggest that subsidies and other public health efforts are 
limited in their ability to affect private behavior, at least in the United States context. There needs 
to be a strong private incentive to pursue preventative activities. A lack of private incentives to 
pursue vaccination in low-prevalence communities has often been cited as a limiting factor in 
                                                 
14MMR is required for students entering formal education. Thus, all children would eventually be 
vaccinated. 
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disease eradication efforts (Geoffard and Philipson, 1996; Geoffard and Philipson, 1997). With 
low prevalence, there is almost zero private benefit to vaccination.  
The measles and HIV examples from the United States are likely not very useful for 
guiding cholera vaccination policy in Matlab. HIV has no cure and is spread primarily through 
voluntary sexual interactions or intravenous drug needle sharing. Thus, protective activities 
require endogenous changes in the frequency and/or intensity15 of pleasurable activities rather 
than simply pursuing a vaccination. In the American measles example, vaccination is mandated 
for public schooling and the disease incidence is already very low. There is no mandate for 
cholera vaccination in Matlab, and prevalence is significantly greater. In addition, the measles 
vaccine provides long term protection at a much higher efficacy than the currently available 
cholera vaccine. 
Other studies examine influenza and pneumococcal cross-sectional and longitudinal 
vaccine demand in response to changes in disease mortality in the United States (Li et al., 2004) 
and Japan (Ohkusa, 2001). In the United States, vaccine demand is correlated with mortality in 
the previous year, but cross-sectional correlation to demand was less significant. For Japan, 
Ohkusa (2005) develops a cost-benefit analysis after researching the price elasticity based on 
recipient co-pays and the probability that the elderly would be vaccinated in 12 large Japanese 
cities. Ohkusa finds that an US$8 reduction in the vaccination co-pay would increase vaccination 
rates enough to prevent approximately 400 deaths per year in the average large city. Influenza 
vaccine studies are a better analog for cholera vaccination because influenza vaccination is not 
mandated and because those vaccines confer limited protection (40-80% depending on age of 
recipient) and duration (about one year) (Coleman et al., 2006).  
Finally, I summarize a typhoid vaccination cross-subsidy article to which I contributed 
(Lauria et al., 2009). This article examines how to maximize the number of cases avoided by 
                                                 
15It is assumed that condom use may be seen as decreasing the utility of sexual interactions by some 
individuals. 
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setting adult and child vaccine prices. It is assumed that adult and child prices are the only choice 
variables, and that the program must be cost neutral from the vaccine provider’s prospective. In 
addition to the revenues collected from user fees, it is assumed that the vaccine provider could 
offset costs with some percentage of expected savings in future public treatment costs. We use 
average data from a number studies conducted in Asia and find that child incidence is typically 
greater than adult incidence and that household private demand for child vaccinations is greater 
than adult vaccinations. We examine both deterministic and stochastic models. The results from 
the deterministic model suggest that it is optimal to provide free vaccines for children and to 
offset revenue shortfalls by charging higher prices for adults. However, the increase in cases 
avoided from the cross-subsidy approach is relatively modest compared to the outcome from a 
program in which adult and child vaccinations cost the same amount. The results from the 
stochastic model are less clear cut and suggest that policy makers are likely to be better off 
charging both adults and children the full cost of vaccination because the greater incidences 
typically experienced by children are offset by the reduced vaccination demand for adults.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
4 Research Design and Data Collection 
In this chapter, I summarize data collection methods including the research designs for 
two stated preference scenarios that were included in a survey to support this dissertation. A 
number of studies have been conducted in Matlab, Bangladesh over the last 20 years. The 
ICDDR,B hospital has been collecting data regarding the number and types of cholera cases each 
year since the 1960s. Recent studies have estimated cholera incidence (Deen et al., 2008) and the 
public and private costs per cholera case (Poulos et al., 2008). The chapter also contains a 
detailed description of the two contingent valuation scenarios conducted in support of this 
dissertation: 1) household willingness-to-pay for cholera vaccines and 2) willingness-to-pay to 
reduce mortality risk for children. The economic and statistical models used to evaluate these 
scenarios are summarized in Chapter 5.   
 
4.1 Historical cholera incidence data 
Accurate estimates of disease incidence are rare, but the ICDDR,B has conducted 
ongoing surveillance of the area since 1966 (Longini Jr. et al., 2002). This surveillance is based 
on the number of patients treated at the ICDDR,B hospital, but does not include cases treated at 
other clinics or hospitals. All patients that presented at the clinic with cholera symptoms provided 
stool samples that identified the serogroup, biotype, and serotype. The number of cases treated at 
the hospital from 1963 to 1998 is shown in Figure 4.7 (originally created by Longini et al. 2000). 
The number of cases is highly variable from year to year, with an approximate range of 100 to 
1,200 cases. The dominant serogroup shifted back and forth between the classical and El Tor 
serogroups until the classical group disappeared around 1993. At the same time, the 0139 
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serogroup first appeared. Longini et al. performed autocorrelation analysis, which showed that 
both Inaba and Ogawa outbreaks were followed 12 months later by outbreaks of the same 
serotype. Ogawa outbreaks were also followed by additional Ogawa outbreaks only 6 months 
later. Thus, population-level immunity for Inaba may be longer lasting than for Ogawa infection 
(Longini et al., 2002).  
The ICDDR,B surveillance area is large, and includes more than 220,000 people. The 
people living in the most distant sectors of the surveillance area would have to devote up to 5 
hours to travel to the ICDDR,B hospital via traditional methods. Since the ICDDR,B hospital is 
very well regarded and provides free treatment, it is expected that most residents of the service 
would choose to pursue treatment there. However, some of the cholera patients from distant 
northern villages may seek treatment from closer clinics or hospitals. It would take at least 4 
hours for these residents to reach the ICDDR,B hospital via traditional transportation methods 
(rickshaw and country boat). In addition, these residents have easier access to the main road to 
Dhaka (Emch 2009).  
Using data from ICDDR,B’s hospital surveillance records, the annual incidence of 
cholera ranges from 1 to 5 cases per 1,000 persons. Sack (2003) reported that if the annual 
ICDDR,B hospital incidence were about 1 to 5 cases per 1,000 persons, the actual incidence 
could be about 4 to 20 cases per 1,000 persons in the surveillance area. A recent analysis of 
cholera and dysentery treatment at the hospital demonstrated that incidence in 1994 decreased 
sharply for villages located more than 10 km from the hospital. Annual cholera incidence was 
about 3 to 6 cases per 1,000 persons for villages within 8 km of the hospital compared to less than 
1 case per 1,000 persons for villages located more than 10 km from the hospital (Ali et al., 2006). 
Thus, cholera incidence may be underestimated for areas located far from the ICDDR,B hospital.
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Figure 4.1. Yearly reported number of cholera cases, by Vibrio cholerae biotype and serotype, for the 
period 1966–1998, in Matlab, Bangladesh. Arrows indicate the periods of various dominant 
serogroups and biotypes. B, Bengal; C, classical; E, El Tor. taken from Longini Jr. et al (2002). 
 
I obtained hospital surveillance records of cholera patients treated at the ICDDR,B 
hospital over the period from 1985-2007. Table 5.1 summarizes incidence by village over four 
overlapping time periods: the latest 3 years (2005-2007), the latest 5 years (2003-2007), the latest 
10 years (1998-2007), and the full 23 years (1985-2007). There is large variation in both village 
size and the annual incidence of cases treated at the ICDDR,B hospital. The range in village size 
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is 55 to 9,400. The range of incidence rates varies from zero from 2005 to 2007 for a number of 
villages to almost 35 cases per 1,000 persons over the full period in one of the villages. It appears 
that there has been a dramatic decline in the number of cholera cases treated at the hospital over 
the previous 22 years; however, the literature does not report a reason for this decline. Figure 5.2 
summarizes the annual number of cases treated at the hospital from 1983 through 2007. The 
figure includes the annual number and five-year rolling averages of cases treated at the hospital. 
There is great fluctuation in the yearly number of cases, which is smoothed by the 5-year rolling 
average.  
There was a large drop in cases treated following the 1985 vaccination trial. Incidence 
remained low until 1992 when the 0139 strain was introduced and the number of cases treated 
increased rapidly, exceeding the rates reported prior to the vaccination trial. After a peak of 1,100 
in 1993, the number of cases treated has declined steadily over the past 15 years. The hospital 
treated about 5,000 cases during the 10 year period from 1985-2004 compared to just 2,000 cases 
during the 10-year period from 1998-2007 and 350 cases over the last three years. Thus, it 
appears that the community may have made some progress in reducing the cholera burden over 
the past 22 years. As a result, a cholera vaccination program may be considered less important to 
the community in the present relative to the time of the last vaccination trial in 1985. 
 
Table 4.1.  Incidence by village over the last 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, and 22 years (annual cases per 
1,000 incidence) 
Village 
code 
Village name Village 
population 
3 yr 
incidence 
5 yr 
incidence 
10 yr 
incidence 
All yr 
incidence 
A00 Uddamdi 3251 0.92 0.98 1.23 2.85 
B00 Charmasua 2038 0.49 0.69 1.47 3.35 
C00 Sarderkandi 3987 1.00 1.00 1.15 3.41 
D00 Charmukundi 2484 0.67 1.13 1.21 2.45 
D28 Bazarkhola 1128 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.28 
D29 Kirtonkhola 209 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
D30 Banuakandi 791 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.06 
D31 Harina Bazarkhola 1099 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.29 
D32 Khalisha 789 0.85 0.51 0.38 0.29 
D33 Nayanagar 1087 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.17 
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Village 
code 
Village name Village 
population 
3 yr 
incidence 
5 yr 
incidence 
10 yr 
incidence 
All yr 
incidence 
D34 Saidkharkandi 1389 0.00 0.14 0.22 0.16 
D35 Mollah Kandi 627 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
D88 Sankibhanga 1490 0.00 0.00 0.47 1.68 
D89 Sankibhanga 
Namapara 
1143 0.58 1.40 1.49 3.86 
D90 Zahirabad 958 0.00 0.21 0.73 3.94 
D93 Maizkandi 1334 1.00 0.60 1.20 3.85 
D94 Hazipur 1504 2.22 1.46 1.99 3.78 
D95 Tapaderpara 563 0.59 0.36 0.89 1.21 
D96 Sakharipara 1116 0.90 0.54 0.90 1.26 
D97 Nayakandi 738 1.81 1.08 0.54 2.53 
D98 Bara Haldia 3379 0.79 0.71 0.74 2.35 
D99 Mandertoli 2028 0.82 0.69 0.79 1.73 
DX0 Barogaon 3655 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.20 
DX1 Naojan 1376 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 
F00 Sepoykandi 1464 0.91 1.23 1.23 3.23 
G00 Thatalia 2970 1.01 1.28 1.31 2.60 
H00 Lamchari 1239 0.27 0.65 0.40 1.65 
J00 Char Harigope 745 0.00 1.07 2.42 2.44 
K00 Shahpur 954 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 
L00 Tatkhana 587 0.00 1.70 0.85 0.70 
M00 Char Nayergaon 203 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.22 
N00 Aswinpur 2199 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.39 
O00 Nayergaon 1952 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.14 
P00 Titerkandi 2137 0.16 0.28 0.14 0.17 
Q00 Char Shibpur 261 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R00 Nandalalpur 1449 0.69 0.55 0.62 0.66 
S00 Tatua 939 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 
T00 Amuakanda 1676 1.19 3.70 2.15 2.47 
U00 Baispur 8830 0.49 0.86 1.25 3.17 
V01 Kadamtali 379 0.88 0.53 2.64 6.36 
V02 Nilokhi 503 0.66 0.80 1.19 3.34 
V03 Char Nilokhi 623 0.54 0.32 0.48 2.85 
V04 Char Pathalia 338 1.97 1.18 2.37 3.50 
V05 Gazipur 3333 0.60 1.14 1.68 4.24 
V06 Fatepur 2438 0.41 1.15 1.19 2.54 
V07 Nayakandi 300 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.79 
V08 Goalbhar 1174 0.00 0.68 1.28 2.56 
V09 Naburkandi 1209 0.28 0.33 0.66 1.43 
V10 Dhakirgaon 1798 1.30 1.11 1.45 3.31 
V11 Nabakalash 2665 1.13 1.35 1.73 2.54 
V12 Bhangerpar 674 0.49 0.89 2.08 4.52 
V13 Baburpara 710 0.47 1.13 1.13 4.10 
V14 Enayetnagar 771 0.86 2.85 1.43 4.42 
V15 Bhati Rasulpur 761 0.00 0.26 0.53 1.73 
V16 Binandapur 868 0.00 0.23 0.46 3.09 
V17 Hatighata 1079 0.31 0.37 0.93 2.23 
V18 Torkey 3953 0.34 1.21 1.06 1.90 
V19 Lakshmipur 2934 0.68 0.95 1.43 2.39 
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Village 
code 
Village name Village 
population 
3 yr 
incidence 
5 yr 
incidence 
10 yr 
incidence 
All yr 
incidence 
V20 Dagorpur 1332 0.75 0.60 0.90 2.66 
V21 Khadergaon 552 3.62 2.90 1.63 2.31 
V22 Beloti 634 0.00 0.63 0.47 1.79 
V23 Baluchar 635 0.00 1.26 1.10 2.15 
V24 Machuakhal 2942 0.91 1.02 1.02 2.27 
V25 Char Pathalia 1361 0.24 0.73 0.73 0.90 
V26 Narayanpur 3052 0.33 1.51 1.41 1.34 
V27 Panchghoria 974 0.68 1.03 0.51 0.89 
V28 Khidirpur 1559 0.00 0.26 0.19 0.90 
V29 Shibpur (South) 491 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.28 
V30 Harion 546 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.17 
V31 Dighaldi 9433 0.95 1.08 1.14 2.67 
V32 Mobarakdi 3332 0.40 1.08 1.29 2.51 
V33 Shibpur (North) 447 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.61 
V34 Satparia 810 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.51 
V35 Durgapur 3731 0.00 0.21 0.32 0.38 
V36 Ludhua 5605 0.36 0.36 1.05 2.59 
V38 Galimkha 1571 0.64 0.51 0.45 0.61 
V39 Gobindapur 346 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V40 Masunda 802 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.17 
V41 Paton 1857 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.24 
V42 Adhara (South) 765 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V43 Kanachak 1031 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.26 
V44 Panchdona 623 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 
V45 Bakchar 1101 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
V46 Silinda 403 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.23 
V47 Tulatali 1795 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.20 
V48 Gangkanda 568 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.32 
V49 Harina Bhabanipur 1245 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.22 
V50 Bakharpur 55 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.71 
V51 Induriakandi 525 0.63 0.38 1.71 7.71 
V52 Nayakandi 216 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.16 
V53 Chhoto Haldia 3040 0.77 0.92 1.32 3.05 
V54 Balairkandi 600 1.67 1.00 1.33 1.82 
V55 Induria 533 0.63 1.50 1.69 2.39 
V56 Pailpara 1511 0.44 0.53 1.13 2.74 
V57 Baluchar 1066 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.17 
V59 Doshpara 1702 2.15 1.29 1.65 2.24 
V60 Suvankardi 987 0.68 0.81 1.01 3.18 
V61 Munsabdi 678 2.95 2.06 1.62 3.29 
V62 Shilmondi 924 0.36 0.22 0.54 2.66 
V63 Islamabad (East) 2114 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.84 
V64 Kawadi 4619 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.11 
V65 Nayachar 804 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.17 
V66 Thatalia 846 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 
V67 Majlishpur 604 0.00 0.00 0.33 1.58 
V68 Sobahan 1041 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
V71 Khamarpara 505 1.32 0.79 0.40 0.27 
V72 Upadi 6342 1.21 1.73 1.69 2.59 
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Village 
code 
Village name Village 
population 
3 yr 
incidence 
5 yr 
incidence 
10 yr 
incidence 
All yr 
incidence 
V73 Sadardia 844 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
V74 Ketundi 1434 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.29 
V75 Mukundi 323 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 
V76 Chosoi 1843 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.12 
V78 Soladana 237 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 
V79 Pitambordi 363 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.50 
V80 Daribond 1258 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 
V81 Sonaterkandi 703 1.90 2.28 1.28 2.59 
V82 Dhanarpar 1748 0.38 0.69 0.97 2.73 
V83 Padmapal 613 0.00 0.00 0.65 2.89 
V84 Shahbajkandi 2323 0.57 1.55 1.46 2.60 
V85 Bhanurpara 516 1.29 1.16 0.78 1.85 
V86 Adhara 946 0.00 1.27 0.95 1.11 
V87 Hurmaisha 689 0.48 0.58 3.05 3.50 
V88 Datikara 531 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.94 
V89 Islamabad (Middle) 1467 0.23 0.41 0.48 1.61 
V90 Narinda 1249 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
V95 Baluchar 2275 0.15 0.62 1.93 2.76 
V96 Rampur 669 0.50 0.60 0.75 3.06 
V97 Dhanagoda 338 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 
V98 Santoshpur 125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V99 Baluakandi 520 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.70 
VB0 South Rampur 2792 0.84 0.72 1.90 3.29 
VB1 Taltoli 1059 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 
VB2 Sree Rayerchar 1156 0.29 0.17 0.35 0.31 
VB3 Rayerkandi 3015 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.32 
VB4 Ramdaspur 3610 0.65 0.66 1.11 2.53 
VB5 Thakurpara 834 1.20 1.44 2.28 3.32 
VB6 Sarkerpara 530 0.00 0.38 1.13 2.66 
VB7 Mirpur 313 0.00 0.00 4.47 5.81 
VB8 Farazikandi 1347 0.74 0.89 1.41 2.09 
VBA Mehron 2483 1.34 0.97 0.72 0.84 
VBB Nagda 4556 0.37 1.49 1.21 2.78 
VBC Naogaon 4925 1.22 1.42 1.40 2.45 
W00 Kaladi 6371 0.68 1.13 1.04 1.18 
       
Average 1580 0.45 0.59 0.79 1.95 
Minimum 55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 percentile 381 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 
25 percentile 624 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.28 
50 percentile 381 0.24 0.39 0.59 1.7 
75 percentile 1066 0.68 1.0 1.2 2.7 
90 percentile 3333 1.2 1.4 1.7 3.5 
Maximum 9433 3.6 3.7 4.5 35 
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Figure 4.2. Annual and 5-year rolling average of hospital-treated cases 
 
Estimates of cholera incidence by age group are obtained from a recent DOMI study that 
estimated incidence rates and cost of illness in multiple countries (Deen et al., 2008; Poulos et al., 
2008). These incidence estimates are summarized in Table 5.2. Incidence was highest for younger 
children less than 5 years of age, followed by school age children, and adults. The average across 
age groups is 1.6 cases per 1,000 persons. These estimates are split into a high incidence group, 
which represents the 10% of villages with the highest incidence over the previous 10 years and 
the remaining 90% of villages. On average, the high incidence villages’ incidence rates were 
about four times greater than the remaining 90% (see Table 5.1). This is based on historical 
incidence rates by village. Although some of these village-by-village differences result from the 
distance to the hospital, this is still the best estimate available. 
Emch (1999) examined the risk factors for hospitalization with cholera and non-cholera 
watery diarrhea at the ICDDR,B hospital. He found cholera incidence was significantly correlated 
with environmental and socioeconomic variables (e.g., baris in which multiple households use 
open latrines, more households sharing a tube well, households with less land, population in a 
bari is high, population density surrounding a bari is high, living in flood controlled areas. Thus, 
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use of improved water and sanitation has a positive impact on cholera transmission as expected. 
Cholera transmission is also more prominent in densely populated baris and households. It is 
unclear why cholera transmission is greater in the flood-controlled region. While households with 
less land were more likely to contract cholera, household income and assets were not correlated to 
cholera transmission. It may be that the amount of land available to households is a better 
indicator of wealth than income or asset measurements in a rural community. It is important to 
note that most all of the households in the Matlab area are poor. Thus, differences in income are 
smaller than what may be found in urban areas. 
Table 4.2. Average annual incidence by age group 
Age group Annual incidence (cases per 1,000 persons) 
 All Highest 10% of 
villages 
Remaining 90% 
of villages 
Infants (age < 1 year) 4.6 14 3.5 
Young children (age 1-4 years) 3.8 12 2.9 
School-age children (age 5-14 
years) 
1.6 4.9 1.2 
Adults (age >14 years) 1.0 3.1 0.8 
All ages 1.6 4.9 1.2 
 
4.2 Cholera cost of illness 
The public and private costs of illness were recently estimated by another DOMI study, for 
which I am a co-author (Poulos et al., 2008). The public cost of illness is estimated based on the 
ICDDR,B hospital’s operating records using a standardized micro-costing approach (Drummond 
et al., 2005). Estimates are calculated based on 1) the length of patients’ stays, 2) the type and 
amount of medication dispensed, and 3) the type of diagnostic tests performed. Each test 
performed is multiplied by an estimated unit cost for that test. Medicine costs are similarly 
estimated by multiplying the amount dispensed by an average unit cost. The overnight stay costs 
are more complicated because it is necessary to account for non-cholera-specific staff, operating 
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and capital costs. These costs include 1) material costs such as maintenance, electricity, 
telephone, meals, and security, 2) labor costs, and 3) capital costs which are estimated as a 
percentage of operating costs based on studies performed in Thailand (Riewpaiboon et al., 2005; 
Riewpaiboon et al., 2007a; Riewpaiboon et al., 2007b; Riewpaiboon et al., 2007c). Because the 
hospital provides treatment for a number of different diseases, it is necessary to determine how to 
allocate administrative and other overhead costs across diseases. For a particular department, the 
ratio of services rendered for one type of disease is calculated relative to the total number of 
services produced by that department. In total, the average public cost of a cholera episode was 
about US$20, and is roughly equivalent for children and adults. 
Private COI is estimated based on in-home interviews conducted with cholera patients or 
the caretakers of child patients. Cholera patients were interviewed at 7 days and 14 days after 
they were tested at the outpost or hospital. The survey instrument includes specific questions 
about direct and indirect costs. The direct COI questions include private expenditure for 
medication, diagnostic tests, and general clinic costs. Other direct non-medical costs include non-
medical expenditure for transportation; special foods and drinks purchased for patients; and food 
and lodging requirements for caretakers that accompanied hospitalized patients.  
The indirect costs of illness measure the lost productivity of the patients, substitute 
laborers, caretakers, and travel companions. If the patient, their caretaker or their substitute 
laborer missed time at work, the indirect COI is simply calculated as their wage rate multiplied by 
the number of work days missed.16 Time lost from household activities, school, or leisure are 
calculated as a fraction of the average wage: 50% for housework or school time; 30% for leisure. 
The value of lost time for children who could not perform housework or school work is further 
reduced by 25% for teenagers and by 50% for children between 5 and 12 years of age. We do not 
                                                 
16If a patient reported a substitute laborer for some or all days, the substitute laborer is assumed to make up 
for the missed work of the patient, although the substitute’s personal lost productivity is accounted for in 
place of time spent on substitute labor. If a caretaker or substitute laborer would have worked for a wage 
that was unknown to the respondent, the average wage was used in its place. 
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value time lost by children under 5. The average private COI varies by age group as shown in 
Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. Public and private cost per cholera episode and ex ante COI 
  Children Adults All ages 
Public COI per case 
(ex post) 
Provider treatment costs (US$) 21 19 20 
Private payments to public 
facilities (US$) 1 1 1 
Net public treatment costs (US$) 20 18 19 
Private COI per case  
(ex post) 
Direct treatment costs (US$) 4 7 5 
Indirect treatment costs (US$) 4 11 7 
Total private treatment costs 
(US$) 8 18 12 
Total COI per case (ex ante) 28 36 31 
Annual Incidence (cases per 1,000) 2.2 1.0 1.6 
Annual ex ante public COI (US$) 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Annual ex ante private COI (US$) 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
 The average private direct COI is about US$4 for children and US$7 for adults. Private 
indirect COI is much greater for adults (US$11) than for children (US$4). It is not surprising that 
indirect COI is greater for adults, because they are more likely to miss time at work. In addition, 
we assume there is no productivity loss for children less than 5 years old. The sum of direct and 
indirect private COI is about twice as great for adults relative to children. The annual ex ante 
private COI is roughly equal for children and adults. While children’s incidence is about twice as 
large as adults’, the private cost per case is about double. Thus, the difference in incidence is 
balanced by the difference in cost per case. The ex ante public COI is greater for children, 
because the cost per case estimates are roughly equal (while the child incidence is larger). 
  
4.3 Survey research design 
Household cholera vaccine demand and willingness-to-pay for mortality risk reduction of 
the household’s youngest child were evaluated in separate sections of a single interview. Thus, all 
of the respondents received both sets of questions. I begin this section with a brief summary of 
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the sample protocol used to select households. Then, I explain the time-to-think protocol used in a 
subset of the surveys. I conclude with discussions of the valuation scenarios used for the cholera 
vaccine demand and VSL scenarios. 
4.3.1 Sampling 
The Matlab area is generally homogenous in terms of its population, although the area 
nearest to the hospital is slightly less rural than the surrounding villages. Survey respondents were 
chosen randomly from the Health and Demographic Surveillance System database via a two-stage 
cluster sample without replacement. The first stage selected a total of 3,000 households, each 
with at least one child less than 18 years of age. Two-thirds of these households were located in 
the government service area, and one-third in the ICDDR,B service area. The sample list was 
subdivided into clusters of 22 to 28 households located in small areas ranging about 1 km2 to 4 
km2 depending on population density. In the second stage I randomly selected clusters of 
households and assigned one each to enumerators. Enumerators were instructed to allot half their 
interviews to males and only to interview the primary caretaker of the children in the household, 
typically one of the parents.17 The second stage sampling was implemented twice to coincide with 
staging of the interviews. In total, 591 households granted interviews and only two households 
refused. Another 160 households were dropped because the selected male parents lived and 
worked outside the village and were not available.  
4.3.2 Survey instrument 
The survey instrument was based on a questionnaire used in a DOMI WTP study in 
Kolkata, India and is included as Appendix 1. Two sets of 60 pretest interviews helped us to 
adapt the survey to local conditions in the Matlab area and to set an appropriate range of prices 
for the contingent valuation scenarios. The study employed 20 local enumerators to conduct the 
                                                 
17Two respondents were the grandparents of children.  
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interviews. These enumerators had experience working on other public health studies conducted 
by ICDDR,B, but they had not worked on a CV survey before. They received two weeks of 
training according to the guidelines recommended in Whittington’s review of CV practices in 
developing countries (Whittington, 2002). Afterward the enumerators practiced implementing the 
questionnaire via field tests and pretests.  
The survey instrument had six sections of questions. The first section recorded 
demographic information about the respondent and members of the household. The second 
section had questions regarding the respondent’s perception of cholera. It also asked about the 
respondent’s experience with cholera and about knowledge of other family members or friends 
having contracted the disease and/or having died from it. The third section discussed how cholera 
was contracted, spread, prevented, and treated; it also included questions about the respondent’s 
previous experience with the oral cholera and TABC vaccines. This section also introduced the 
CV scenario of the hypothetical new cholera vaccine, described the vaccine’s effectiveness, and 
then tested the respondents’ understanding of the concept of vaccine effectiveness. The visual aid 
presented to respondents to help them understand vaccine effectiveness was adapted from 
Suraratdecha et al. (2005), and is presented as Figure 4.3. The fourth section contained the CV 
questions that were used to estimate WTP (described in Section 4.3.3). The fifth section included 
questions to determine the value of a reduction in the risk of death for the respondent’s youngest 
child (described in Section 4.3.4).  The sixth section included socioeconomic questions about 
education, income, housing characteristics, household assets, disease-averting behaviors, 
economic status, and access to credit. This section also had questions on access to and usage of 
electricity, water, and telephones. 
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Figure 4.3. Vaccine effectiveness visual aid (Suraratdecha et al. (2005) 
4.3.3 Contingent valuation scenario to estimate WTP for mortality risk reduction of the 
household’s youngest child 
This section includes more detail in the description of the information provided to 
respondents because valuation for mortality risk reduction is considerably more controversial and 
difficult to present to survey respondents, especially those in developing countries. The survey 
questionnaire informed respondents about children’s risk of death, presented a hypothetical 
nutritional supplement that would reduce the risk, and elicited respondents’ willingness-to-pay for 
such a supplement in terms of its efficacy (two levels) and price (from five possible sets of paired 
amounts). The average risk of death from a number of causes is summarized in Chapter 2 (Table 
2.1). Although the primary causes and numerical risks of death are different for children younger 
than 5 years compared to older children, I used the same CV nutritional supplement scenario for 
all ages of children because of the length and complexity of the survey instrument, the distances 
traveled by interviewers to respondents’ households, and other limitations of working in rural 
areas. For respondents with more than one child less than 18 years, the questions always referred 
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to the youngest child. Younger children were the focus because they are often targeted for 
vaccination and public health campaigns. 
The entire nutritional supplement CV scenario is presented in Appendix 1. The first 
objective of this section was for respondents to consider all possible risks of death for children 
and the relative likelihood of each. Following Corso et al. (2001), I presented a scale that showed 
pictures of a number of different causes of death such that the most common causes appeared at 
the top of the scale and the least common at the bottom (Figure 4.4). Next, using techniques 
similar to Mahmud (2009), the enumerator instructed the respondent about probability using coin 
flips and die rolls as examples. The enumerator used Figure 4.5 to explain the expected outcomes 
for a single coin flip and for a series of 1,000 coin flips. After the coin flip example, the 
enumerator turned to an example based on die throws. She pointed out that the probability of 
getting a 5 in a single die throw was considerably less than getting a particular outcome from a 
single coin flip. 
  
  
 
  
         
                     
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Infections
Lightning strike        
Drowning
Figure 4.4. Risk ladder demonstrating the relative risks of different causes of death 
for children in Matlab 
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Figure 4.5 Visual aid for probability of coin flip and die roll 
 
Figure 4.6. Visual aid representing the average risk of death for children in Matlab (adapted from 
Alberini et al., 2004a) 
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 Next the enumerator introduced the hypothetical nutritional supplement that would 
reduce the child’s risk of death. Each respondent received a randomly assigned scenario such that 
the supplement reduced the child’s risk of death from disease from 5 in 1,000 to either (a) 2 in 
1,000 or (b) 4 in 1,000 over 5 years.  Respondents were shown another figure, which was adapted 
from a previous study by Alberini et al. (2004a) (Figure 4.7 or Figure 4.8). These figures helped 
respondents to visualize how the supplement would decrease the already small baseline risk for 
their child. I chose to use large risk reductions in the scenarios to improve respondent 
comprehension and because large changes in risk generate conservative VSL estimates. Most 
other VSL studies use smaller risk reductions relative to baseline.  Prior to asking the valuation 
questions, respondents were told to assume that the cholera vaccine was not available and not to 
consider the vaccine cost in their hypothetical purchasing decision. 
 
Figure 4.7. VSL hypothetical risk reduction- high effectiveness (adapted from Alberini et al., 2004a) 
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Figure 4.8. VSL hypothetical risk reduction- low effectiveness (adapted from Alberini et al., 2004a) 
 
I chose a monthly payment mechanism because of Matlab’s low average income and 
because many respondents were farmers and did not have large amounts of cash on hand. Thus, 
the enumerator explained that the parent would need to continue buying the supplement every 
month to maintain protection for the child. Each respondent was asked if they would purchase the 
hypothetical supplement at a monthly price that was randomly assigned from an array of five: 
US$0.15, $0.30, $0.75, $1.50, and $7.50. Next, the respondent was asked if they would purchase 
the supplement at a specified follow-up price, which was either higher or lower, depending upon 
whether the respondent agreed to the initial price. The respondents were again read a short cheap 
talk script to urge careful and honest responses to the purchasing question. 
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4.3.4 Time to think treatment 
Before the interviews began, respondents were divided into two groups. NTTT (no time 
to think) respondents received the entire questionnaire in one sitting. TTT (time to think) 
respondents answered the first half of the survey, then were given overnight to consider the 
prospective “purchase” of the hypothetical vaccines for self and family and to discuss the 
decision with other family members; an interviewer returned the next day to finish the survey. 
The TTT treatment has previously resulted in lower estimates of willingness-to-pay (Cook et al., 
2006; Lucas et al., 2007). It is possible that the TTT treatment would be more representative of 
actual vaccine purchasing decisions because households would have time to think about their 
decision, especially for vaccinations that must be purchased every three years to maintain 
efficacy. 
Because the VSL section was always presented after the vaccine scenario, it always 
occurred in a single session—either in the single-day NTTT interview, or in the return-visit 
portion of the TTT interview. Although TTT considerations were not directly applied to the 
nutritional supplement purchase decision, TTT would have allowed respondents to carefully 
consider their budget constraints prior to hearing the supplement scenario. It is also possible that 
respondents could have overestimated the importance of cholera mortality relative to other risks.  
 
  
 
5 Model formulation 
The policy models are developed in a number of stages. Both models require examination 
of vaccination demand as a function of price, the epidemiology of cholera vaccination herd 
protection and the interaction between demand, coverage, herd protection, and vaccination 
program outcomes. These program outcomes include coverage rates, cases avoided, and DALYs 
saved, which can be converted to monetary estimates of benefits and costs.  
The first section of this chapter includes a graphical summary of basic theoretical 
considerations. The second and third sections summarize the statistical estimation of the results 
from the Matlab in-home surveys for household cholera vaccination demand and VSL estimates 
for households’ youngest children. The fourth and fifth sections develop the numerical 
optimization models for maximizing net societal benefits and total DALYs for a cholera 
vaccination program subject to a net revenue constraint.   
 
5.1 Graphical model 
The graphical model is used to demonstrate basic concepts. The relationships shown in 
this section may not necessarily represent cholera vaccination in Matlab. The equations and 
parameter estimates for Matlab are specified in later sections. This section starts with an 
examination of the simple relationships between price and coverage rates as well as between 
coverage rates and herd protection impacts. These relationships can be used to estimate public 
health outcomes, cases avoided and DALYs saved, as functions of price or coverage. Economic 
benefits can also be estimated from program outcomes. In the absence of herd protection, 
economic benefits can be estimated directly from vaccination demand curves. I begin with an 
examination of vaccination demand. The demand curves in Figure 5.1 subdivide demand into 
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adult, child, and total categories based on expected coverage rates as functions of price. It is 
important to note that it is possible that a large percentage of adults and children would not 
choose to pursue vaccinations even if vaccines are provided free of charge. In order to receive a 
vaccination, it is necessary to travel to and from a clinic or outpost and to wait in line for service. 
Since this dissertation examines policy in a developing country context, it is expected that 
coverage rates decline quickly as functions of price. However, it is possible that small groups of 
adults and children have relatively high WTP (i.e. fat tails in the demand distribution). If herd 
protection impacts are ignored, WTP benefits may be calculated directly from the integral of the 
demand curve. 
 
Figure 5.1. Adult and child vaccination demand as functions of price  
The next figure (5.2) demonstrates a herd protection versus coverage relationship. The 
figure is similar to the cholera vaccination herd protection figure (3.2) presented in Chapter 3. In 
this figure, I demonstrate two distinct types of protection, assuming an average coverage rate of 
about 35%. The purple or darker rectangle represents the baseline direct protection benefits (65% 
reduction in baseline incidence) that would accrue to the 35% of the population that received 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 2 4 6 8 10
Price (US$)
Co
ve
ra
ge
Children
Total
Adults
92 
vaccines. The green or lighter rectangle represents the additional indirect protection experienced 
by both the vaccinated and unvaccinated populations. For vaccinated persons, there is an increase 
from the direct protection rate of 65% to the effective protection rate of 90%. Despite not 
receiving vaccinations, unvaccinated persons’ effective risk of infection would decline by more 
than 70% if just 35% of the population were vaccinated. Thus, the expected indirect protection 
for unvaccinated persons would exceed the direct protection of vaccination in the absence of herd 
protection at low coverage rates. Total incidence reduction for the population would be calculated 
by dividing the colored area by the total area. 
 
Figure 5.2. Delineation of direct versus indirect protection with consideration for herd protection 
 The total number of cases for a hypothetical vaccination scenario with and without 
consideration for herd protection is shown in Figure 5.3. Without consideration for herd 
protection, the number of cases avoided would be a linear function of the coverage rate. The 
linear relationship would depend on the baseline incidence, the direct effectiveness of 
vaccination, and the coverage rate. When herd protection is accounted for, the number of cases 
avoided is a nonlinear function of coverage, and the expected number of cases avoided is much 
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greater. This suggests that vaccination benefits may be considerably underestimated if herd 
protection benefits are unaccounted for. 
 
Figure 5.3. Cases avoided with and without consideration for herd protection 
The next figure (5.4) examines how total monetary benefits, which should be a function 
of the number of cases avoided, and costs are influenced by herd protection. The total costs are 
assumed to be the sum of a fixed cost and a constant variable cost, resulting in a linear function of 
coverage. Monetary benefits can be estimated both with and without consideration of herd 
protection effects. The total private benefits function is calculated based on an integral of the 
demand curve shown in Figure 5.1 without consideration for herd protection. If herd protection 
benefits are ignored, the private benefit calculation is nonlinear because demand is 
heterogeneous. If coverage rates are assumed to be a function of price, it is expected that those 
with the greatest WTP would be covered at low coverage rates (i.e. low coverage rates would 
correspond with higher user fees, such that only those with high WTP would choose to purchase). 
As coverage rates increase (due to decreasing user fees), those with successively lower WTP 
would choose to pursue vaccinations. Thus, the private benefits would increase as coverage 
increases; however the rate of increase decreases across the entire range of coverage rates.  
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The total social benefits function incorporates both direct and indirect benefits that result 
from herd protection impacts. Because unvaccinated persons are also protected (and vaccinated 
persons are protected at a greater effective rate), the total societal benefits increase at a faster rate 
and societal benefits are greater than the private benefits of direct protection.    
Net benefit calculations are the total benefits minus the total costs, as shown in Figure 
5.5. Similarly, the maximum net benefits are significantly larger after accounting for herd 
protection impacts. In addition, the maximum net benefits occur at a higher coverage rate when 
herd protection benefits are incorporated. Thus, the optimal coverage rate from a societal 
perspective is greater when indirect protection benefits are properly accounted. In order to 
achieve this optimal coverage rate, it is necessary to use a Pigouvian subsidy to boost coverage 
from the optimal coverage that results from private vaccination decisions to the optimal coverage 
rate for societal benefits (i.e. from 20% to 25% in Figure 5.5).. 
 
Figure 5.4. Total benefits and costs of a vaccination program 
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Figure 5.5. Net benefits of a vaccination program 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 examine hypothetical vaccination benefits and costs in monetary 
terms; however, public health professionals often prefer to consider public health outcomes. In 
Figure 5.6, I present cases avoided, DALYs saved, and total costs as functions of coverage (with 
consideration for herd protection). The total cost curve is again a linear function of coverage; 
however, the DALYs saved and cases avoided functions are both increasing functions; however, 
like, the benefit estimate curves, the rates of increase decline as coverage increases.  
Returning to Figure 5.2, it appears that community incidence would decrease rapidly as 
coverage increases from low coverage rates. At higher coverage rates, incidence is already 
reduced to almost zero. Thus, further increases in coverage would have relatively modest impacts 
on incidence. The decreasing marginal changes in incidence are reflected in the average and 
marginal cost per DALY saved functions, as summarized in Figure 5.7. The average cost per 
DALY curve is u-shaped because of competing effects. At low coverage rates, the fixed 
component of cost may dominate the variable component of cost because these fixed costs would 
be spread across a small number of recipients. The average cost per vaccination declines as 
coverage increases. At high coverage rates, the variable cost component would dominate the 
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fixed cost component. However, at high coverage rates, the marginal change in cases avoided per 
change in coverage declines because most cases have already been avoided. Thus, the marginal 
cost per DALY is greater at high coverage rates. The marginal cost per DALY increases 
monotonically as a function of coverage because of diminishing herd protection effects and 
because fixed costs do not affect the marginal cost calculation. Overall, there is much more 
variation in the marginal cost per DALY than the average cost per DALY. The average cost per 
DALY varies from US$100-150 over a range of coverage rates from 10%-30%.   
 
Figure 5.6. Total costs, cases avoided and DALYs saved as functions of price 
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Figure 5.7. Average and marginal costs per DALY saved 
In conclusion, a number of important insights are obtained from Figures 5.1 through 5.7. 
First, the omission of herd protection may lead to considerable underestimates of cases avoided, 
total societal benefits, and optimal coverage rates. In addition, the average cost per DALY may be 
overestimated. This could potentially lead to under-provision of vaccinations. These figures also 
demonstrate that it may not be optimal to provide free vaccinations. In Figure 5.5, the net societal 
benefit curves are downward-sloping over the range of coverage rates from 25-44%. Thus, it may 
be possible to collect some user fees to offset the cost of the program while still achieving 
socially optimal coverage rates for the example shown. Finally, I also show that the average and 
marginal costs per DALY are not constant and that single point estimates may not be sufficient 
for cost utility analysis.  
These figures assume that an entire community would purchase vaccinations at the same 
price. However, it may be optimal to charge different prices to different subgroups (by age or by 
incidence). The rest of the chapter summarizes the mathematical models that can be used to 
develop similar figures using empirical data. I begin with a summary of the modeling approaches 
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that I use to estimate WTP for cholera vaccinations and for mortality risk reduction. The basic 
modeling approaches assume no herd protection effects. These models are then expanded to 
incorporate the herd protection effect.  
 
5.2 Household demand for cholera vaccines (no herd protection) 
  This section demonstrates my models for estimating vaccination demand as function of 
household characteristics and an exogenously assigned user fee. Following the approaches of 
Cropper et al (2004), Canh et al (2006), and Cook (2007), I assume the household decision-
maker’s utility function depends on each family member’s consumption of some numeraire good 
(Xi), leisure time (Li), a vector of household characteristics, and the risk of becoming ill with a 
specific illness (Si), and the expected treatment and productivity costs of illness imposed if a 
family member gets sick (COIi). Assuming n family members, the utility function is:  
 (5.1) U= u(X1,…,Xn, L1,…,Ln, S1,…,Sn, COI1,…COIn)  
The decision-maker maximizes utility subject to the household budget constraint, given in eq. 
5.218.  
 (5.2) ∑∑∑ ∑
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The left-hand side of eq. 5.2 is the amount of income available to the household that can be used 
for the numeraire good and for prevention and treatment of disease. This is the sum of household 
non-earned income (I) and earned income, where wi is the wage for family member i and the total 
time available is T.  The right-hand side of the equality is the sum of household expenditure on 
the numeraire good, on prevention (pv is the price of prevention and Qi indexes the quantity of 
                                                 
18Note that I assume that lost productivity is incorporated into the cost of illness on the right hand side of 
the equation rather than the left hand side of the equation. For a disease like cholera, the time spent ill 
should be very small relative to work and leisure time. 
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prevention purchased for the ith household member), and on treatment of the disease (pm is 
treatment cost and Mi indexes the quantity of treatment purchased for household member i). 
The head of household selects values of X, L, Qi and M to maximize household utility 
subject to the budget constraint and to their health production functions (adapted from 
(Grossman, 1972).  The solutions to q series of these maximization problems yields a demand 
function for preventive care 
 (5.3)  q*= ∑
=
n
i
iq
1
, 
where q* is the amount of prevention chosen by the decision-maker, e.g., the number of vaccines 
the decision-maker purchases. Note that uncertainty is modeled implicitly; I assume the decision-
maker takes into account the probabilities, mortality risks, and treatment costs of getting ill in 
arriving at q*.  Rather than define household demand for prevention as an additive function of 
demand for individual members, I simplify household demand as a function g(⋅) of the prices of 
prevention and treatment, household non-wage income (I), a vector of each household member’s 
wage (w), a vector of household characteristics (Z), and a vector of the health characteristics of 
family members (H): 
 (5.4)  q* = g(pv, pm, I, w, Z, H) . 
The total household willingness-to-pay (WTP) for vaccines (or other preventive 
measures) for n household members is calculated by integrating the inverse demand function g-
1(⋅) from 0 to n vaccines19. 
 (5.5) dqIqgWTP
n
∫ −=
0
1 )H,Z,,,( w   
 The model requires some additional structure in order to estimate the parameters of the 
demand function g(⋅) in eq. 5.4 and to calculate WTP.  First, combine the characteristics of 
                                                 
19As a Marshallian demand function, this assumes that the marginal utility of income is constant. 
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household i, the vaccine and prevention (including terms I, w, pm, Z and H in eq. 5.4, as well as 
variables for the study like whether the respondent was given time-to-think and the respondent’s 
neighborhood) into the vector Xi. Further define the bid price of the vaccine offered to 
respondents in the contingent valuation survey as A.  Assuming an additive and separable utility 
function, the model I estimate statistically is: 
 (5.6) g(Xi, A) = exp(Xiβ - Aβp) + εi 
 To estimate β and βp from the observed data, I use the negative binomial regression 
model, a variant of the Poisson count model. The Poisson-distributed probability of observing the 
respondent buying vaccines for all n household members is20: 
 (5.7) 
!
)exp())exp(exp(][
n
AXAX
nqP
n
pipi ββββ −⋅−== . 
 The Poisson model constrains the conditional mean and conditional variance in the data 
to be the same. Relaxing this assumption, the negative binomial model adds a gamma-distributed 
error term to Xiβ to allow the two to differ. The predicted number of units qˆ  purchased by 
household i at price A is given by eq. 5.8.  Notice that when the bid price is zero (i.e. there are no 
user charges), A=0, and qˆ  is simply exp(Xiβ). 
 (5.8)   qˆ  = exp(Xiβ - Aβp) 
 To calculate the percentage of the sample that would purchase a vaccine at a specific 
price, I sum the expected number of vaccines purchased in all H households in the sample and 
divide by the total number of household members in the sample.    
(5.9) Percent coverage  = ∑
=
H
i 1
exp(Xiβ - Aβp )   /   ∑
=
H
i 1
(Members in household i)  
                                                 
 
20Because the sample was spread across a number of villages, I assigned each interviewer to a cluster of 
nearby households. Because there are likely to be unobserved similarities among neighboring households, I 
used a cluster correction for standard errors.   
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Again, willingness-to-pay21 to vaccinate the entire household (not an individual person) is the 
area under the inverse household demand curve g -1(⋅) and to the left of household size 
 (5.10) WTPi = ∫
n
0
g -1(q, X) dq 
Equivalently, I can also integrate the demand function g(⋅) over prices A.   
 (5.11) WTPi = ∫
∞
0
exp(Xiβ - Aβp) dA    
   =  − 1/βp · exp(Xiβ - Aβp)
∞
0   =  [exp(Xiβ )] / -βp 
 WTP is simply the household consumer surplus calculated at price A = 0. Next, I define 
an average WTP per person in each household as WTPi / ni (i.e. the total household WTP divided 
by the number of household members). The population average WTP per person is simply∑
=
H
i 1
 
WTPi  /   ∑
=
H
i 1
 ni. 
As price increases, the predicted number of vaccines purchased declines for each 
household. I would like to estimate the average WTP per vaccine purchased (rather than per 
person) as price increases and demand declines. When A is non-zero, the household’s WTP per 
vaccine is comprised of the consumer surplus at price A = p* plus the expenditure on vaccines 
divided by the expected number of vaccines purchased (i.e. exp(Xiβ - p*βp)).  Eq. 5.12 
characterizes the consumer surplus at price A = p*, and eq. 5.13 characterizes household 
expenditures at A = p*.
 
                                                 
21The theoretically correct measure of WTP is the Hicksian compensating variation. Because we asked 
respondents how many vaccines they would buy at price A, I actually observe a Marshallian demand 
function; consumer surplus, not Hicksian compensating variation, is the area I calculate with eq. 5.11.  This 
“uncompensated” demand should theoretically be adjusted for income in order to observe true Hicksian 
compensating variation, but I make the common assumption that the income effect is likely to be so small 
that the Marshallian consumer surplus which I observe is a reasonable approximation of Hicksian 
compensating variation (Willig, 1976)  
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(5.12) CS =  − 1/βp ⋅ exp(Xiβ −  Aβp)
∞
*p   = 1/βp · exp(Xiβ −  p*βp) 
 (5.13) Expenditures  = p* ⋅ exp(Xiβ −  p*βp) 
and average WTP per vaccine is22: 
(5.14) Average WTP/vaccine  =  (Expenditure + CS) / expected coverage  
=     pp β
ββ
βββ
/1*)*p  exp(X
 )1/   *(p  )*p  (exp(Xi
pi
pp
−=
−
+⋅−
 
Thus, unlike the average WTP per person calculated from eq. 5.11, the WTP per vaccine is 
dependent only on the price coefficient and the price at which vaccines are offered for sale. 
Because my modeling approach uses the same price coefficient for every household, the WTP per 
vaccine is the same for all households (though the predicted number of vaccines purchased will 
vary by household). If vaccines are provided free of charge the average WTP per vaccine 
received is simply -1/βp. The average WTP per vaccine should not be considered analogous to 
the average WTP per person if a significant fraction of the population would choose not to 
receive free vaccines. The average WTP per person includes zero values for those predicted not to 
pursue free vaccines. In contrast, the WTP per vaccine only includes the fraction of the 
population that is predicted to purchase vaccines, which varies as a function of price. The WTP 
per vaccine is important for calculating the private benefits of vaccination as a function of the 
price charged. 
 Note that this framework can be applied for vaccine demand for household members of a 
specific age group (i.e. young children, school-children or adults). The only differences will be 1) 
n indexes only the number of household members in that age group, and 2) disease incidence 
should be less variable among family members of similar ages, and 3) the characteristics included 
                                                 
22Note that this derivation is only applicable for an additive, separable utility function with an exponential 
price-demand relationship. For example if I used log price in place of price in eq. 5.14, this derivation 
would no longer be correct.  
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in the vector Xi may differ somewhat. Note that my derivation does not assume a discontinuity in 
demand for free vaccines. In the survey results for respondents, I found that the fraction of 
respondents that said they would receive free vaccines (85%) was much greater than the 
estimated demand for free vaccines using the statistical models (35%)23. This suggests there may 
be a discontinuity in the demand function for free vaccinations. 
 
5.3 Children’s value of statistical life 
Theoretical approaches for modeling parents’ willingness-to-pay to reduce mortality risk 
for children turn on whether parents value mortality risk reductions for children due to altruistic 
intentions, or paternalistic intentions. As Jones-Lee (1991; 1992) explains, a purely altruistic 
concern would optimally result in a direct wealth transfer from giver(s) to receiver(s), who could 
then freely choose to purchase an optimal level of risk reduction without further involvement of 
the giver. A purely paternalistic approach assumes that the giver only values mortality risk 
reduction for the receiver, being indifferent to the preferences of the receiver. Of course parents’ 
regards for children are somewhere between pure altruism and pure paternalism. Parents are 
concerned about a variety of aspects of their children’s well-being besides their mortality risk. 
However, parents’ interests in reducing their children’s mortality risk is likely to be greater than 
that of the children themselves, owing to children’s lack of experience with causes and risks of 
death (Cropper and Sussman, 1988; Jones-Lee, 1991; Jones-Lee, 1992).24  
 For the analysis, I simplified Jones-Lee’s unitary decision maker approach (1992) to 
modeling familial WTP for a public good that reduced mortality risk for all family members 
                                                 
23Note that respondents were told respondents that vaccines would be available at a convenient clinic. Thus, 
there should be some travel and waiting time costs even for free vaccines. Given these costs, I might not 
expect a discontinuity for free vaccination. 
 
24An additional complication is introduced when comparing a mother’s and a father’s separate valuations 
for a mortality risk reduction for one of their children. Some authors (e.g., Mount et al. 2001) have 
developed game theoretic constructs to explore how parents make joint decisions. Others (e.g., Cropper et 
al. 2004; Dickie and Gerking 2003) use a simpler unitary household model where a single decision-maker 
optimally allocates resources among family members. 
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simultaneously (as well as for the public at large). In the model, the household decision maker 
decides whether to purchase a private good that would reduce the mortality risk only for one 
member of the family. Unlike Jones-Lee’s model, the hypothetical nutritional supplement used in  
my survey was a private good that would only affect the survival probability of the family 
member that used it, (i.e. the youngest child). I assume that the decision maker maximizes the 
household utility function, which includes the family’s consumption of a numeraire good w, the 
probability of death for each of n family members prior to the next period (πi), and a vector of 
socioeconomic characteristics of each family, X. The representative utility function is represented 
as  
 (5.15) ),, . . . ,,,( 21 XwuU nπππ= .  
I assume that the utility function is increasing in w and decreasing for each πi, and that 
the marginal willingness to trade off a decrease in current consumption, w, for a decrease in πi, 
can be obtained by simple differentiation. The marginal rate of substitution between the 
numeraire good and a one-month risk reduction for one member can be considered as the VSL. 
(5.16) iii wwUUVSL ππ ∂∂=∂∂∂∂= /)/(/)/( .  
 This calculation assumes that VSL is constant regardless of the magnitude of mortality 
risk reduction. Given the large mortality risk reductions (20% or 60% of total health-related 
mortality risk) specified in the VSL scenario, the results may be limited by this assumption. 
The econometric model is based on a stochastic utility function v(h,y;X) + εh, with h = 1 
if the respondent wanted to purchase the supplement and h = 0 if not. The other components are 
household income y and a vector of socioeconomic variables X expected to influence preferences. 
The stochastic term εh is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. Similar to other 
studies (Alberini 1995; Alberini, Boyle, and Welsh 2003), I find that answers to the follow-up 
price question in the survey were influenced by presentation of the initial price, and suffer from 
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starting point bias issues.25 As a result, I only use the first price to model the decision to purchase. 
The probability that an offer is accepted at price Ai is 
(5.17)  [ ] )(F)F(     )(0v  )(1vPr  )yesPr( θ,Avee; X, y; X A , y i10iiiii =∆−=−>−−=  
 
5.4 Net societal benefit optimization 
The calculation of economic benefits begins with equations 5.14 and 5.15 such that the 
private willingness-to-pay for direct protection, WTPdi, as a function of price for subgroup i is 
(5.18) WTPdi = (pi* - 1/βpi) · exp(Xiβi) + βpi ⋅ pi*)  =  (pi* - 1/βpi) · αi · exp(βpi ⋅ pi*), 
where pi* is the optimal price for subgroup i, βpi is the price coefficient for subgroup i, and αi is 
the demand intercept for subgroup i, where αi is expressed as the number of people vaccinated at 
price equal to zero (not the fraction of population expressed as a percentage). 
Eq. 5.18 is maximized when price is set equal to zero and coverage rates are maximized. 
The maximum private WTP for direct protection, WTPMAXdi, is 
(5.19) WTPMAXdi = (-1/βpi) · exp(Xiβi) = (-αi /βpi). 
In the absence of herd protection, only vaccinated persons’ risk of infection is reduced by a 
fraction representing the direct efficacy of vaccination. Unvaccinated persons’ risk of infection 
would remain equal to the pre-vaccination baseline. Before defining economic benefits of herd 
protection, it is necessary to define functional forms for the coverage-incidence relationships 
effected by herd protection for both the vaccinated and unvaccinated subgroups. The variable 
COVi is coverage for subgroup i and is based on the demand relationship: COVi = αi · exp(βpi ⋅ 
pi*). The coverage-incidence relationship for unvaccinated persons in subgroup i (INCUi) is 
assumed to be the following exponential relationship  
                                                 
25A bivariate normal model was also used to jointly model the responses to the first and second prices. The 
coefficients estimates for the two questions were statistically different at the 1% level. I also estimated 
interval models based on normal, lognormal, and Weibull distributions. The Weibull distribution best fit the 
data and provided average WTP estimates that were very similar to those from the probit models. (Median 
WTP estimates from the Weibull interval model were smaller.)  
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(5.20) INCUi = INCU0i ⋅ exp(γi,1 · COV1 + γi,2 · COV2 + …) 
where INCU0i is the baseline incidence for group i and γi,1 and γi,2 are herd protection 
coefficients. The choice of an exponential function ensures that the magnitude of incidence 
reduction will be greatest at low coverage rates and that the rate of change will decrease as 
coverage increases. If COVi represents the number of people vaccinated in each subgroup, the 
herd protection coefficients determine the impact increased coverage on indirect protection by 
subgroup, allowing for differential rates of impact by subgroup. Thus, an increase in coverage for 
subgroup 1 may have a greater impact on herd protection than an increase in coverage for 
subgroup 2.  
 Next, I assume that the direct efficacy of vaccination, Eff, is constant such that the 
vaccinated subgroup incidence is a fraction of the unvaccinated incidence rate, specifically 1 - 
Eff. Thus, the expected incidence rate for vaccinated persons in subgroup i (INCVi) is  
(5.21) INCVi = (1-Eff) · INCUi. 
These INCUi and INCVi relationships can be used in combination with the willingness-to-
pay for direct protection functions to estimate the value of indirect protection. The estimated 
benefits for vaccinated persons can be calculated based on eq. 5.19 for WTPdi and the difference 
in incidence reduction with and without consideration for herd protection. This difference can be 
calculated from (1-Eff) · (INCU0i – INCUi). I assume that vaccinated persons would value the 
reduced risk of infection due to herd protection; however, I do not have any empirical data on the 
prevalence elasticity of demand. In the absence of data, I assume that vaccinated persons’ 
willingness-to-pay for indirect protection, WTPvii, are proportional to the magnitude of (1-Eff) · 
(INCU0i – INCUi) according to 
(5.22) WTPvii = πv · Eff · (INCU0i – INCUi) / (Eff · INCU0i) · WTPdi 
where πv is a correction factor for the value of indirect versus direct protection for vaccinated 
persons. The fraction, Eff · (INCU0i – INCUi) / (Eff · INCU0i), represents the ratio of the 
magnitude of indirect protection to the magnitude of direct protection without herd protection. 
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For example, assume that the baseline incidence, INCU0i, is 1 case per 1,000 persons, vaccination 
efficacy, Eff, is 65% and that the incidence for unvaccinated persons, INCUi, is 0.50 cases per 
1,000. Without herd protection, the incidence of vaccinated persons would be (1 – Eff) · INCU0i = 
0.35 cases per 1,000 persons. With herd protection incidence declines to (1 – Eff) · INCU0i = 
0.175 cases per 1,000 persons. Thus, the ratio of indirect to direct protection would be 0.175/0.65 
= 0.27, indicating that the additional indirect protection is about a quarter of the expected direct 
vaccine protection without regard for herd protection. This is multiplied by a correction factor, 
πv, such that the sum of willingness-to-pay for direct and indirect protection for vaccination 
persons is (1 + 0.75 · 0.27) · WTPdi or 1.20 · WTPdi 
 Next, I develop an expression to estimate unvaccinated persons’ WTP for indirect 
protection. Recall that αi is the fraction of the population that would receive a free vaccination. 
For now, I assume that the rest of the population, POPi - αi, has no value for indirect protection. 
Thus, I focus on the remaining portion of the population that would accept a free vaccination, but 
would not purchase a vaccination at price pi*. Recall from eq. 5.19 that the total WTP for a free 
vaccination program without consideration of herd protection is WTPMAXdi or – αi / βpi for 
subgroup i. Next, I define the change in WTP benefits in moving from a program that offers 
vaccines at price pi* to a free program. 
(5.23) WTPMAXdi - WTPdi = (-αi / βpi) - (pi* - 1/βpi) · αi · exp (βpi · pi*) 
This would represent the potential value of protection for the unvaccinated if their 
incidence were reduced to exactly INCUi = (1-Eff) · INCU0i, i.e. the expected direct protection 
from vaccination without herd protection. Of course, it is unlikely that the unvaccinated incidence 
would be exactly (1-Eff) · INCU0i. I set up a second ratio that relates the unvaccinated incidence 
reduction due to herd protection relative to the direct-protection-induced incidence reduction 
effected by vaccination in the absence of herd protection: (INCU0i - INCUi) / (Eff · INCU0i). Using 
this ratio, the estimated willingness-to-pay for indirect protection for the unvaccinated, WTPuii is 
(5.24) WTPuii = πu · (INCU0i - INCUi) / (Eff · INCU0i) · (WTPMAXdi - WTPdi) 
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where πu is a correction factor for the value of indirect versus direct protection for the 
unvaccinated subgroup. In the sensitivity analysis, I can also assume that persons unwilling to 
purchase vaccines would have some non-zero WTP for protection. This would occur if people 
were unwilling to spend time procuring vaccinations or if they were frightened of vaccination 
side effects. I again assume that WTP is proportional to the magnitude of protection, similar to 
eqs. 5.22 and 5.24. I have already accounted for the monetary benefits for those with non-zero 
willingness-to-pay, as represented by the demand function intercept, αi. The remainder of the 
population is POPi – αi. The willingness-to-pay for indirect protection for those with zero WTP 
for vaccinations is 
(5.25) πu · (POPi – αi) · (INCU0i – INCUi) / (Eff · INCU0i) · TIME · MED_WAGE · 
CORR. 
where TIME is the average time required to receive two doses of cholera vaccine, MED_WAGE is 
median hourly wage rate, and CORR is a correction factor that relates the value time required for 
vaccination and the median wage rate. This assumes that the maximum willingness-to-pay for 
indirect protection by those unwilling to receive a free vaccination is equal to the opportunity cost 
of time required to pursue a free vaccination. 
 Next, I examine the public cost of illness avoided. This is equal to the number of cases 
avoided multiplied by the average public COI per case. I discount these savings over three years 
at 8% interest using a present worth function, PWF. The following expression summarizes the 
public COI savings, PUBSAVi, for group i. 
(5.26) PUBSAVi = PUBCOIi · PWF · (POPi · (INCU0i – INCUi) + COVi · (INCUi – 
INCVi) 
The cost function is simply assumed to be a fixed cost plus a constant variable cost 
multiplied by the coverage for each group i.  
(5.27) Total costs = F + C · (COV1 + COV2 + … ) 
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Now, I am prepared to calculate the set of optimal prices that maximize societal net 
benefits via unconstrained optimization. I exclude the unvaccinated benefits for those with zero 
WTP for vaccinations, eq. 5.25. I revisit these benefits in the sensitivity analysis. Without these 
benefits, net societal benefits are calculated from the sum of eqs. 5.18, 5.22, 5.24 and 5.26 less eq. 
5.27. If I assume that there are four subgroups, the complete expression would be 
(5.28) ∑ =
4
1i
[(1 + πv · Eff · (INCU0i – INCUi) / (Eff · INCU0i)) · (pi* - 1/βpi) · αi · 
exp(βpi ⋅ pi*) + πu · (INCU0i - INCUi) / (Eff · INCU0i) · ((-αi / βpi) - (pi* - 1/βpi) · 
αi · exp (βpi · pi*)) + PUBCOIi · PWF · (POPi · (INCU0i – INCUi) + COVi · 
(INCUi – INCVi)] - F - C · (COV1 + COV2 + COV3 + COV4) 
 = ∑ =
4
1i
[ WTPdi + WTPvii + WTPuii + PUBSAVi] - F - C · (COV1 + COV2 + 
COV3 + COV4) 
An optimal set of prices, p1*, p2*, p3*, p4*, can be solved for via Lagrangian analysis or 
similar numerical methods. If public COI benefits are small relative to WTP benefits and herd 
protection benefits are minimal, the optimal solution would set price equal to the marginal cost of 
vaccination.  Eq. 5.28 assumes that either the public health ministry or an external donor would 
be willing to pay the difference between socially optimal prices and revenue neutral prices. 
However, the program may be constrained to be revenue neutral. The net revenue constraint is 
program revenues plus public COI savings less program costs as shown in eq. 5.29. 
(5.29) ∑ =
4
1i
[COVi · pi* + PUBSAVi]  - F - C · (COV1 + COV2 + COV3 + COV4) ≥ Z 
where COVi · pi* represents the revenue generate through vaccination sales to subgroup i at price 
pi* and Z is a fixed external contribution which may be zero. The maximum societal net benefits 
subject to a revenue constraint can be solved via a Lagrange multiplier approach using the 
following equation 
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(5.30) L1 = ∑ =
4
1i
[ WTPdi + WTPvii + WTPuii + PUBSAVi] - F - C · (COV1 + COV2 + 
COV3 + COV4) – λ1 · (∑ =
4
1i
[COVi · pi* + PUBSAVi]  - F - C · (COV1 + COV2 + COV3 + 
COV4) – Z) 
where λ1 is the undetermined Lagrangian multiplier, which denotes the marginal change in the net 
societal benefits per unit change in present value net revenue. The optimal prices pi* can be found 
numerically or by using calculus to solve for i = 1 to 4, ∂L1/∂(pi) = ∂L1/∂(π)=0. 
In summary, the net societal benefit maximization equations contain many variables 
despite a number of simplifying assumptions, including the following: 
♦ I assume that demand is independent of herd protection effects. While this is 
reasonable for the first vaccination period, it seems likely that prospective 
purchasers would change their behavior in subsequent periods as they become 
aware of herd protection impacts. 
♦ I model demand based on an average uptake of vaccinations for each subgroup. 
However, there may be spatial differences in uptake rates within subgroups. 
♦ I assume that indirect protection benefits can be calculated based on simple 
fractional incidence reduction relationships because I do not have any data 
regarding valuation of indirect protection. 
♦ I assume that the population can be modeled based on relatively simplistic 
subdivisions of the population. I assume four subdivisions based on the 
subdivisions I use in the empirical models in Chapter 7. 
♦ I assume a linear marginal cost function. 
 
5.5 Public health outcome (DALY) optimization 
The analysis in Section 5.4 requires monetization of the economic costs and benefits of 
vaccination. In this section, I reexamine vaccination programs in terms of public health outcomes, 
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specifically, cases avoided and DALYs saved. I already estimated cases avoided in the estimation 
of public COI savings. In order to calculate the number of DALYs saved, it is necessary to 
estimate disutility units per case. The disutility depends on the degree of incapacitation 
experienced during the illness, the duration of illness, the case fatality rate, and the expected 
number of life years lost per case (Jeuland et al., 2008).  
The average number of DALYs saved per case avoided is calculated for each of i groups 
over the duration of the program. The total number of DALYs incorporate both reductions in 
morbidity (years of life lost to disability, YLD) and mortality (years of life lost, YLL). I used 
uniform age weights that apply the same value to an extra year of life regardless of the age of the 
recipient. I also use country-specific life expectancies, LE, based on ICDDR,B life tables for the 
Matlab area ((ICDDRB), 2005). The numbers of life years saved for each age group are 
discounted using a 3% real discount rate.  
(5.31) YLDi saved per case = (1 – CFRi) · DURi ·  DALY weight 
(5.32) YLLi saved per case = (CFRi / 0.03 ·  (1 – exp(–0.03 ·  LEi)) 
(5.33) DALYi saved per case avoided = YLLi+ YLDi / (1 + 0.03)t 
where CFRi is the case fatality rate, DURi is the disease’s average duration, and t is the time span 
of vaccination protection, DALYweight is a weight that compares the disutility of living with the 
disease to death. The total number of DALYs saved is equal to the number of DALYs saved per 
case multiplied by the number of cases avoided. The objective function for DALY maximization 
is thus 
(5.34) ∑ =
4
1i
DALYi · (POPi · (INCU0i – INCUi) + COVi · (INCUi – INCVi)) 
 Without a revenue constraint, the maximum number of DALYs saved would result from 
a free vaccination program. For comparison with the net societal benefit optimization, it is again 
necessary to include a net revenue constraint. This net revenue constraint is the sum of 
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vaccination sales revenue and public treatment cost savings less program cost. The full 
Lagrangian equation for DALY maximization with a net revenue constraint is thus 
(5.35) L2 = ∑ =
4
1i
[DALYi · (POPi · (INCU0i – INCUi) + COVi · (INCUi – INCVi))] -  
λ2 · ∑ =
4
1i
[COVi · pi* + PUBSAVi]  - F - C · (COV1 + COV2 + COV3 + COV4) - Z] 
where λ2 is the undetermined Lagrangian multiplier, which denotes the marginal change in the 
DALYs saved per unit change in present value net revenue. The optimal prices pi* can be found 
numerically or by using calculus to solve for i = 1 to 4, ∂L2/∂(pi) = ∂L2/∂(π)=0.  
I am not aware of any published articles that examine how to maximize DALYs saved 
subject to a revenue constraint. This may be used when considering how to set prices across 
subgroups for a single intervention or it may be possible to expand this analysis to consider how 
to set prices for multiple interventions given a single revenue constraint. It is necessary to 
understand the price-coverage and coverage-herd protection relationships to employ this analysis. 
These data are not commonly available, which would preclude the widespread use of this 
approach. 
For locations where data are available, it is useful to compare approaches that maximize 
societal net benefits with those that maximize DALYs. When comparing eq. 5.30 with eq. 5.35, 
the net revenue constraints are the same. Thus, differences arise from the marginal change in the 
DALYs saved per unit change in present value net revenue compared to the marginal change in 
the societal net benefits per unit change in present value net revenue. The herd protection effects 
should be similar for both the societal net benefit calculation and for the DALY calculations. All 
else equal, the subgroups with greater impacts on herd protection should be charged lower user 
fees. For example, since school-age children have a greater impact on influenza vaccine herd 
protection than other age groups, they should be charged lower user fees since herd protection 
effects may be experienced across subgroups.  
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When comparing one subgroup to another, differences in baseline incidence rates and 
DALYs saved per case would influence optimal prices such that, all else equal, subgroups with 
higher baseline incidence rates, INCU0i, and more DALYs saved per case avoided, DALYi, should 
be charged smaller user fees. In contrast, if public COI savings are small in comparison to 
program costs, net societal benefits are maximized when all groups were charged the same price 
(i.e. a price similar to the marginal cost of vaccination). In fact, incidence rates may not have 
much influence on WTP benefits. For example, in Kolkata, private WTP for cholera vaccines was 
higher in a average incidence, middle class neighborhood than in a high incidence, low income 
neighborhood (Whittington et al., 2009). If public treatment cost savings are large compared to 
program costs, subgroups with higher incidence rates and higher public COI per case estimates, 
PUBCOIi should be charged lower prices. 
  
 
 
6 Contingent valuation survey results for household cholera vaccination demand and 
children’s value of statistical life 
This chapter presents the estimates of household cholera vaccine demand and estimates 
of children’s VSL based on results from my contingent valuation studies. Section 6.1 summarizes 
respondent and household characteristics of survey participants. Section 6.2 presents a statistical 
analysis of household cholera vaccine demand. Section 6.3 presents a statistical analysis of VSL 
estimates for the youngest children of households based on the nutritional supplement scenario. 
Finally, Section 6.4 presents a comparison of implicit VSL estimates generated from a 
combination of cholera vaccine WTP data and cholera COI data with the VSL estimates 
generated from the nutritional supplement scenario. The article published in Health Policy 
summarizing the household cholera vaccination demand is included at Appendix 2. The 
children’s VSL study is formatted as an article for submission and is included as Appendix 3. 
 
6.1 Household sample characteristics 
Prior to examining household demand for cholera vaccinations, I summarize 
socioeconomic and other characteristics of the sample. Since the optimization models subdivide 
populations into high and average incidence subgroups, summary statistics are provided by these 
subgroups in Table 6.1. The high incidence group represents households located in the villages 
with the highest incidence (top 10% based on cases treated at the ICDDR,B hospital over the 
previous 10 years). The average incidence group represents households in the remaining 90% of 
villages. Incidence rates were not a sampling criterion; thus, these groupings were created after 
data were collected. In my sample, the top 10% of villages experienced incidence rates that were 
twice as large as the remaining 90% of villages. Note that estimates for the entire Matlab area
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would indicate that the top 10% of villages experience about four times greater incidence than the 
remaining villages (See Table 4.1). In addition, the incidence rates observed for villages in my 
sample are about twice as high as for surveillance area as a whole in Table 4.1. This suggests that 
incidence rates for all of the villages in my sample may be greater than for the remainder of the 
surveillance area. Recall that I was unable to sample from the entire ICDDR,B surveillance area 
due to travel time constraints. It is notable that ratio of high-to-average incidence villages is larger 
for shorter observation periods (i.e. using a 3-year observation period instead of a 10-year 
period).   
Some of the overall average characteristics were summarized in Chapter 2. The average 
respondent was about 40 years old with less than five years of education. The average household 
had about 3 adults, 2 school-age children and 0.7 children less than five years of age. These 
households had average household incomes of about US$75 and monthly per capita incomes of 
about US$21 after adjusting household sizes by OECD equivalency scales. Education rates were 
slightly higher in the average incidence villages, but differences were generally not significant. 
Respondents in the high incidence areas were significantly more likely to be unable to read a 
newspaper. The differences in educational achievement did not appear to influence income as the 
average household per capita incomes were exactly the same across groups. Emch (1999) also 
found that neither household income, nor household assets were correlated with cholera incidence 
based on a study of patients treated at the ICDDR,B hospital. 
Descriptive statistics of experience with and attitudes towards cholera and vaccines are 
summarized in Table 6.2. Households in the average incidence villages were significantly more 
likely to treat drinking water, although very few households treated water in either group. In 
addition, most of the high incidence villages were located in the government service area. This is 
not surprising because there have been fewer health related research studies conducted in the 
government service area. In the high incidence villages, a larger fraction of respondents reported 
that they had experienced a case of cholera within the household. However, more respondents in 
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the average incidence villages reported that they knew someone outside the household that 
experienced cholera. Respondents from average incidence villages were also more likely to 
believe that cholera is common in their community, that their children are likely to contract 
cholera and that cholera is serious or very serious for adults. Thus, it appears that the fear of 
cholera may actually be lessened in villages where the disease is more common. The differences 
in attitudinal variables are not large, but they are significant.  
Importantly, the average travel time from village to hospital is not statistically different 
between average incidence and high incidence villages. This suggests that differences in 
incidence rates are not caused by differences in hospital accessibility across villages. It is also 
important to note that residents of high incidence villages were significantly less likely to be 
selected for the time-to-think treatment. 
Table 6.1. Variable definition and descriptive statistics (Respondent and household characteristics) 
  
Average 
incidence 
High 
incidence 
Variable name Description Mean (SD) Mean 
(SD) 
 (N = 524)  (N = 67) 
Respondent characteristics   
Male respndent            Gender =1 if male, = 0 if female 0.50 (0.50) 0.43 
(0.50) 
Age Age (yrs), continuous 40 (10) 40 (9.0) 
Practice Hinduism  Religion = 1 if Hindu, 0 = else 0.07** 
(0.26) 
0** (0) 
Education 1–5 years = 1 if respondent completed 1–5 years of school, 
0 = else 
0.36 (0.48) 0.33 
(0.47) 
Education 5–10 years, 
vocational 
= 1 if respondent completed 5–10 years of school, 
vocational school, or madrassa, 0 = else 
0.18* (0.39) 0.13* 
(0.34) 
Education more than 10 
years 
= 1 if respondent completed university, 
postgraduate or professional course, 0 = else 
0.13 (0.33) 0.04 
(0.21) 
Unable to read = 1 if respondent is not able to read a newspaper, 0.51*** 0.69*** 
117 
  
Average 
incidence 
High 
incidence 
Variable name Description Mean (SD) Mean 
(SD) 
 (N = 524)  (N = 67) 
0 = else (0.50) (0.47) 
Household characteristics   
Infants number of infants (<1 year), continuous 0.12 (0.34) 0.16 
(0.37) 
Young children number of children age 1–5, continuous 0.75 (0.72) 0.66 
(0.69) 
School-aged children number of children 6–17, continuous 1.7** (1.1) 2.0** 
(1.3) 
Adults number of adults age 18–65, continuous 3.1 (1.5) 3.2 (1.6) 
Monthly income per 
capita 
hh income divided by number of  hh members 
(US$ per month), continuous 
14 (11) 14 (12) 
Log income per capita Natural log of hh income divided by number of  
hh members, continuous 
7.3 (0.7) 7.3 (0.72) 
Gender of hh’s youngest 
child 
=1 if male, =0 if female 0.52 (0.5) 0.45 (0.5) 
Age of hh’s youngest 
child 
Age (yrs), continuous 6.5 (4.9) 5.6 (3.9) 
Household income 
quartile 2b 
=1 if hh income is between about 25th and 50th 
percentiles 
0.15 (0.36) 0.07 
(0.26) 
Household income 
quartile 3b 
=1 if hh income is between about 50th and 75th 
percentiles 
0.23 (0.42) 0.16 
(0.37) 
Household income 
quartile 4b 
=1 if hh income is between about 75th and 99th 
percentiles 
0.27 (0.45) 0.27 
(0.45) 
a
 This corresponds to an average household monthly income of US$75 (Tk. 5000). 
b
 The household income could not be divided into exact quartiles because a number of households often 
reported the same income. For example, about 17% of the population reported an income of Tk 100 per 
day. For these duplicate values, households were assigned to the lower income quartile. As a result, the 
lowest income quartile included 32% of the households. 
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Table 6.2. Variable definition and descriptive statistics (Perceptions of disease, vaccine history and 
characteristics of research design) 
 
Average 
incidence 
High 
incidence 
 
Risk behavior, perceptions of disease, vaccination history 
Average 
(SD) 
Average 
(SD) 
Treat drinking water = 1 if household treats water for drinking, 0 = 
else 
0.20** 
(0.40) 
0.07** 
(0.26) 
Someone in household has 
had cholera 
= 1 if someone in household has had cholera, 
0 = else 
                   
0.36* (0.48) 0.46* (0.50) 
Know person who has had 
cholera (outside hh) 
= 1 if knows someone outside hh who has had 
cholera, but not some in hh, 0 = else    
0.29** 
(0.45) 
0.13** 
(0.34) 
Cholera is very serious for 
adults 
= 1 if respondent believes cholera is (very) 
serious for adults, 0 = else  0.65* (0.48) 0.54* (0.50) 
Cholera is serious for 
children 
= 1 if cholera (very) serious for children, 0 = 
else   
 
0.84 (0.37) 0.85 (0.35) 
Cholera likely for 
respondent 
= 1 if respondent believes he or she is likely 
or very likely to contract cholera in next 5 
years, 0 = else 
0.21 (0.41) 0.18 (0.38) 
Cholera likely for 
respondent’s child 
= 1 if respondent believes his or her child will 
likely contract cholera in next 5 years, 0 = else 
0.42** 
(0.49) 
0.25** 
(0.43) 
Believes cholera is 
common in community 
= 1 if respondent believes cholera is common 
in his or her community, 0 = else 
0.24** 
(0.43) 
0.13** 
(0.34) 
Respondent believes 
vaccine is still working 
= 1 if respondent had oral cholera vaccine and 
believes that it is still effective, 0 = else 0.24 (0.43) 0.27 (0.44) 
Respondent unsatisfied 
with vaccine 
= 1 if respondent was not satisfied with 
previous vaccine for self or family member, 0 
= else 
0.025 (0.16) 0.015 (0.12) 
Average annual incidence 
in villages over previous 10 
years 
=average annual cases per 1000 persons 1.0*** (0.5) 2.1*** (0.2) 
Average travel time to 
village by traditional 
methods 
=minutes to travel to village reported by 
enumerators 72 (31) 82 (26) 
Characteristics of research design   
Time to think (TTT) = 1 if given time to think overnight, =0 else 0.49** (0.50) 
0.34** 
(0.47) 
ICDDR,B Health service area; = 1 if ICDDR,B, = 0 if government 
0.40*** 
(0.49) 
0.05*** 
(0.20) 
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6.2 Household cholera vaccination demand 
Next, I summarize household cholera vaccination demand results from the contingent 
valuation survey. The average fraction of household members vaccinated decreases as the price 
increases and for respondents given time to think (TTT). In the raw data, I find that many 
respondents (74%) either decide to purchase vaccines for all family members or for none of their 
family members. Relatively fewer respondents (26%) choose to purchase vaccines for some, but 
not all of their family members. 
Negative binomial regression results for the household demand model are summarized in 
Table 6.3. Average marginal effects, which reflect the change in population average demand for a 
unit change in a single variable, are summarized in Table 6.4. Statistically significant variable 
coefficients typically correspond to statistically significant marginal effects. Price is highly 
significant and there is an average marginal decrease in stated demand of 0.12 adult vaccines and 
0.20 child vaccines per family for a price increase from US$1.00 to US$1.50. The change in 
vaccine demand is larger for children because the demand intercept for children is greater. Note 
that the adult and child price coefficients are similar in magnitude.  
Village incidence rates appear to be negatively correlated with demand; however, 
coefficient estimates are not statistically significant for either adult or child models. While it 
might be expected that higher incidence villages should have higher WTP, it appears that the 
discrepancy in incidence rates were not large enough across the sampled villages to result in 
statistically significant differences in WTP. In addition, attitudinal data suggests that households 
in high incidence villages tend to believe cholera is less serious than households in other villages. 
Generally, respondents residing in the ICDDR,B service area and TTT respondents state that they 
would purchase fewer vaccines for both age groups; average marginal decreases are about 0.34 
adult vaccines and 0.48 child vaccines if given TTT and 0.21 adult vaccines and 0.18 child 
vaccines for the ICDDR,B service area. Male respondents and respondents from wealthier 
families purchase significantly more vaccines; average marginal demand increases by 0.16 adult 
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vaccines and 0.30 child vaccines per 1 log unit increase in monthly per capita income. Average 
marginal demand decreases by 0.003 adult vaccines and 0.012 child vaccines as respondent age 
increases by one year. As expected, respondents with larger families are shown to purchase more 
vaccines. This is true for all age groups.  
Table 6.3. Household cholera vaccine demand negative binomial regression results 
Model  Adults (n=582) Children age 1-17 
(n=582) 
Price (Tk) –0.0049*** –0.0054*** 
 (–9.1) (–11) 
Average annual incidence over last 10 years -116 -91  
 (-1.25) (-1.21) 
Time to think –0.47*** –0.44*** 
 (–4.4) (–5.2) 
Male respondent 0.33*** 0.077 
 (2.76) (0.80) 
Resident from ICDDR,B service area –0.29* –0.17* 
 (2.44) (–1.80) 
Age 0.054 –0.011** 
 (0.84) (–2.0) 
Education 1–5 yrs. 0.16 0.10 
 (1.23) (0.98) 
Education 6–10 yrs. 0.38** 0.24** 
 (2.39) (1.97) 
Education >10 yrs. 0.11 0.09 
 (0.57) (0.62) 
Log income per capita 0.25*** 0.29*** 
 (2.74) (3.9) 
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Model  Adults (n=582) Children age 1-17 
(n=582) 
No. of infants < age 1 -0.055 0.02 
 (-0.37) (0.17) 
No. of children age 1–5 -0.038 0.40*** 
 (-0.53) (6.9) 
No. of children age 6–17 -0.088 0.39*** 
 (-1.64) (8.9) 
No. of adults age >18 0.35*** 0.02 
 (11.2) (0.65) 
Practice Hinduism 0.31 0.04 
 (1.59) (0.23) 
Serious or very serious for children -0.16 -0.15 
 (-1.1) (–1.4) 
Serious or very serious for adults 0.28** 0.26*** 
 (2.46) (2.93) 
Cholera likely for respondent 0.24* 0.18* 
 (1.84) (1.65) 
Cholera likely for children 0.15 0.02 
 (1.34) (0.26) 
Someone in hh has had cholera 0.05 -0.028 
 (0.43) -(0.30) 
Know someone other than hh member that 
has had cholera 
-0.25* -0.11 
 (-1.77) (–1.03) 
Resp had prior vaccine; was satisfied and  
thinks vaccine still works 
0.19 0.19** 
(0.92) (2.07) 
Resp. had prior vaccine; not satisfied -0.57* -0.06 
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Model  Adults (n=582) Children age 1-17 
(n=582) 
 (-1.22) (-0.19) 
Treats water -0.021 0.15 
 (-0.16) (1.54) 
Constant –2.67*** –1.87*** 
 (–2.9) (–3.29) 
Pseudo-R2 0.020 0.19 
    * indicates significance at the 10% level 
  ** at the 5% level 
*** at the 1% level 
T–statistic in parentheses 
 
Table 6.4. Average marginal effects for household negative binomial regression 
Price (US$; 1 unit US$0.50) -0.12*** (-8.0) -0.20*** (-10.2) 
Average annual incidence over last 10 
years 
-81 (-1.2) -98 (-1.22) 
Time to think -0.34*** (-4.3) -0.48*** (-5.2) 
Male  0.22** (2.5) 0.083 (0.80) 
Resident from ICDDR,B service area -0.21** (-2.53 -0.18* (-1.85) 
Age (yrs) 0.0032 (0.67) -0.012** (-1.95) 
Education (category- 0, 1—5, 6—10, >10) 0.056 (1.3) 0.062 (1.27) 
Log income per capita (log Tk per cap) 0.16* (2.5) 0.30*** (3.81) 
No. of infants < age 1 -0.044 (-0.39) 0.015 (0.11) 
No. of children age 1–5 -0.026 (-0.49) 0.43*** (7.1) 
No. of children age 6–17 -0.064 (-1.6) 0.42*** (9.4) 
No. of adults age >18 0.25 (11) 0.017 (0.60) 
Practice Hinduism 0.26 (1.4) 0.054 (0.27) 
Cholera likely for respondent 0.22* (1.9) 0.23* (1.7) 
Cholera likely for children 0.10 (1.2) 0.01 (0.10) 
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Someone in household has had cholera 0.031 (0.34) -0.03 (-0.30) 
Unsatisfied with previous vaccine -0.35* (-1.9) -0.11 (-1.0) 
Treats water -0.013 (-0.14) 0.17 (1.44) 
    * indicates significance at the 10% level 
  ** at the 5% level 
*** at the 1% level 
T–statistic in parentheses 
 
The number of vaccines purchased increases significantly for respondents who believe 
that cholera is a serious disease for adults or who believe that adults are likely to contract cholera. 
The average marginal increase in demand if respondents believed that cholera is likely for adults 
is about 0.22 for both adult and child vaccines. The difference is much smaller and not significant 
for the same belief for children. This discrepancy in the importance of attitudes for adults 
compared to children might result if parents are more risk averse about their children’s health 
than their own. Respondents who had previously received a cholera vaccine generally stated that 
they would purchase more vaccines for their families, unless they were not satisfied with the first 
vaccine. Previous recipients wanted additional vaccines despite the widespread belief that their 
previous vaccine was still effective in reducing risk. I find that respondents who treat their 
drinking water purchase more vaccines for children, but the difference is of borderline 
significance. The possible correlation between vaccine demand and water treatment would 
suggest common preferences for risk averting behaviors. I present a single model in Table 6.3, 
but I tested a number of different models. For example, I also estimated models to separately 
predict demand for high incidence and average incidence subgroups. The results from these 
models could be used to fit separate demand functions for high incidence villages. However, 
these models had fewer significant variables and likelihood ratio tests suggested that combined 
models performed better. In addition, since incidence rates did not significantly influence 
demand, I chose to use the same demand functions for high incidence and average incidence 
villages in the optimization models.  
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Figure 6.1 shows raw and predicted household demand for adult and child vaccines as 
functions of price. Comparing the raw data to the predicted data, it appears that the predictions 
may underestimate demand at low prices and overestimate demand at higher prices. It is 
important to note that the raw data do not account for non-price variables used in the multivariate 
predictions. Figure 6.1 shows that the predicted fraction of children vaccinated is higher than that 
for adults at any price. These findings suggest that respondents place precedence on vaccinating 
children over adults. This is consistent with my findings that cholera incidence and diarrhea 
mortality are greater for children, especially young children. My best WTP estimates are about 
US$1.0 per adult and US$1.6 per child age 1-17 years. The median WTP corresponds to the price 
in Figure 6.1 at which 50% of an age group population is vaccinated. The median WTP is about 
US$0.35 for children and it would be necessary to pay adults to achieve a 50% coverage rate. The 
large differences between mean and median WTP estimates indicate that there is great variation 
in WTP for cholera vaccines among households. In other words, there is a large portion of the 
population that is only willing to pay small amounts of money if any for cholera vaccines, while 
there is also a small fraction of the population with high WTP. Specifically, although the 
estimated average adult WTP is about US$1, I predict that only 25% of the adult population 
would choose to purchase a US$1 vaccine. The remaining 75% of adults would choose not to be 
vaccinated if price were set at the average WTP estimate. 
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Figure 6.1. Predicted and raw coverage rates as functions of price by age 
 
In summary, vaccine demand is strongly influenced by price, income, self-perceived risk 
and severity of disease, and whether respondents received time to think about their decision. 
While self perceived risk tended to be significant, estimates of actual incidence by village are not 
statistically significant for adults or children. In fact the coefficient estimate is negative, which 
would indicate that, all else equal, households that experience greater incidence would be less 
likely to purchase a vaccine. While this may seem illogical, I did find that risk perceptions were 
generally less in the high incidence villages. The residents of high incidence villages were less 
likely to think cholera was serious or that their family members would likely contract the disease. 
Thus, fear of the disease may have been greater in the average incidence villages.  
However, there is a caveat for this finding. Note that incidence measurements are 
confounded by distance to the ICDDR,B hospital (i.e. villages further from hospital are more 
likely to self-treat or visit other health facilities). The distance from village to hospital has a 
negative correlation with incidence at the 25% significance level (the sample was restricted to 
villages located within 2 hours travel distance of hospital. The correlation would likely have been 
greater if I had included all villages.) Ali et al. (2006) also found a strong negative correlation 
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between incidence of cases treated at the hospital and distance from the hospital. However, on 
average for my sample, the travel times from high incidence villages are not statistically 
significantly different than for the remaining 90% of villages. Thus, while travel distance is 
important, it is not the only driver of variation in incidence. 
There is likely to be less incidence variation from one village to the next in the Matlab 
area than between slum, middle class and affluent neighborhoods in urban areas (e.g., in Matlab). 
In those situations, it is likely that proper accounting for incidence would have a greater effect on 
vaccine demand and policy analysis in general. 
 
6.3 VSL estimate for children 
The results from the VSL study are discussed in more detail in Appendix 3. For this 
study, parents were asked if they would be willing to purchase a nutritional supplement that 
would reduce their youngest child’s risk of death from all disease-related causes by an 
exogenously assigned 20% or 60%. Parents were only asked about their youngest child and 
would have to pay for the supplement every month to maintain protection. I summarize the raw 
demand data by age and percentage risk reduction in Table 6.5. I do not include results for 
children less than one year of age because their baseline risk is much greater than other ages and 
because I am not sure how breast-feeding mothers would interpret the usability of the 
hypothetical nutritional supplement. Households in which the youngest child is less than a year 
old are omitted from all analyses. As shown in Table 2.1, the annual baseline risks of non-
accident mortality are about 2.1x10-3 for the children between 1 and at 2.9 years, 1.1x10-3 for 
children between 3 and 4.9 years and about 0.5x10-3 for children older than 5. The effective risk 
reduction is the baseline risk for that age group multiplied by the percentage risk reduction that 
was randomly assigned, either 20% or 60%. With four different baseline mortality risk rates for 
each of the four age groups and two exogenously assigned percentage risk reduction scenarios, 
there are eight different effective risk reduction values faced by survey respondents as shown in 
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Table 6.5. Since sampling was not stratified by age, some of sample sizes by price are quite 
small. As a result, there would appear to be some kinks in the demand curve; however, these 
disappear when results are aggregated over the whole sample. Generally, the fraction of the 
parents willing to purchase monthly supplements for their youngest child is greater at lower 
prices and for larger effective risk reductions. 
It is easier to visualize trends by combining these data into two subgroups: a large risk 
reduction group and a small risk reduction group. I use an annual risk cutoff of 4 x 10-4 to define 
the high and low risk groups and plot raw demand as a function of price in Figure 5.4. This figure 
shows that the distribution of WTP for the large risk reduction may have a large tail, which 
indicates that a small fraction of the population would purchase the supplement at very high 
prices. The tail appears to be much smaller for the lower effective risk reduction group. Although 
stated demand is greater for the group that received the larger risk reduction, the difference in 
demand is smaller than would be expected if WTP were linearly correlated with risk reduction 
magnitude.  
Nonparametric Turnbull lower-bound estimators (Haab and McConnell 2002), can be 
calculated based on the raw demand reported in Table 6.5. The average WTP per month varies 
between US$0.6 and US$3, and generally decreases as the effective risk reduction increases. It 
should be noted that these estimates are very sensitive to uptake at the highest price. Given the 
small sample sizes associated with each cell, a single affirmative response to the highest price has 
a large impact on the Turnbull estimator. These Turnbull estimates can be converted into VSL 
estimates for each subgroup by dividing the average monthly WTP by the monthly mortality risk 
reduction. Because the data per cell are limited, I average the VSL estimates across the large and 
small percentage change scenarios for each age group. The average VSL estimate is smaller for 
children between 1 and 2.9 years, but relatively constant for children older than 3. It is not 
surprising that VSL estimates are smallest for the youngest age group because their baseline risk 
is twice that for children between 3 and 4.9 years of age and four times greater than children older 
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than 5 years. In order to observe equivalent VSL estimates across age groups, the young 
children’s WTP would have to twice as great relative to 3-4.9 year olds, and four times greater 
than older children to balance the difference in mortality rates. 
 
Figure 6.2. Raw demand for hypothetical mortality risk reduction 
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 Table 6.5. Raw demand data and Turnbull estimates by age 
Age 
group 
Baseline 
annual 
risk 
(1x10-3) 
% risk 
change 
Effective annual 
risk change 
(1x10-3)  
Coverage 
at 
US$0.15 
Coverage 
at 
US$0.30 
Coverage 
at 
US$0.74 
Coverage 
at 
US$1.49 
Coverage 
at 
US$7.44 
Turnbull 
Avg. WTP 
per month 
Turnbull 
Avg. VSL 
1-2.9 
yr 2.1 
20% 0.42 0.9 
(n=9) 
0.7 
(n=17) 
0.8 
(n=16) 
0.4 
(n=21) 
0.2 
(n=6) 
$2.0 $40,000 
60% 1.26 0.9 
(n=10) 
0.6 
(n=22) 
0.7 
(n=13) 
0.6 
(n=16) 
0.1 
(n=8) 
$1.5 
3-4.9 
yr 1.1 
20% 0.22 1 
(n=9) 
0.6 
(n=14) 
0.4 
(n=8) 
0.6 
(n=8) 
0.1 
(n=11) 
$1.3 $60,000 
60% 0.66 0.9 
(n=7) 
0.7 
(n=16) 
0.4 
(n=15) 
0.4 
(n=5) 
0.4 
(n=8) 
$3.1 
5-9.9 
yr 0.6 
20% 0.12 0.6 
(n=11) 
0.8 
(n=15) 
0.5 
(n=21) 
0.3 
(n=18) 
0.1 
(n=7) 
$0.9 $60,000 
60% 0.36 0.8 
(n=16) 
0.7 
(n=18) 
0.6 
(n=20) 
0.2 
(n=19) 
0 
(n=10) 
$0.6 
> 10 
yr 0.4 
20% 0.08 0.7 
(n=15) 
0.6 
(n=18) 
0.3 
(n=20) 
0.3 
(n=16) 
0 
(n=7) 
$0.6 $60,000 
60% 0.24 1 
(n=10) 
0.6 
(n=9) 
0.4 
(n=18) 
0.4 
(n=22) 
0 
(n=9) 
$0.7 
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Multivariate probit models are used to identify the socioeconomic determinants of 
demand for the nutritional supplement. The dependent variable is a binary representation of the 
decision to purchase the supplement and the independent variables include price, effective risk 
reduction and a series of socioeconomic variables. Coefficient estimates from three multivariate 
probit models with cluster corrected standard errors are included in Table 6.6. Table 6.7 shows 
the marginal changes in the probability of purchase for a 1-unit change in each variable after 
averaging over the sample. The first model, Model 1, omits respondent age and water treatment 
variables to avoid collineraity issues. Note that child age was omitted from the list of independent 
variables for all models because the effective risk change is a direct function of child age; thus, 
the inclusion of age would result in collinearity. Consistent with the raw data results, the analysis 
revealed that price and magnitude of risk reduction are strongly correlated with the decision to 
purchase the supplement. The probability of purchase decreases by about 5% for a US$0.50 price 
increase and increases by about 2% for a 1/10,000 change in annual risk. When respondent age is 
added to the model, the coefficient for effective risk reduction becomes smaller but remains 
significant. The coefficient for male respondents is positive and the average marginal effect (4-
7%) is quite large; however, these findings are highly uncertain and not significant at the 10% 
level. There is no difference in demand among respondents living inside versus outside the 
ICDDR,B service area. All models show that respondents with more education and higher income 
are significantly more likely to purchase the supplement. Average marginal probability of 
purchase increases by about 10% for a one-category increase in education compared to 5% 
increase for a one-income-quartile increase.26  
Respondents who are given time to think overnight about the hypothetical cholera 
vaccine are significantly less likely to agree to purchase the hypothetical nutritional supplement 
for their youngest child. The 16% average marginal decrease might result from the additional 
                                                 
26For marginal effects, I had to estimate a model that combined dummy categorical variables into a single 
ordered categorical variable for income quartiles and education categories.  
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time that they could have used to consider budgetary constraints prior to approaching the 
supplement section of the interview. Parents are about 7% more likely to purchase the 
hypothetical supplement for male children, but this difference is of borderline significance. When 
the youngest child is the only son, the difference is significant at the 5% level. Respondents’ 
estimates of baseline risk of death for children in their villages are not included in the multivariate 
analysis because so many respondents were unable to provide estimates. In addition, I learned 
that respondent estimates of mortality risk are compromised by the way the question is presented. 
Our respondents provided estimates of the number of children that lived in their village (mean 
2,300, SD 22,000) and then estimated how many might die from disease in the next 5 years (mean 
62, SD 500). Many respondents (22%) were unable to answer one or both of the questions, 
despite encouragement to venture a “best guess”. The median estimated risk of death based on 
these answers was 10 in 1,000, which is about 25% higher than the actual risk of death from 
disease for children age 1 to 4 years and about 400% higher than the risk of death from disease 
for older children.  We discovered than another 40% of the respondents reported that there were 
500 or fewer children in their village. These small estimates of the child population would limit 
the resolution in respondents’ estimates because the expected number of children that would die 
was always an integer.  
Table 6.6. Multivariate regression of parental demand for nutritional supplements for their 
households' youngest children 
Model  1 2 3 
T-statistic in parentheses 
   
Supplement price -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** 
 (-6.9) (-6.8) (-6.9) 
Male respondent 0.11 0.20 0.12 
 (0.75) (1.3) (0.76) 
Resident from ICDDR,B service area -0.036 -0.041 -0.04 
 (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.20) 
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Model  1 2 3 
Received time to think for  -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.40*** 
Cholera vaccine experiment (-3.7) (-3.4) (-3.4) 
Respondent age  -0.011  
  (-1.5)  
Respondent older than 55 years   -0.25* 
   (-1.7) 
Risk reduction (annual*1000) 0.45** 0.32* 0.39** 
 (2.6) (1.9) (2.3) 
Education 1-5 yrs. 0.36** 0.35** 0.33** 
 (2.2) (2.1) (2.0) 
Education 6-10 yrs. 0.61*** 0.53** 0.60*** 
 (3.0) (2.5) (2.8) 
Education >10 yrs. 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.82*** 
 (3.0) (2.7) (2.9) 
Log income per capita 0.31*** 0.31***  
 (4.6) (4.4)  
HH income quartile 2   0.30 
   (1.6) 
HH income quartile 3   0.36*** 
   (2.8) 
HH income quartile 4   0.37** 
   (2.0) 
Youngest child is male 0.17 0.17 0.15 
 (1.6) (1.5) (1.4) 
Treats water  0.15 0.16 
  (0.65) (0.77) 
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Model  1 2 3 
Hindu respondent -0.55* -0.58** -0.57** 
 (-1.8) (-2.0) (-2.0) 
Constant -2.1*** -1.6** -0.21 
 (-4.7) (-2.5) (-1.2) 
Log likelihood -296 -297 -297 
    
Average WTP per month US$1.50 US$1.50 US$1.50 
VSL estimate US$22,000 US$16,000 US$19,000 
    
    * indicates significance at the 10% level 
  ** at the 5% level 
*** at the 1% level 
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Table 6.7. Average marginal effects estimated from determinants of parental demand for nutritional 
supplements 
Model  1 2 3 
Supplement price (increment $0.50) -0.048 (.0071) -0.049 (.0071) -0.0048 (0.0072) 
Male respondent (yes/no) 0.040 (0.059) 0.074 (0.059) 0.051 (0.059) 
Resident from ICDDR,B service area  (yes/no) -0.012 (0.081) -0.0014 (0.082) -0.0038 (0.082) 
Received time to think for cholera vaccine 
experiment  (yes/no) 
-0.16 (0.043) -0.16 (0.046) -0.16 (0.046) 
Respondent age (increment 1 year)  -0.0047 (0.0032)  
Respondent older than 55 years  (yes/no)   -0.094 (0.058) 
Estimated risk reduction (1/10,000 annually)  0.018 (0.69) 0.0013 (0.068) 0.16 (0.068) 
Education (increment 1 education category) 0.11 (0.035) 0.10 (0.035) 0.11 (0.037) 
Log income per capita (increment 1 log unit) 0.12 (0.027) 0.12 (0.028)  
HH (increment 1 income quartile)   0.053 (0.22) 
Youngest child is male  (yes/no) 0.066 (0.042) 0.069 (0.045) 0.061 (0.044) 
Hindu respondent -0.21 (0.10) -0.22 (0.10) -0.22 (0.10) 
Treats water  (yes/no)  0.058 (0.090) 0.063 (0.085) 
    
T-statistic in parentheses 
 
Average willingness-to-pay for a nutritional supplement is estimated from the parameter 
estimates for each of three probit models. The population average WTP for supplements for 
households’ youngest children is about US$1.50 per month for all three models. This estimate is 
within the range of Turnbull estimates presented in Table 6.5. The probit WTP estimate is an 
average across all age groups and effective risk reduction scenarios, and is not directly 
comparable to any of the Turnbull estimates. Note that age groups are based on the different ages 
for each household’s youngest child not for all children in all households. Approximate VSL 
estimates can be calculated by dividing the coefficient for risk reduction by the price coefficient. 
Although the average WTP per month was constant across models, VSL estimates varied from 
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US$16,000 to US$22,000 because the coefficient for risk reduction varied across the model 
specifications depending on whether respondent age was included and how respondent age was 
specified.  
These VSL estimates represent the average tradeoff between mortality risk reduction and 
price in the demand equation. As demonstrated in Table 6.5, it is likely that WTP for a nutritional 
supplement would not be a linearly function of the magnitude of risk reduction. Rather, VSL 
estimates depend on the magnitude of risk reduction presented. I believe this is generally the case 
for this population. Thus, parents appear to be more willing to purchase the supplement for 
younger children that face greater baseline risks of death. However, they are still willing to 
purchase the product for older children with much smaller risks of death as long as the price is 
reasonable. The VSL to annual income ratio is about 18-25, which is at the low end of the values 
reported in Table 3.2. It is important that the ratios in Table 3.2 refer to adult VSL. I am not 
aware of any estimate of parents’ VSL for their children. 
 
6.4 Comparison between cholera vaccine WTP estimates and nutritional supplement VSL 
estimates 
I can now compare my nutritional supplement VSL results with cholera vaccine WTP 
estimates. In general, vaccines should reduce 1) ex ante private expenditure on treatment, 2) ex 
ante productivity losses for sick patients and their caretakers, 3) reduced risk of pain and 
suffering from cholera symptoms, and 4) reduced risk of cholera mortality. Ex ante private cost of 
illness (COI) estimates are inclusive of the first two types of benefits, while generic mortality risk 
reduction valuation27 would cover the fourth type of benefit.  
                                                 
27Generally, I think that the value of generic mortality risk reduction multiplied by the magnitude of 
vaccine risk reduction plus the expected private treatment cost savings would be approximately equal to 
vaccine WTP. Recovered cholera patients are unlikely to experience long term disability, which would 
complicate comparisons between generic mortality risk reductions and vaccine WTP. 
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I expect that vaccine WTP estimates from my CV surveys should be inclusive of all four 
of these benefits. Cholera vaccine mortality risk benefits can be calculated based on the product 
of vaccine effectiveness, VSL estimates, and cholera mortality rates. These mortality risk 
reduction benefits can then be added to ex ante private COI (also multiplied by vaccine 
effectiveness) for comparison with WTP estimates. These calculations for VSL + COI benefits 
are summarized in Table 6.8.  
Because the ICDDR,B diarrhea hospital provides free treatment for cholera patients, the 
patients’ ex ante private COI are modest. I do not have explicit data for cholera mortality, though 
I do have estimates for diarrhea mortality. I know that cholera patients comprise about 10-25% of 
all diarrhea patients treated at the ICDDR,B hospital (personal communication with hospital 
staff). I also know that less than 1% of cholera patients will die if treated properly (Ryan et al., 
2000). I presume that mortality rates for other types of diarrhea treated at the ICDDR,B would 
also be quite low, but I do not have that data. For the upper and lower bounds of cholera mortality 
risk estimates, I assume that 10% to 50% of all diarrhea deaths are caused by cholera. My best 
estimate is that 20% of diarrheal deaths are due to cholera. This is based on the facts that 1) 
cholera is a virulent form of diarrheal disease and 2) cholera cases comprise 10-25% of all 
patients with diarrhea presenting at ICDDR,B hospital.  
For this comparison, I assume that the cholera vaccine will be 50% effective for 3 years 
to allow for a direct comparison to the cholera vaccine WTP study. (Note that recent herd 
protection research suggests that 65% is a better effectiveness estimate for the direct protection of 
vaccination.) The COI and mortality risk reduction benefits are summed and discounted at an 8% 
financial rate over a 3-year period.28 My best estimates of VSL are US$15,000 for both age 
groups. The lower bound for both groups is US$10,000. The upper bound for young children is 
                                                 
28The financial discount rate (8%) is greater than the DALY discount rate (3%) used to discount future life 
years. The larger value is more representative of an interest rate that might be necessary to procure a loan to 
pay the upfront costs of a vaccination program in which future public treatment cost savings are expected. 
This financial discount rate should be different than a discount rate for future life years. 
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assumed to be US$25,000, while the upper bound for older children is US$50,000. I chose a 
higher upper bound for older children because their VSL estimates in Table 6.5 appear to be 
greater.  
The overall average WTP per fully-vaccinated child (i.e. 2 doses of cholera vaccine) is 
US$1.6. If children are split into two groups, the average WTP for vaccinations for 1-5 year olds 
is US$2.4 compared to US$1.2 for older children age 5-17 years (Islam et al., 2008). Thus, WTP 
is considerably greater for younger children who also face a higher baseline risk of death from 
diarrhea. For sensitivity analysis, I assume that lower bound estimates are about half of these 
values and that upper bound estimates are twice as great. Similarly, I assume that the lower bound 
and upper bound estimates of private COI are about half and double the values reported in Table 
4.3. The lower bound and base estimates of WTP are based on estimates for respondents given 
time to think. The upper bound estimates correspond to values for respondents who were not 
given time to think. 
Vaccine WTP benefits should be inclusive of all three of ex ante private treatment 
savings, ex ante mortality risk reduction benefits, and ex ante reduced pain and suffering benefits. 
I cannot separately evaluate the value of reduced pain and suffering, so I assume it should be the 
difference between WTP benefits and the other types of benefits as shown in Figure 6.3. This 
figure shows the relative contributions of each type of discrete benefit to the overall private WTP 
estimate. The expected private COI savings for 3 years of vaccine protection are about US$0.04 
for young children and US$0.02 for school-age children. These values are about 1-2% of the 
estimated private WTP per vaccinated young child, US$2.4, or per vaccinated school-age child, 
US$1.20, as estimated from my CV survey. This suggests that private COI savings in isolation 
are a poor estimate of the private benefits of vaccination. Ex ante mortality risk reduction benefits 
are estimated to be US$1.70 for young children and US$0.24 for older children. These are 
equivalent to 70% of WTP estimates for young children and 20% of WTP estimates for school-
age children. The remaining benefits are reduced pa
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back-calculated from the other types of benefits as shown in Figure 6.3. The back-calculated 
value of reduced pain and suffering is about US$0.70 for young children and about US$0.95 for 
older children. These would represent 28% of total WTP benefits for young and 80% of total 
WTP benefits for school-age children.  
In the CV survey, respondents were asked to identify the most important benefit of a 
cholera vaccination. Most respondents stated that the most important benefit was either to prevent 
pain and suffering (51%) or to reduce risk of death (24%). Very few respondents (8%) cited 
avoided treatment costs or lost wages as the primary benefit. These stated beliefs are consistent 
with my comparison between ex ante COI, ex ante mortality risk reduction benefits, and WTP for 
vaccination estimates. For older children, my best estimate of WTP for vaccination (US$1.20) is 
much greater than my best estimate of COI + VSL estimates (US$0.25). I speculate that parents 
may have overestimated the risk of death from cholera for older children, who actually have a 
very small diarrhea mortality risk. Alternatively, the value of reduced risk of pain and suffering 
might be a more important consideration relative to mortality risk for this age group. Similar to 
the nutritional supplement results, I find that parents are less willing to purchase vaccines for 
older children (i.e. WTP is lower); however, the ratio of vaccine WTP to vaccine mortality risk 
reduction is still greater for older children because their risk of death was much less than for 
younger children. Notably, the value of reduced pain and suffering is very similar for young 
children (US$0.70) and older children (US$0.95) are very similar. 
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Table 6.8. Summary of incidence, COI, VSL, and vaccine WTP by age 
  Young Children School-age children 
Upper/ Lower 
bound  Best Lower Upper Best Lower Upper 
Private COI 
per case  
(ex post) 
Direct 
treatment 
costs, US$  
$4 $2 $8 $4 $2 $8 
Indirect 
treatment 
costs, US$   
$4 $2 $8 $4 $2 $8 
Total 
private 
treatment 
costs, US$  
$8 $4 $16 $8 $4 $16 
      
Annual Incidence (cases 
per 1,000) 3.8 1.9 7.2 1.6 0.8 3.2 
Estimated cholera fatality 
rate (20%/10%/50% of 
diarrhea deaths) 
8.8E-05 4.4E-05 2.2E-04 1.2E-05 5.8E-06 2.9E-05 
VSL, US$ per statistical 
death $15,000 $10,000 $25,000 $15,000 $10,000 $50,000 
 
       
Annual ex ante private COI $0.03 $0.01 $0.12 $0.01 $0.00 $0.05 
Annual ex ante mortality 
cost $1.30 $0.44 $5.50 $0.18 $0.06 $1.50 
Discounted vaccine benefits for 50% effective – 3 year vaccinea 
Discounted private COI 
benefits, US$ per vaccine $0.04 $0.01 $0.15 $0.02 $0.00 $0.07 
Discounted mortality risk 
reduction benefits, US$ per 
vaccine 
$1.70 $0.57 $7.10 $0.23 $0.07 $1.87 
Discounted total benefits 
(COI + mortality), US$ per 
vaccine 
$1.70 $0.57 $7.20 $0.24 $0.08 $1.90 
 
      
Stated WTP for cholera 
vaccination from CV survey, 
US$ 
$2.40 $2.40 $3.80 $1.20 $1.20 $2.30 
 
   
 
 
a Benefits are discounted using 8% annual discount rate- PWF for 3 years=2.58 
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Figure 6.3. Graphical presentation of ex ante benefits 
 
The lower bound COI + VSL benefits tend to be smaller than the lower bound WTP 
estimates, while the upper bound COI + VSL estimates tend to be greater. The difference between 
lower bound and upper bound COI + VSL estimates are greater than for WTP benefits, because 
the uncertainty in mortality rate and VSL estimates are multiplied together. Overall, the COI + 
VSL estimates appear to be consistent with the WTP estimates after accounting for the 
uncertainty. This might seem somewhat surprising because the number of deaths due to cholera 
comprise a relatively small fraction of the total number of child deaths in the Matlab area. As 
demonstrated in Table 3.2, scenarios with larger risk reductions usually generate smaller VSL 
estimates (within the same population). However, the valuation scenario for the cholera vaccine 
required an up-front payment of the entire cost of the vaccine, which was then effective for 3 
years. As a result, the mortality risk reduction from a one-month supply of the nutritional 
supplement is similar to the protection provided by the cholera vaccine over a 3 year period (i.e. 
the risk of death from cholera was about 1/36 of the total risk of death from disease for young 
children).
  
7 Matlab policy model 
7.1 Policy model input parameters 
This chapter incorporates the Matlab-specific data from the previous chapter into an 
integrated economic model that summarizes the costs and benefits of cholera vaccination. In 
addition to these data, I need to make a number of assumptions. Model input parameters are 
summarized in Table 7.1. This table includes my best estimate for each parameter in addition to a 
range of possible low and high values. I split the Matlab area into four different subgroups: 
children in high incidence villages, children in average incidence villages, adults in high 
incidence villages, and adults in average incidence villages. The population is split such that 10% 
of the population resides in high incidence villages and the remaining 90% live outside these 
villages. Based on Table 4.1, it appears that villages with the top 10% of incidence experience 
about four times greater incidence than the rest of the villages. This represents the maximum 
potential difference between the highest incidence villages compared to the rest of the Matlab 
area. It is possible that incidence is underestimated in many villages because patients seek 
treatment at other facilities besides the ICDDR,B hospital, especially patients that live in villages 
located farther from the hospital in the northern part of the surveillance area. In personal 
conversations with hospital doctors, they stated that they believed that certain areas are more 
prone to cholera than others. However, it is possible that these doctors are somewhat biased by 
their experience of working at the hospital. Alternatively, differences may occur at geographical 
areas smaller than villages, such that differences are small after averaging across entire village 
populations. Among the villages in my CV survey sample, which included the majority of those 
located within two hours of the hospital, the top 10% of villages experienced twice the incidence 
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of the remaining 90% of villages over 10 years. If I restrict the observation period to 3 years 
instead of 10 years, the top 10% experience more than 4 times the incidence of the remaining 
90%. I explore this maximum difference (i.e. 4 times greater incidence in the top 10%) to 
understand whether it is useful to attempt to target high incidence geographical areas in Matlab. 
Thus, the baseline scenario represents an upper bound difference in incidence rates between high 
and average incidence villages. Smaller differences are explored in the sensitivity analysis. If it is 
not useful to target prices assuming a larger discrepancy in incidence, it definitely would also not 
be useful for smaller discrepancies. 
Thus, I adjusted my estimates of population average incidence rates for the high 
incidence villages to be four times greater than the remaining 90%. This adjustment is made such 
that the expected number of cases remains constant. Relative to the population average incidence, 
the risk of infection is almost four times greater in the high incidence villages and slightly less 
than average in the remaining 90% of villages where most of the population resides. The ranges 
of low-to-high incidence values used in the sensitivity analysis are one half and double the best 
estimates. Incidence may be less than the best estimate if the recent trend of declining incidence 
rates continues into the future. In contrast, incidence may be higher than expected if a large 
fraction of the population seeks treatment at alternative locations or if the recent downward trend 
in incidence were to be reversed.   
I use the same demand equations for both low and high incidence groups because 
incidence rates were not significant in any of the demand models that I evaluated. Vaccination 
demand function parameters are taken from the previous chapter. The range in child demand 
intercepts is based on an assumption that between 50% and 80% of children would be willing to 
pursue free vaccinations if these were available. The adult intercept bounds are assumed to be 
smaller than the child bounds, 25% to 60% of the adult population. 
This basic herd protection relationship is shown in Figure 3.2 and is the basis of the 
estimates in Table 7.1. As discussed in Section 3.5, Emch et al. (2009) found a strong correlation 
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between herd protection effects and environmental connectivity, specifically baris collocated with 
water bodies. These findings suggest that herd protection effects are highly localized. Thus, I 
assume that herd protection occurs primarily within village groups rather than between village 
groups. Specifically, I assume that coverage rates in high incidence villages have no impact on 
herd protection for average incidence villages. Similarly, I assume that coverage rates in average 
incidence villages have no impact on high incidence villages.  
In the absence of age-group-specific herd protection effects, I assume that adult and child 
coverage rates have the same impact on herd protection effects within a village grouping. 
Because I express coverage rates in terms of the number of people vaccinated rather than as 
percentages, the coefficients for the average incidence villages must be smaller to account for the 
larger population. Specifically, the coefficients for high incidence villages are nine times greater 
to account for the fact that total population of the high incidence villages is nine times smaller 
than for the average incidence villages. The coefficients are determined by fitting an exponential 
expression to the data reported in Longini et al.’s (2007) model of herd protection observed 
during the 1985 vaccination trial. In the sensitivity analysis, I allow herd protection coefficients to 
vary separately for adults and children. The range of herd protection coefficients is 50% to 150% 
of the baseline values. For the lower bound, this is analogous to assuming that functional form 
remains the same, but twice as many people must be vaccinated to achieve the same herd 
protection effect. The herd protection results are based on the first year after vaccination and 
effects may diminish in years two and three (Longini et al., 2007).  
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Table 7.1. Population, herd protection and other model input parameters 
Variable Children high 
incidence (ch 
subscript) 
Adults high 
incidence (ah 
subscript) 
Children 
average 
incidence (cl 
subscript) 
Adults 
average 
incidence (al 
subscript) 
Values from literature 
    
Population, POPxx 9,800 12,300 89,000 109,000 
Demand intercept, αxx 5,300 [4,600 – 
7,100] 
3,900 [3,000 –  
7,400] 
47,000 [34,000 
– 68,000] 
 
35,000 
[26,000 – 
62,000] 
Price coefficient, βxx  -0.36 
[-0.20 –  -0.50] 
-0.33 
[-0.20 –  -0.75] 
-0.36 
[-0.20 –  -0.50] 
-0.33 
[-0.20 –  -0.75] 
Baseline annual incidence, 
INCU0xx, cases per 1,000 
persons 8.9 [2.9 – 18] 3.2 [1.0 – 6.3] 2.2 [1.1 – 4.4] 
0.80 [0.4 – 
2.0] 
Herd protection coefficient 
for coverage γxx  
-1.8E-04 
[-8.9E-05 –       
-2.7E-04] 
-1.8E-04 
[-8.9E-05 –       
-2.7E-04] 
-2.0E-05 
[-1.0E-05 –          
-3.0E-05] 
-2.0E-05 
[-1.0E-05 –          
-3.0E-05] 
Fixed cost, F, US$ 22,000 [10,000 -50,000] 
Variable cost, C, US$ 2.0 [1.5 – 4.0] 
Public COI per case- 
PUBCOI, US$ 
20 [10 - 30] 20 [10 – 30] 20 [10 - 30] 20 [10 - 30] 
Vaccine efficacy, Eff,  65% [50 - 75] 
Duration of vaccine 
protection, t (years) 
3  [2 - 4] 
Present worth factor, PWF 2.58 
DALY weight, DALYweight 0.105 [0.08 - 0.4] 
Case fatality rate, CFRxx 
(%) 
1 [0.5 – 3] 
Expected remaining life 
years, LE
 xx 
65 35 [10-35] 65 35 [10-35] 
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Variable Children high 
incidence (ch 
subscript) 
Adults high 
incidence (ah 
subscript) 
Children 
average 
incidence (cl 
subscript) 
Adults 
average 
incidence (al 
subscript) 
Length of illness, DUR 
(days) 
3  [1 – 7] 
Financial discount rate (%) 8 
DALY discount rate (%) 3 
Indirect protection valuation 
correction coefficient for 
vaccinated, πv 
0.75 [0.5 – 1.0] 
Herd protection valuation 
coefficient- indirect 
protection for unvaccinated, 
πu 
0.75 [0.5 – 1.0] 
     
 
The fixed cost is assumed to be US$22,000, which is equivalent to US$0.10 per person. 
This is similar to the amount used in a recent optimization study for typhoid vaccination 
programs in Asia (Lauria et al., 2009). The uncertainty range for fixed cost is US$10,000 to 
US$50,000, which corresponds to per person costs of US$0.05 to about US$0.25. The variable 
cost of vaccination is assumed to be US$2.2 for two doses of the cholera vaccination. Following 
Jeuland et al. (2009), this assumes a procurement cost per dose, inclusive of wastage, would be 
US$0.60 and that the delivery cost per dose would also be about US$0.50. The delivery costs are 
based on a study of delivery costs in low income countries (Lauria and Stewart, 2007). Overall, 
the uncertainty range is US$1.5 to US$4. The upper bound delivery cost may be greater than the 
average for low income countries if estimates are based on rural (rather than urban) areas.  
The public treatment cost savings per case avoided is estimated to be US$20 as reported 
in Section 5.2. The uncertainty range (US$10 to US$30) is small because ICDDR,B keeps precise 
records of operations. Vaccination direct efficacy is assumed to be 65% based on Longini’s 
reanalysis of vaccination efficacy (Longini et al., 2007). This is greater than the 50% direct 
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efficacy reported in the original analysis (Clemens et al., 1990b) because that study did not 
account for herd protection effects. Thus, at any coverage rate, vaccinated persons’ risk of 
contracting cholera is 65% less than unvaccinated persons. I estimated that the duration of 
vaccine protection is 3 years based on a recent oral cholera vaccination effort in Vietnam (Thiem 
et al., 2006) with an uncertainty range of 2 to 4 years.  
I estimate that the average duration of cholera illness is seven days and that the DALY 
disutility weight is 0.105 for those that survive the illness. This weight is based on the World 
Health Organization’s standard for diarrheal disease ((WHO), 2003). For the sensitivity analysis, 
I assume DALY disutility weights range from 0.08 to 0.40 because cholera is an especially 
virulent form of diarrheal disease and patients are often unable to perform any other tasks during 
the short duration of symptoms. The case fatality rate is estimated at 1% based on personal 
communications with epidemiologists from the International Vaccine Institute. The range for case 
fatality rate is 0.5% to 3%. I would expect that the Matlab rate is at the low end of the range 
because of the high quality treatment facilities available at the ICDDR,B hospital. These 
estimates and ranges are consistent with those reported in a recent multicountry cost utility study 
of cholera vaccination (Jeuland et al., 2009). 
The remaining life years per cholera death are 65 for children and 36 for adults based on 
life tables developed from ICDDR,B’s surveillance efforts. I used the average adult age to 
calculate adult life expectancy. However, Table 2.1 suggests that elderly adults are considerably 
more likely to die from diarrheal disease than younger adults. Thus, I include a range of 10 to 36 
years for adult life expectancy in the sensitivity analysis. There is little uncertainty for children 
because life expectancies are similar across all child ages. Overall, I estimate that 0.22 DALYs 
are saved per adult case prevented and 0.29 are saved per child case prevented. Most of the 
DALYs saved result from avoided mortality rather than avoided morbidity. Thus, case fatality 
rate would be especially important to estimate for an accurate DALY measure. 
147 
In the absence of data, I assume that πu and πv are equal to 0.75. This would indicate that 
indirect protection is less valuable than direct protection. It also indicates that WTP decreases per 
additional unit of protection. Indirect protection may be less valuable than direct protection for at 
least two reasons: 1) people are not protected when they spend time outside of the Matlab area or 
2) estimates of indirect protection are much more uncertain than estimates of direct efficacy. I 
assume that the uncertainty ranges for πu and πv are 0.5 to 1.0. 
 
7.2 Policy model results 
The input parameters in Table 7.1 can be used to estimate outcomes of different types of 
vaccination programs. The baseline disease burden without a vaccination program is summarized 
in Table 7.2. The population and incidence rates are the same as the reported best estimates in 
Table 7.1. Over three years, the Matlab area is expected to experience about 1,200 cholera cases 
with about 30% occurring in the high incidence areas. The numbers of child cases are expected to 
more than double the numbers of adult cases. These cases would correspond to more than 330 
lost DALYs and would cost the public treatment system about US$21,000. It is instructive to note 
that the maximum possible public treatment savings are approximately equal to the expected 
fixed cost of the vaccination program, US$22,000. Thus, these savings are unlikely to have much 
of an impact in offsetting total program costs, i.e. fixed + variable costs. 
Prior to solving for optimal prices using the models developed in Chapter 5, I examine 
outcomes for some basic programs. In these basic programs, vaccinations will be provided either 
1) free of cost or 2) at my best estimate of the variable cost of vaccination, US$2.2. The basic 
programs under consideration include: 1) free vaccinations for all groups; 2) free vaccinations for 
adults and children in high incidence villages, charging US$2.2 for vaccinations of adults and 
children in average incidence villages; 3) free vaccinations only for children in high incidence 
villages, charging US$2.2 for the other three groups; and 4) charging US$2.2 for all groups. 
Outcomes from each of these programs are summarized in Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.2. Cholera disease burden in Matlab in the absence of a vaccination program 
 Children in 
high 
incidence 
villages 
Adults in 
high 
incidence 
villages 
Children in 
average 
incidence 
villages 
Adults in 
average 
incidence 
villages 
Total 
Population 9,800 12,300 89,000 109,000 220,000 
Baseline annual 
incidence, cases per 
1000 persons 
8.9 3.2 2.2 0.80 1.6 
Number of cases over 
three years 260 120 590 260 1,200 
DALYs lost 75 27 170 60 330 
Discounted Public 
treatment savings  $4,400 $2,000 $10,000 $4,500 $21,000 
 
Moving from left to right in Table 7.3, the total number of vaccinations delivered 
decreases as additional groups are required to pay the variable cost of vaccination. Because the 
adult and child price coefficients are similar, the percentage changes in coverage are 
approximately the same for both groups. In fact, coverage rates for both groups decline by 
slightly more than 50% as price increases from free to US$2.2. As coverage decreases, the 
number of cases avoided and DALYs saved also decrease. However, the declines are less than 
50% because of the nonlinear herd protection relationships. The number of cases avoided 
decreases from 1100 for a program in which everyone receives free vaccines to 750 for a program 
in which everyone is forced to pay US$2.2. The decline in DALYs saved is from 290 to 210. 
Relative to the pre-vaccination baseline, about 90% of the disease burden is alleviated via free 
vaccination (cases avoided or DALYs saved) and by about 60% via a program in which all 
recipients must pay the marginal cost of vaccination. Outcomes are very similar across the three 
programs in which residents of low income villages must pay the variable cost of vaccination, 
probably because most of the population resides in these villages. 
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All of the monetary measures (direct and indirect benefits, public COI savings, and total 
costs) decline as prices increase. Public COI savings are about 10% of program costs for each of 
the programs, ranging from US$13,000 to US$19,000. These savings are insufficient to cover 
even the fixed cost of the programs. As a result, all of the programs require contributions from the 
government or donors. Moving from left to right, as coverage declines by more than 50%, 
program direct and indirect benefits decline by much less than 50% because of the nonlinear 
demand function. The fat tails of the demand distributions, shown in Figure 6.1, indicate that 
there is a small fraction of the population with very high willingness-to-pay for cholera 
vaccinations. This small subset of the population would be willing purchase vaccines for US$2.2 
or at even greater prices. Recall that the herd protection relationship is also nonlinear and that the 
rate of change in incidence is greatest at low coverage rates. Net societal benefits are about 
US$170,000 for the free vaccination program and about US$220,000 for each of the other three 
programs. Without consideration for herd protection or public COI savings, net societal benefits 
would be maximized if price was set equal to the marginal cost of vaccination. With 
consideration of these benefits, net societal benefits are still greatest when recipients are charged 
prices close to the marginal cost of vaccination. Notably, since net societal benefits are positive 
for each program, all would pass a cost-benefit test. 
The net revenue row represents the vaccination program cost to government or donor, net 
of collected user fees and public COI savings. It would cost about US$220,000 to provide free 
vaccines to everyone. This government/donor cost would decline to US$20,000 if free 
vaccinations were limited to only children in high incidence villages and to US$9,000 if vaccines 
were provided at the marginal cost. If prices are set equal to the marginal cost of vaccination, the 
external contribution is needed to offset the fixed cost of vaccination (after adjusting for public 
COI savings). 
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Table 7.3. Outcomes for four non-optimized vaccination programs 
 Free 
vaccination for 
all subgroups 
Free 
vaccination for 
adults and 
children in high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$2.2 for 
others 
Free vaccination 
for children in 
high incidence 
villages, US$2.2 
for others  
All groups 
are charged 
US$2.2 
Price- children high 
incidence, US$ 
 $0     $0     $0     $2.20  
Price- adults high 
incidence, US$ 
 $0     $0     $2.20   $2.20  
Price- children 
average incidence, 
US$ 
 $0     $2.20   $2.20   $2.20  
Price- adults average 
incidence, US$ 
 $0     $2.20   $2.20   $2.20  
     
Coverage- children 
high incidence 
57% 57% 57% 26% 
Coverage- adults high 
incidence 
33% 33% 16% 16% 
Coverage- children 
average incidence 
57% 26% 26% 26% 
Coverage- adults 
average incidence 
33% 16% 16% 16% 
Total vaccinations  96,000   50,000   48,000   45,000  
     
Direct private 
benefits, US$ 
 $280,000   $230,000   $230,000   $230,000  
Indirect private 
benefits, US$ 
 $110,000   $98,000   $97,000   $95,000  
Public COI savings, 
US$ 
 $19,000   $15,000   $14,000   $13,000  
Sales revenue, US$  $-     $89,000   $93,000   $99,000  
Total costs, US$  $230,000   $130,000   $130,000   $120,000  
Net societal benefits, 
US$ 
 $170,000   $210,000   $220,000   $220,000  
Net revenue, US$  $(220,000)  $(28,000)  $(20,000)  $(9,000) 
     
Total cases avoided 1100 850 830 750 
Total DALYs saved 290  230  230 210  
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 Free 
vaccination for 
all subgroups 
Free 
vaccination for 
adults and 
children in high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$2.2 for 
others 
Free vaccination 
for children in 
high incidence 
villages, US$2.2 
for others  
All groups 
are charged 
US$2.2 
Cost per case 
avoided, US$ per 
case 
 $200   $140   $140   $150  
Cost per DALY 
saved, US$ per DALY 
 $750   $520  $510   $540  
Cost per life saved, 
US$ per life saved 
 $20,000   $14,000   $14,000   $14,000  
     
 
The cost per DALY calculation subtracts public COI savings from the total cost of 
vaccination and divides by the number of DALYs saved. The cost per DALY is typically used for 
comparison with other types of health interventions. However, it is important to note that this 
measure is variable depending on how a vaccination program is administered. The cost per 
DALY saved is greatest when free vaccinations are provided for everyone, US$750. The cost per 
DALY saved is approximately the same, US$510 – US$540, for the other three programs in 
which user fees are charged. The higher cost per DALY from providing free vaccinations to all 
groups results because herd protection very effectively reduces incidence even at low coverage 
rates. The cost of providing free vaccinations to all subgroups is about double the cost of other 
programs. However, the number of cases avoided only increase by about 25-30% when free 
vaccinations are provided to all. The total cost of implementing a free vaccination program is 
US$110,000 (90%) greater than the cost of providing vaccines to all subgroups at a price of 
US$2.20. This is because it is necessary to deliver nearly twice as many vaccines. However, due 
to herd protection, the number of DALYs saved increases by only 80 (40%). Thus, the marginal 
cost per marginal DALY saved in moving from a program that charges US$2.20 to a free 
vaccination program is US$110,000 / 350 DALYs = US$1375. This is about 2.5 times greater 
than the average cost per DALY for the program that charges all groups about US$2.20. A more 
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thorough examination of the average and marginal costs per DALY saved as functions of 
coverage rates is provided in Appendix 4.  
According to the World Bank, a ‘very cost-effective’ intervention has a net cost 
per DALY ratio less than per capita GDP. A ‘cost-effective’ intervention has a ratio less 
than three times per capita GDP (Jeuland et al., 2009). For Bangladesh, per capita GDP is 
about US$510. Thus, free vaccination would not be considered ‘very cost-effective’, but 
the ratios for the other three programs in Table 7.3 are very close to this threshold. 
The average cost per life saved varies from about US$14,000 to US$20,000. Similar to 
the DALY calculations, the cost per life saved estimate is considerably larger when vaccinations 
are provided for free to all subgroups. The range of cost per life saved estimates is very similar to 
the estimates of parents’ VSL for their youngest child US$10,000 to US$25,000. If ex ante 
mortality risk reduction benefits were evaluated in place of CV estimates for cholera vaccine 
WTP benefits, the programs would still pass a benefit-cost test. However, the net societal benefits 
would be reduced. Recall that in Table 6.8, I showed that vaccine WTP estimates are greater than 
ex ante private COI plus mortality risk reduction benefits.29  
Table 7.4 summarizes program outcomes for both of the objective functions developed in 
Chapter 5: 1) maximization of societal net benefits (Net Benefit model) and 2) maximization of 
DALYs saved (DALY model). These are both maximized subject to net revenue constraints, 
which require that program revenue shortfalls do not exceed a pre-specified government or donor 
contribution. Both objective functions are subjected to two distinct revenue constraints. The first 
two columns of Table 7.4 assume that there is no external contribution; the cost of the program 
must be less than or equal to the sum of program revenues and public treatment cost savings. The 
two rightmost columns of Table 7.4 assume that an external contribution of US$50,000 is 
                                                 
29While the average cost per life saved is within the range of VSL estimates from Section 6.3, the marginal 
cost per life saved in moving from variable cost pricing (US$2.20) to free vaccination is about US$31,000 
per statistical life. 
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available to help finance the program. Optimal prices are considerably different for the Net 
Benefit model than for the DALY model. This occurs because economic benefits are strongly tied 
to the shape of the demand functions, which do not vary between high incidence and average 
incidence villages. The range in optimal prices for the Net Benefit model is from US$1.90 for 
children in high incidence areas to US$2.60 for adults in average incidence areas. The estimated 
coverage rates at these prices are all quite low (14% to 29%) because prices must be sufficient to 
generate enough revenue to cover program costs. The optimal prices are slightly lower for 
children because they have greater incidence, which means that more cases are avoided per child 
vaccination delivered. This translates to greater public COI savings per vaccination for children 
(though public COI savings are small compared to direct protection and indirect protection 
benefits). This is also the reason for price differences between high incidence and average 
incidence villages.  
In comparison to the Net Benefit model, there is greater variation in optimal prices for the 
revenue neutral DALY model. The optimal price for children in high incidence villages 
(US$0.10) is much less than optimal prices for other groups (US$0.40 – US$3.20). This makes 
sense because incidence is so much greater for that group. The optimal price for adults in high 
incidence villages is also substantially larger than the optimal price for adults in average 
incidence villages.  
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Table 7.4. Outcomes for revenue-neutral optimized vaccination programs 
 Net Benefit 
model: revenue 
neutral 
DALY model: 
revenue 
neutral 
Net Benefit 
model: 
maximum 
external 
contribution of 
US$50,000 
DALY model: 
maximum 
external 
contribution of 
US$50,000 
Price- children high 
incidence, US$ 
 $1.90  $0.40   $1.20   $-    
Price- adults high 
incidence, US$ 
 $2.20   $1.50   $1.50   $0.25  
Price- children 
average incidence, 
US$ 
 $2.40   $2.50   $1.80   $1.40  
Price- adults average 
incidence, US$ 
 $2.60   $3.20   $1.80   $2.30  
     
Coverage- children 
high incidence 
29% 49% 37% 57% 
Coverage- adults high 
incidence 
16% 20% 20% 30% 
Coverage- children 
average incidence 
24% 23% 30% 35% 
Coverage- adults 
average incidence 
14% 12% 18% 16% 
Total vaccinations  41,000   40,000   53,000   57,000  
     
Direct private 
benefits, US$ 
 $220,000   $210,000   $240,000   $250,000  
Indirect private 
benefits, US$ 
 $93,000   $93,000   $98,000   $101,000  
Public COI savings, 
US$ 
 $13,000   $13,000   $15,000   $16,000  
Sales revenue, US$  $101,000   $97,000   $91,000   $82,000  
Total costs, US$  $110,000   $110,000   $140,000   $150,000  
Net societal benefits, 
US$ 
 $210,000   $210,000   $220,000   $210,000  
Net revenue, US$  $-     $-     $(32,000)  $(50,000) 
     
Total cases avoided 740 760 840 910 
Total DALYs saved 200  210  230  250  
     
Cost per case 
avoided, US$ per 
 $140   $130   $150   $150  
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 Net Benefit 
model: revenue 
neutral 
DALY model: 
revenue 
neutral 
Net Benefit 
model: 
maximum 
external 
contribution of 
US$50,000 
DALY model: 
maximum 
external 
contribution of 
US$50,000 
case 
Cost per DALY 
saved, US$ per DALY 
 $500   $470   $540   $530  
Cost per life saved, 
US$ per life saved 
 $14,000   $13,000   $15,000   $15,000  
     
 
 Although there are large differences in the optimal prices across model specifications, 
differences in program outcomes are considerably smaller. Net societal benefits are only about 
2% greater for the Net Benefit model compared to the DALY model. Similarly, the number of 
DALYs saved is only about 4% greater for the DALY model compared to the Net Benefit model. 
The total cost and total number of vaccinations delivered are also very similar for the two models. 
Because the total number of vaccinations is similar for both objective functions, the herd 
protection effects and numbers of cases avoided are very similar for both objective functions. 
Thus, net societal benefits and total DALYs saved are almost equal for the two objective 
functions.  
There are slightly fewer total vaccinations delivered with the DALY model since that 
program targets vaccinations for the high incidence villages. As a result, higher prices are 
necessary in the average incidence villages where a majority of the population lives. In addition, 
since slightly more DALYs are avoided at a slightly lower cost, the cost per DALY is reduced 
with the DALY objective function. In summary, while the optimal prices are considerably 
different across types of models, differences in program outcomes are typically less than 5%.  
Next, I consider programs in which government or donors are willing to provide a 
US$50,000 contribution to a potential vaccination program. The outcomes for these models are 
summarized in the two rightmost columns of Table 7.4. The additional capital allows for a 
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considerable reduction in the user fees charged relative to the revenue neutral models. In other 
words, the external contribution is like a transfer payment to vaccine purchasers. This lump sum 
transfer is used to reduce user fees by varying amounts for each subgroup. The optimal prices 
vary from about US$1.20 to US$1.80 for the Net Benefit model compared to free to US$2.30 for 
the DALY model. It is again optimal to charge the lowest prices to children in high incidence 
villages and the highest price to adults in the average incidence villages. The reduced user fees 
result in increases in the number of vaccinations by about 12,000 (30%) for the Net Benefit 
model and by 17,000 (43%) for the DALY model. These increases in total vaccinations boost 
total program costs by US$27,000 and US$37,000 respectively.  
Notably, only about US$32,000 is required to maximize societal net benefits. If one tried 
to further reduce prices from those listed, the net societal benefits would decline. The US$32,000 
contribution from government or donors allows a US$5,000 increase in net societal benefits 
(about 3%). Thus, there is a net increase in social welfare, but the external investment has a small 
effect on program outcomes.  
 For the DALY model, the entire US$50,000 in available extra funding is used to 
maximize the number of DALYs saved. This reduction in user fees made possible by this extra 
US$50,000 results in an increase of 40 DALYs saved (16%). In contrast to Net Benefit model, 
the extra funding has a substantial impact on the objective function (i.e. the number of DALYs 
saved). The total costs of the program increase by US$37,000 to save the additional 40 DALYs. 
Thus, the marginal cost per DALY saved is US$37,000 / 40 DALYs = US$930. This is 
substantially greater than the average cost per DALY estimate (US$470) for the revenue neutral 
program.  
Prior to examining results from the sensitivity analysis, I examine a range of pricing 
options graphically. The results depicted in each graph are based on programs in which each of 
the four groups is charged the same price. I assume that US$10 would be the maximum price 
charged and that free vaccination would be the minimum price. When both groups are charged 
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the same price, child coverage rates are expected to be considerably greater than adult coverage 
rates. Since all graphs are 2-dimensional, it should be assumed that child coverage rates are 
disproportional to adult coverage rates within the population average coverage rates. Figure 7.1 
summarizes total economic benefits, total costs, total cases avoided and total vaccinations as 
functions of coverage. Figure 7.2 summarizes the same outcomes as functions of price.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Total benefits, costs, vaccinations, and cases avoided as functions of coverage 
 
Total costs and vaccinations are linear functions of coverage. The total benefits and cases 
avoided functions are nonlinear and the rate of change decreases as coverage increases. Total 
economic benefits include WTP estimates for direct and indirect protection in addition to public 
treatment cost savings. Total economic benefits are about US$290,000 at a 15% coverage rate; 
and the maximum total benefits are about US$410,000. Thus, about 70% of the maximum total 
benefits can be captured at a coverage rate of just 15%. The total cases avoided function does not 
level off as quickly as the total benefits function. At 15% coverage, there are about 630 cases 
avoided. The maximum 1,100 cases are avoided when vaccinations are provided for free and the 
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coverage rate is 44%. In contrast to total benefit calculation, only about 58% of the maximum 
cases are avoided at 15% coverage.  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Total benefits, costs, vaccinations, and cases avoided as functions of price 
Figure 7.2 is an inverted version of Figure 7.1, because cases avoided, vaccinations, total 
costs, and total benefits all decrease as functions of price. The number of cases avoided again 
declines at a faster rate than total benefits. There is a large drop (more than 50%) in total 
vaccinations as price increases from free to US$2. As price continues to increase from US$2, the 
number of vaccinations purchased appears to level off up to US$10 at which point a small 
fraction of the population would be willing to pay.  The number of cases avoided decline at a 
faster rate than total economic benefits. Thus, changes in price are likely to have larger effects on 
cases avoided than on total economic benefits. These differences are caused by the shape of the 
demand functions, which are also nonlinear. 
Figure 7.3 summarizes public revenues and costs from a potential vaccination program. 
The public sector earns income from vaccination sales and public COI savings, while paying for 
the fixed and variable costs of vaccination. It is clear that public COI savings are always quite 
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small relative to total costs. Thus, it is necessary to charge user fees to achieve revenue neutrality. 
Sales revenue increases quickly to a maximum at US$3, then decline slowly back toward zero. 
Net revenue is maximized at a price of about US$4.70. It would be illogical to charge a greater 
price; both because fewer cases would be avoided and because less net revenue would be earned.  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Total costs, sales revenue, public COI savings, and net revenue as functions of price 
 
The individual components of benefits include direct private benefits, indirect private 
benefits, and public COI savings, which are summarized in Figure 7.4. All three types of benefits 
are maximized when vaccinations are free and decrease as price increases. Public COI benefits 
are quite small relative to other types of benefits, just as public COI is small relative to costs in 
the revenue graph. The percentage composition of benefits is summarized in Figure 7.5. Public 
COI savings are never more than 5% of the total benefits. The percentage of public COI savings 
relative to total benefits decrease from 5% at low coverage rates and high prices to 2% at high 
prices and low coverage. This is because the average WTP per vaccine increases as price 
increases and only those with the highest WTP are willing to purchase vaccinations.  
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Figure 7.4. Individual components of total benefits 
Indirect benefits decrease from a maximum of US$110,000 for free vaccination to a 
minimum of about US$15,000 when vaccinations cost US$10. The percentage of indirect benefits 
relative to total benefits remains between 26% and 31% across the entire range of prices. Direct 
benefits decrease from a maximum of about US$280,000 to a minimum of about US$37,000. The 
percentage of direct benefits also remains almost constant between 65% and 70%.  
The composition of direct versus indirect benefits depends on the way that benefits are 
accounted for. There are competing factors for the percentage of direct versus indirect benefits. 
Recall that I assigned zero monetary benefits to the fraction of the population that I predicted 
would be unwilling to receive free vaccination. As price decreases, more people become 
vaccinated and the pool of unvaccinated persons who receive indirect benefits decreases. 
Concurrently, the magnitudes of indirect protection for both vaccinated and unvaccinated persons 
increase. Thus, the indirect benefit per person increases as coverage increases; however, the 
number of unvaccinated persons with non-zero WTP decreases. In addition, indirect protection is 
valued at 75% of direct protection. Thus, direct protection benefits are consistently larger than 
indirect benefits. In Figure 7.5, I show the fractional breakdown of benefits for a program with 
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free vaccination in comparison to a program in which all subgroups are charged US$2.20. The 
total indirect benefits decrease by about US$50,000 (16%), while the direct private benefits 
decrease by about US$50,000 (18%). Thus, the percentage composition of benefits remain almost 
constant across the likely pricing range. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Percentage composition of benefit components 
 
Net societal benefits and net revenue as functions of coverage are shown in Figure 7.6. 
These represent the objective function and revenue constraint for net societal benefit 
maximization if the same price were charged to all subgroups. Net societal benefits increase 
across the narrow range of prices from free to US$1.7. Net societal benefits are about 
US$170,000 for free vaccination and about US$210,000 if a user fee of US$1.70 is charged. If 
prices greater than US$1.70 are charged, net societal benefits decline from the maximum. The 
vertical dotted line shows the necessary external contribution to maximize net societal benefits, 
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which is about US$35,000. The net societal benefit curve is very flat across the price range from 
US$1 to US$3. Thus, one could change any price within this range and achieve near optimal net 
societal benefits. In contrast, the choice of price has a great effect on net revenue. If a price of 
US$1 is charged, an external contribution of about US$90,000 would be required. Alternatively, 
if a price of US$3 is charged, the program would generate a profit of about US$15,000. This 
demonstrates why the external contribution had a small impact on net societal benefits as reported 
in Table 7.4. It is sub-optimal to provide free vaccinations. Net societal benefits would decline 
considerably if there were a compulsory vaccination program to increase coverage rates to closer 
to 100%. 
  
 
Figure 7.6. Net societal benefits, net revenue, and cases avoided as functions of price 
 
The average cost per DALY, marginal cost per DALY, average cost per vaccination, and 
total DALYs saved functions are shown in Figure 7.7. A more thorough examination of the 
average and marginal costs per DALY is included in Appendix 4. Since the program has both 
fixed and variable costs, the average cost per vaccination delivered is not constant. As coverage 
increases, the average cost per vaccination decreases toward the variable cost of vaccination, 
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US$2. At low coverage rates, the average cost per vaccination may be very high, a maximum of 
US$16 at price US$10. Thus, it is important to consider fixed costs if coverage rates are expected 
to be low. At these low coverage rates, the fixed cost dominates variable costs in the average cost 
calculation.  
 
Figure 7.7. DALYs saved, average cost per vaccine and per DALY saved, and marginal cost per 
DALY saved 
The marginal cost per DALY is calculated based on the change in total cost divided by 
the change in DALYs saved in moving from price A to price B. Because the calculation is 
marginal, the fixed cost drops out of the calculation (in contrast to the average cost calculation). 
The marginal cost per DALY saved is minimized at low coverage rates because the marginal 
change in herd protection effects is greatest at low coverage rates. As more people become 
vaccinated, the number of cases avoided per vaccination decreases because incidence rates have 
already been reduced considerably for both vaccinated and unvaccinated persons.  
The shape of the average cost per DALY saved is influenced by both the average cost per 
vaccination and marginal cost per DALY curves. At very low prices and high coverage rates, the 
marginal cost per DALY is large, but the average cost per vaccination is minimized. Because the 
marginal cost per DALY is very high for free vaccination, the average cost per DALY will 
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decline as price is increased from free to US$3. After the marginal cost curve intersects the 
average cost curve at US$3, the average cost per DALY increases with price. At very high prices 
and low coverage rates, the average cost per DALY is very high, because fixed costs dominate 
marginal cost even thought the marginal cost per DALY is minimized. If the fixed cost were zero, 
the average cost per DALY would increase monotonically as coverage increases across the entire 
range of prices. 
  
7.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Due to the considerable uncertainty in parameter estimates and assumptions, I performed 
a sensitivity analyses using Monte Carlo simulation (MCS), treating most of the model 
parameters in Table 7.1 as random variables. I consider each objective function separately: 1) the 
maximization of net societal benefits and 2) the maximization of DALYS saved. Further, I 
assume that no external contribution will be available to help offset program costs. The basic 
features of the original model apply to the MCS without change, e.g. the child and adult 
populations by village type, the ability to apply discounted public treatment cost savings to the 
net revenue constraint, and the financial and DALY discount rates.  
The remaining parameters are variable based on the parameter ranges included in Table 
7.1. For each random variable, the probability density function (pdf) is assumed to be triangular, 
based on the best estimate and bracketed lower and upper bound values shown in Table 7.1. The 
sensitivity analysis produces an optimal solution for each of 500 MCS trials. The same 500 
parameter draws are used to solve both models separately. 
Cholera incidence is assumed to be higher in children than in adults for both village 
types. This was ensured in the MCS by using correlations that resulted in child incidence 
exceeding adult incidence for 100% of the trials. The ratio of child to adult cholera incidence was 
about 2.8 in the deterministic case, and in the MCS it ranged from 1 to 8 with a median of 2.8. 
Similarly, the median ratio of incidence for high incidence versus low incidence villages is 3.7, 
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which is similar to the ratio assumed in the deterministic models, 4. Correlations were also used 
for the parameters of the demand functions, α and β, to ensure that child coverage would exceed 
adult coverage for identical prices; the median ratio of α-values for children relative to adults in 
the MCS was about 1.7 (on a percentage basis), and the median ratio of β-values for adults 
relative to children was about 1.2, both of which closely match the ratios in the deterministic 
model. It was assumed that demand functions would be the same for high incidence and low 
incidence villages, as in the deterministic model. The same probability density function for the 
herd protection coefficients cases was used for both adults and children, but the model allowed 
for differences by age group. Herd protection effects for children and adults, γc and γa, are drawn 
independently in case either adults (or children) are more efficient at spreading cholera once they 
become ill.  
For 10% of the simulations, it was not possible to achieve revenue neutrality. These 
scenarios include simulations with high average and marginal costs. In addition, the demand 
function parameters and herd protection coefficients tend to be smaller. I omit these scenarios for 
the rest of this discussion and focus on simulations in which revenue neutrality is possible. For 
the net societal benefit model, the mean optimal prices across simulations are US$2.90 for 
children in high incidence villages, US$3.00 for adults in high incidence villages, US$2.90 for 
children in low incidence villages, and US$2.90 for adults in low incidence villages. For any 
individual draw, it might be optimal to charge certain subgroups slightly more or slightly less 
than others. On average, net societal benefits are maximized when approximately equal prices are 
charged. This is because WTP benefits are considered to be independent of the uncertainty in 
incidence, case fatality rate, and other public health parameters within the MCS, (i.e. no 
correlations were assumed between demand function parameters and these public health 
parameters).   
In contrast, for the DALY model, the mean optimal prices across simulations are 
US$1.50 for children in high incidence villages, US$1.90 for adults in low incidence villages, 
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US$3.10 for children in low incidence villages, and US$3.10 for children in low incidence 
villages. Thus, it is optimal to target program subsidies for the high incidence villages where the 
program cost per DALY saved is likely to be less. However, it is generally not optimal to provide 
free vaccinations to the high incidence villages. The optimal child price in high incidence villages 
is zero in just 5% of the simulations and the optimal adult price is zero in less than 1%. 
Next, I examine the differences in outcome measures from the two models. In Figure 7.8, 
the cumulative distribution of net societal benefits from both the DALY and Net Benefit models 
are shown. Since net societal benefits are included in the objective function of the Net Benefit 
model, it is expected that estimates are larger for the Net Benefit model relative to the DALY 
model. However, differences are very small, less than 5%, across the entire distribution. The 5%-
to-95% confidence interval for net societal benefits is about US$110,000 to US$380,000 for the 
448 simulations in which the net revenue constraint can be satisfied.30  
The cumulative density functions of DALYs saved from the Net Benefit and DALY 
models are shown in Figure 7.9. The DALYs saved are greater for the DALY model, but, again, 
differences are small. The maximum difference across all simulations is only about 20%. The  
median number of DALYs saved is about 250, and the 5% to 95% uncertainty range is about 110 
to 580 DALYs. 
Thus, the type of model, Net Benefit or DALY, appears to have more influence on setting 
prices than on program outcomes.31 I believe that differences are limited by herd protection 
effects, which allow for significant incidence reductions in unvaccinated groups. Since incidence 
is reduced to some degree for both vaccinated and unvaccinated persons, cross-subsidies are less 
influential in changing program outcomes. 
                                                 
30Net societal benefits are greater than zero across the other 52 simulations for which the net revenue 
constraint cannot be satisfied. Thus, properly designed cholera vaccination programs should easily pass a 
benefit-cost test.  
 
31It is also possible to solve a model in which all subgroups are charged the same price. Program outcomes 
from this model are very similar to the Net Benefit and DALY models. I omitted this model from Figures 8 
and 9 so that the minimal difference between the Net Benefit and DALY models would be easier to see. 
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Figure 7.8. Net societal benefits from MCS 
 
 
Figure 7.9. Number of DALYs saved from MCS 
   
   
In Table 7.5, I present the results of an analysis of variance for the Net Benefit Model. It 
is clear that average and fixed costs are the most important determinants of optimal prices 
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(columns 1-4), accounting for between 75-85% of the total variation across the four prices. For 
simulations with high costs estimates, all prices must be set relatively high to achieve revenue 
neutrality. Other important parameters include: adult and child herd protection coefficients and 
adult and child demand coefficients. When one age group has a greater influence on herd 
protection than the other, it is typically optimal to subsidize that group to increase indirect 
protection benefits.   
It is illustrative to consider the ratio of weighted average adult to child prices. Average 
adult and child prices can be calculated from a population-weighted average of prices charged in 
high incidence and average incidence villages. The fifth column of Table 7.5 shows an analysis of 
variance for this ratio. This clearly shows the importance of herd protection coefficients, which 
account for 65% of the variation. This is further demonstrated in Figure 7.10, which plots the 
ratio of adult to child price relative to the ratio of adult to child herd protection coefficients on a 
log scale. When the adult herd protection coefficient is larger in magnitude than the child 
coefficient, γa> γc, it is optimal to charge adults lower user fees, pa< pc, to take advantage of these 
effects (see bottom-right corner of Figure 7.10. In contrast, if γa< γc, it optimal to charge children 
lower prices (see upper-left corner of Figure 7.10). It is important to note that I chose tightly 
bounded uncertainty ranges for herd protection coefficients. The largest gamma ratio is just 2.3. If 
I had used a larger uncertainty range, it is likely that herd protection coefficients would play a 
larger role in analysis of variance calculations. This is a potentially important topic for future 
epidemiological research. 
 
 
 Table 7.5. Analysis of variance for Net Benefit model 
 
Pch, Child 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$  
(1) 
Pah, Adult 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$  
(2) 
Pcl, Child 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$  
(3) 
Pal, Adult 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$  
(4) 
Weighted 
average price 
difference 
between 
children and 
adults, US$ 
(5) 
Net 
societal 
benefits, 
US$  
(6) 
Benefit- 
cost ratio 
(7) 
Common parameters        
Vaccine efficacy, Eff,  1% 2% 0% 0% 1% 10% 19% 
Variable cost, C, US$ 62% 57% 64% 60% 0% 19% 35% 
Fixed cost, F, US$ 17% 17% 21% 18% 0% 6% 12% 
Public COI per case- PUBCOI, US$ 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
Indirect protection correction factor for vaccinated 
and unvaccinated, πx 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 6% 
Duration of vaccine protection, VACCDUR (years) 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Length of illness, ILLDUR (days) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Case fatality rate (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Adult expected remaining life years, LEa 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
DALY weight, DALYweight 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Child parameters 
       
Baseline annual incidence for children in high 
incidence villages, INCU0ch, cases per 1,000 
persons 
2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Baseline annual incidence for children in average 
incidence villages, INCU0cl, cases per 1,000 
persons 
0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Child demand intercept, αcx 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 7% 2% 
Child price coefficient, βcx  1% 2% 0% 5% 10% 24% 11% 
Herd protection coefficient for child coverage, γcx  4% 5% 5% 4% 31% 1% 2% 
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Pch, Child 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$  
(1) 
Pah, Adult 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$  
(2) 
Pcl, Child 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$  
(3) 
Pal, Adult 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$  
(4) 
Weighted 
average price 
difference 
between 
children and 
adults, US$ 
(5) 
Net 
societal 
benefits, 
US$  
(6) 
Benefit- 
cost ratio 
(7) 
Adult parameters 
       
Baseline annual incidence for adults in high 
incidence villages, INCU0ah, cases per 1,000 
persons 
1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Baseline annual incidence for adults in average 
incidence villages, INCU0al, cases per 1,000 
persons 
0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Adult demand intercept, αax 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 10% 2% 
Adult price coefficient, βax  4% 0% 4% 3% 22% 19% 9% 
Herd protection coefficient for adult coverage, γax  4% 4% 3% 7% 34% 0% 1% 
 
Table 7.6. Analysis of variance for DALY model 
 
Pch, Child 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(1) 
Pah, Adult 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(2) 
Pcl, Child 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(3) 
Pal, Adult 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(4) 
Weighted 
average price 
difference 
between 
children and 
adults, US$ 
(5) 
DALYs 
saved 
(6) 
Average 
cost per 
DALY 
(7) 
Common parameters 
       
Vaccine efficacy, Eff,  0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Variable cost, C, US$ 36% 29% 57% 48% 0% 9% 10% 
Fixed cost, F, US$ 21% 16% 19% 11% 1% 3% 4% 
Public COI per case- PUBCOI, US$ 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
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Pch, Child 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(1) 
Pah, Adult 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(2) 
Pcl, Child 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(3) 
Pal, Adult 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(4) 
Weighted 
average price 
difference 
between 
children and 
adults, US$ 
(5) 
DALYs 
saved 
(6) 
Average 
cost per 
DALY 
(7) 
Indirect protection correction factor for vaccinated 
and unvaccinated, πx 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Duration of vaccine protection, VACCDUR (years) 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 9% 11% 
Length of illness, ILLDUR (days) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Case fatality rate (%) 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 59% 58% 
Adult expected remaining life years, LEa 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
DALY weight, DALYweight 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Child parameters        
Baseline annual incidence for children in high 
incidence villages, INCU0ch, cases per 1,000 
persons 
11% 3% 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 
Baseline annual incidence for children in average 
incidence villages, INCU0cl, cases per 1,000 
persons 
2% 1% 2% 0% 0% 8% 7% 
Child demand intercept, αcx 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Child price coefficient, βcx  0% 13% 2% 10% 18% 1% 0% 
Herd protection coefficient for child coverage, γcx  
3% 11% 4% 2% 13% 2% 2% 
Adult parameters        
Baseline annual incidence for adults in high 
incidence villages, INCU0ah, cases per 1,000 
persons 
0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
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Pch, Child 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(1) 
Pah, Adult 
price in 
high 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(2) 
Pcl, Child 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(3) 
Pal, Adult 
price in 
average 
incidence 
villages, 
US$ 
(4) 
Weighted 
average price 
difference 
between 
children and 
adults, US$ 
(5) 
DALYs 
saved 
(6) 
Average 
cost per 
DALY 
(7) 
Baseline annual incidence for adults in average 
incidence villages, INCU0al, cases per 1,000 
persons 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Adult demand intercept, αax 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 
Adult price coefficient, βax  16% 5% 11% 16% 48% 2% 1% 
Herd protection coefficient for adult coverage, γax  
10% 16% 2% 9% 20% 0% 1% 
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Figure 7.10. Adult to child price ratio versus adult to child herd protection coefficient ratio 
   
The variation in societal net benefits (column 6 of Table 7.5) is primarily due to a 
combination of cost function and demand function parameters, such that societal net benefits 
would be large in scenarios for which adult and child WTP for vaccinations is greater than 
average and for which program costs are less than average. These parameters are also 
primarily responsible for the variation in benefit-cost ratio calculations (column 7).  
It is also important to identify parameters that do not affect societal net benefit 
calculations. Incidence and public COI estimates have very little effect on program outcomes 
indicating that public COI savings are small relative to other economic benefits in almost all 
simulations. In addition, many of the parameter inputs to the DALY calculations (e.g., 
duration of illness, case fatality rate, DALY weight) have no impact on Net Benefit model 
outcomes. This is not surprising because these parameters are not included in the vaccine 
demand functions, which are primarily used to estimate benefits for this model. 
Table 7.6 shows an analysis of variance for the DALY model. Uncertainties in 
program fixed and variable costs are again the most important contributor to variation in 
optimal prices (columns 1-4) for the DALY model. This is again because of the necessity to 
achieve revenue neutrality, which impacts prices for all subgroups. Other important 
contributors to variation in the price for children in high incidence villages (column 1) include 
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their incidence rate, INCU0ch, (11%) the adult price coefficient (16%) and the adult herd 
protection coefficient (10%). These parameters are all important in determining the 
effectiveness of adult-to-child cross subsidies. If adult coverage rates are expected to decline 
quickly as a function of price, it would be difficult to subsidize child vaccinations by charging 
adults more. This is especially true in light of herd protection effects, which may be strongly 
influenced by adult coverage rates. 
Similar to the Net Benefit model, the variation in the ratio of population-weighted 
average adult to child price for the DALY model (column 5) is primarily determined via adult 
and child price coefficients (66% total) and herd protection coefficients (33% total). Again, 
this is due to the importance of herd protection in reducing community-wide disease rates 
(and thereby increasing the number of DALYs saved). Incidence rates have very little impact 
on this outcome, although this is probably because I used a correlation coefficient between 
adult and child incidence rates for the parameter draw. Thus, the ratio of adult to child 
incidence is not likely to vary much from one simulation to the next. 
Next, I consider an analysis of variance for the number of DALYs saved (column 6). 
The single greatest source of uncertainty is the case fatality rate (almost 60%). The baseline 
incidence rates for children (10% total), the duration of protection (9%), and program costs 
(12% total) are also important. The importance of uncertainty in case fatality rates relative to 
uncertainty in incidence is slightly exaggerated, because I incorporate separate incidence 
values by subgroup, but only a single case fatality rate. The causes of variation in the average 
cost per DALY saved (column 7) are very similar to those for total DALYs. 
In Table 7.7, I calculate 5% to 95% uncertainty intervals for a number of important 
vaccination metrics. The data are taken from Net Benefit model results, but these metrics 
would be very similar if I used the DALY model instead. The average number of vaccinations 
per case avoided (column 1) depends primarily on incidence rates, vaccination efficacy and 
duration, and herd protection effects. The median is 50 vaccinations per case avoided with a 
tightly bounded 5% to 95% range of 32 to 78 vaccinations per case avoided. The ratio of 
public treatment cost savings to total costs (column 2) is small all across parameter draws. 
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The median ratio of public treatment savings to total costs is about 11% and the 95th 
percentile value is 18%. Thus, one could neglect these to simplify the net revenue constraint. 
The 5% to 95% uncertainty range for the societal benefit-cost ratio (column 3) is between 2.2 
and 3.6, with a median of 2.8. This uncertainty range is very tightly bound as the 95th 
percentile value is only about 1.6 times greater than 5th percentile value. Variation is primarily 
determined by cost and price coefficient parameters. 
Table 7.7. MCS uncertainty ranges for important vaccination program metrics 
Cumulative
% 
Vaccinations / 
cases 
avoided 
COI savings / 
total cost (%) 
Societal 
benefit-cost 
ratio 
Net cost per 
DALY saved 
 
Net cost 
per life 
saved 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
5 32 0.06 2.2 185 4,664 
10 35 0.07 2.3 213 5,521 
15 38 0.07 2.4 233 5,952 
20 40 0.08 2.4 256 6,628 
25 43 0.08 2.5 279 7,203 
30 44 0.09 2.6 293 7,673 
35 45 0.09 2.6 320 8,192 
40 47 0.09 2.7 346 8,944 
45 48 0.10 2.7 370 9,448 
50 50 0.11 2.8 388 9,930 
55 52 0.11 2.8 420 10,567 
60 54 0.12 2.9 450 11,617 
65 56 0.12 2.9 482 12,362 
70 58 0.13 3.0 514 13,109 
75 60 0.14 3.1 554 13,964 
80 63 0.15 3.2 593 14,807 
85 65 0.16 3.3 651 16,574 
90 70 0.17 3.4 738 18,894 
95 78 0.19 3.6 850 21,405 
 
There is considerably more variation in the cost utility metrics, net cost per DALY 
saved (column 4) and net cost per life saved (column 5), than in the benefit-cost ratio. The 5% 
to 95% uncertainty range for the net cost per DALY is 185 to 850; the median is 388. Thus, 
the 95th percentile value is about 4.6 times greater than 5th percentile value. Since the World 
Bank’s ‘very cost-effective’ threshold for Bangladesh is about US$510, about 70% of the 
simulation results would qualify as ‘very cost-effective’. The variation in this parameter is 
primarily due to the uncertainty assumed for the case fatality rate, which varied from 0.5% to 
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3% in the sensitivity analysis. This is why the MCS distribution appears to be more favorable 
than the deterministic models, which assumed a 1% case fatality rate. 
The uncertainty range for the cost per life saved is shown in column 5 of Table 7.7. 
The median cost per life saved is about US$10,000 and the 5% to 95% range is US$4,600 to 
US$21,000. My best estimate of parental VSL for a youngest child is about US$15,000, with 
a range of US$10,000 to US$25,000. Since the cost per life saved is less than US$15,000 in 
about 80% of the simulations, revenue-neutral cholera vaccination programs would pass cost-
benefit tests in a majority of simulations even if private COI savings and avoided pain and 
suffering were not valued. Thus, cholera vaccination programs in the Matlab area would pass 
benefit-cost tests regardless of whether WTP benefits or private COI + mortality risk 
reduction benefits are used. It may be easier to estimate benefits for private COI + mortality 
risk reductions in locations where private demand surveys are not conducted. A lot of the 
variation in the cost per life saved is again driven by the uncertainty for the case fatality rate. 
 8 Conclusions 
I believe that this dissertation makes the following contributions to the existing 
literature on vaccination policy. First, I was able to collect and synthesize vaccination benefit 
data from multiple sources. The collection of data from multiple sources allows me to test for 
consistency, which increases validity of my results. Second, I developed new approaches to 
modeling vaccination policy, including new methods to account for economic herd protection 
benefits for both vaccinated and unvaccinated persons. My approach varies from that reported 
in Cook et al. (2009) because my economic benefit estimates for both vaccinated and 
unvaccinated groups are based on consumer surplus generated from predicted demand 
functions and adjusted for herd protection. In contrast, Cook et al.’s estimates of economic 
benefits for the unvaccinated are based on ex ante mortality risk reduction and private 
treatment cost savings. One potential deficiency in the Cook et al. approach is the use of a 
population-average VSL for the unvaccinated subgroup when it is likely that the average VSL 
for the unvaccinated group is less than that for the population as a whole as evidenced by the 
fact that they chose not to purchase vaccines. Cook et al.’s use of different valuation methods 
for the vaccinated and unvaccinated subgroups also leads to a discontinuity in the net benefit 
function.  
In addition, I split the Matlab population into four subgroups with varying incidence 
rates and demand function parameters, while Cook et al. only consider a single population. 
Thus, my approach can examine whether cross-subsidies might be useful to increase the 
economic efficiency of cholera vaccination in consideration of herd protection. Finally, my 
study also examines the differences in program outcomes when non-monetary health utility 
units are used in the objective function in place of net economic benefits. In fact, I believe this 
is the first attempt to use cost utility metrics in an optimization analysis.
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I estimated cholera vaccination WTP benefits and the value of statistical life from CV 
surveys. These allow me to compare average cholera vaccine WTP to ex ante cholera mortality 
and morbidity benefit estimates per person based on VSL, incidence and private COI data. The ex 
ante cholera vaccination benefits per person include the sum of expected morbidity and mortality 
savings over the duration of vaccine protection and should be approximately equal to the product 
of average WTP for vaccination after accounting for the fact that cholera vaccinations are not 
100% effective and assuming prospective purchasers are risk neutral.  
The average WTP per person is greatest for young children age 1 to 5 years (US$2.4) 
followed by older children age 5 to 17 years (US$1.2) and adults (US$1). I only collected VSL 
estimates for children. The average VSL across age groups is US$15,000 but appears to be 
greater for older children who face a lower baseline risk of death. My best estimates of the sums 
of ex ante mortality risk reduction and morbidity risk reduction benefits are US$1.7 for young 
children and US$0.24 for older children. The ex ante estimate for young children (US$1.70) is 
about 70% of the WTP estimate (US$2.40). For older children, the ex ante morbidity and 
mortality risk reduction benefits per person, US$0.24, are only about 20% of the WTP benefits 
per person (US$1.20). I believe that differences result because the ex ante morbidity plus 
mortality estimate ignores the cost of pain and suffering, which might compose a larger fraction 
of total vaccination benefits when mortality risks are small, as is the case for older children. It 
may also be the case that parents overestimated their older children’s baseline risk of death from 
cholera, which is likely to be very small. It is also important to note that there is greater 
uncertainty in calculating ex ante morbidity plus mortality estimates than in calculating the WTP 
estimates. This is because there is uncertainty in both cholera mortality rates and VSL estimates. 
These uncertainties are compounded when the two variables are multiplied. 
I examined a number of different pricing models for vaccination programs. These include 
simple models in which all four groups are charged the same price and optimized models in 
which different subgroups are charged different prices. The optimized models attempt to 
 179 
maximize either net societal benefits or total DALYs saved. The net societal benefit curve is 
almost flat over the range of likely prices, US$1.00 to US$3.00, for a cholera vaccination 
program in Matlab (see Figure 7.6). Over this range of prices, net societal benefits vary between 
US$200,000 and US$220,000. Thus, there is very little difference in the absolute maximum net 
benefits, US$220,000, and the maximum net societal benefits possible from a revenue neutral 
program, US$210, 000. A public or donor contribution of US$32,000 could be used to boost net 
societal benefits by about US$5,000, a 2% change. Thus, donor contributions are unnecessary to 
increase net societal benefits; however, the number of DALYs can be increased to a small degree 
by external contributions. 
The optimal prices that maximize net societal benefits tend to fall within tightly bound 
ranges around the marginal cost of vaccination. As a result, the prices for each of the four groups 
would typically fall within US$1 of one another when societal net benefits are maximized. This 
occurs because the demand functions are found to be independent of incidence differences across 
villages. Since demand functions drive the calculation of direct and indirect benefits, the 
difference in optimal prices result solely from small differences in herd protection effects and 
public COI savings. However, public COI savings tend to be small relative to direct and indirect 
benefits (see Figure 7.5). In the deterministic model, it is assumed that herd protection effects are 
same for vaccinating adults or children. Thus, the targeting of vaccinations is unnecessary for 
maximizing herd protection. 
Program outcomes are very similar for models that maximize DALYs saved. Relative to 
net benefit maximization models, the optimal prices derived from models that maximize DALYs 
show more variability across subgroups. The optimal prices for groups with high incidence tend 
to be smaller (i.e. for children relative to adults and for high incidence villages relative to average 
incidence villages). As a result, predicted coverage rates at optimal prices are greater for groups 
in which the numbers of cases avoided per vaccination are greater. However, the population-
average coverage rates remain about the same. Hence, herd protection effects accrue equally to 
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vaccinated and unvaccinated persons and are assumed to be independent of who is vaccinated. 
Thus, there are very small differences in the numbers of DALYs saved for the Net Benefit versus 
the DALY model, despite the differences in optimal prices. Monte Carlo Simulation results 
indicate that the differences in net societal benefits or DALYs saved for the Net Benefit or DALY 
models are less than 10% across a range of 500 independent parameter draws.  
It is possible to increase the number of DALYs saved if external funding is available. 
However, the marginal cost per DALY saved would be high. The cost per DALY saved varies 
depending on the coverage rate of the program (see Figure 7.7 and refer to Appendix 4). At very 
low coverage rates, the average cost per vaccination is very high because fixed costs are spread 
across a small number of vaccinated individuals. As a result, the cost per DALY saved is also 
high. As coverage increases, the cost per DALY saved decreases as more people become 
vaccinated and fixed costs across a larger number of vaccination recipients. The cost per DALY 
is minimized when the average price charged is about US$3 and the average coverage rate is 
about 20%. As coverage rates increase beyond 20% the average cost per DALY saved decreases. 
This is because of the diminishing returns to scale of herd protection. If fixed costs were assumed 
to be zero, the average cost per DALY saved would increase monotonically with coverage, 
because of these declining returns to scale.  
I performed sensitivity analysis on a number of model input parameters using Monte 
Carlo Simulation with 500 parameter draws. The uncertainty in optimal pricing is driven 
primarily by uncertainty in the fixed and variable costs of vaccination programs. If program costs 
are greater than expected, it would be necessary to charge all subgroups higher prices in order to 
maintain revenue neutrality. When higher prices are charged, coverage rates decline, herd 
protection effects are diminished, and fewer cholera cases are avoided. Thus, variation in societal 
net benefits and DALYs are also strongly affected by uncertainty in program costs. Uncertainty in 
net societal benefits is also driven by uncertainty in demand function parameters. If demand is 
greater than expected, net societal benefits increase because cholera protection is perceived to be 
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more valuable to the community. The uncertainty in DALYs saved is primarily driven by 
variability in case fatality rate and incidence rates, such that more DALYs are saved when 
incidence and case fatality rates are greater. It is believed that cholera case fatality rates may be 
lower in Matlab relative to other rural communities because Matlab’s ICDDR,B hospital is 
available to provide high quality treatment. If case fatality rate were greater than 1%, it is likely 
that cholera vaccination in the Matlab area could be considered ‘very cost-effective’ based on 
World Bank Standards, but only at modest coverage rates (20-40%). At higher coverage rates, the 
cost per DALY saved would be higher due to diminishing returns to scale of herd protection.  
In the MCS, I allowed the shape of the herd protection curve to be influenced by who is 
receiving vaccinations. Individuals in different subgroups may spread disease differently than 
members of other subgroups.32 I am not aware of attempts to model differential herd protection 
effects of cholera vaccination based on coverage rates by different subgroups (e.g., school 
children, elderly, males, females). The Matlab trial is the only cholera vaccine trial that has been 
modeled for herd protection (Ali et al., 2005; Ali et al., 2008; Longini et al., 2007; Emch et al., 
2009). This trial only included children older than 2 years and adult women. In addition, 
modeling of the coverage-protection relationship is only available for the population as a whole, 
not for different age groups. Ali et al. (2008) reported that cholera incidence for children less than 
2 years is significantly correlated with the fraction of adult females vaccinated in their bari, but 
not statistically correlated with the coverage rate for older children. Thus, it would appear that 
vaccinating women is more effective than vaccinating children for boosting herd protection of 
infants.  
The authors consider different reasons for the greater impact of vaccinating women. They 
rule out transmission of immunogenic compounds via mothers’ breast milk, which had been 
examined during the trial (Clemens et al., 1990a). Instead, they suggest that physical (rather than 
                                                 
32For example, in the United States and Japan, researchers have found that school children spread influenza 
more than other age groups. As a result, greater herd protection effects are realized by targeting children 
relative to other age groups (Patel et al. 2005). 
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biological) transmission methods are more likely (possibly because of women’s roles in the 
preparation of household food or infants’ contacts with soiled saris) (Stanton and Clemens, 1986; 
St. Louis et al., 1990). It is not know if vaccinations of adult women were also more effective for 
reducing incidence in older children or adults. It would be difficult to draw inferences for other 
age groups, who do not spend all of their time in the care of their mother. 
In the MCS, I allowed adult and child herd protection coefficients to vary independently, 
such that vaccination of one group may have a greater herd protection effect than the other. If 
child herd protection coefficients are larger than adult coefficients, the optimal child prices would 
be reduced relative to the base case models, but differences are small (see Figure 7.10). 
Differences in outcome measures are also relatively small. Similar conclusions are reached if the 
magnitudes of adult herd protection coefficients are greater than child coefficients. It should be 
noted that I used tightly bounded uncertainty ranges in the MCS. At maximum, the herd 
protection effect was 2.2 times greater for one group than the other. If I used larger uncertainty 
ranges, I may have seen a more pronounced effect. However, discussions with epidemiologists at 
the International Vaccine Institute indicated that such large differences would be unlikely. 
I also examined differences in outcome measures after estimating monetary benefits for 
those with zero WTP for vaccines. This assumes that some fraction of the population would have 
chosen to receive free vaccinations if there were no time costs or if they were completely certain 
there would be no side effects. The inclusion of these benefit measures has a very small impact on 
optimal prices and program outcomes because the majority of cholera protection benefits would 
still accrue to those with non-zero WTP for cholera vaccinations. 
A number of conclusions may be drawn from my analysis. For diseases like cholera, it 
may be unnecessary and excessively costly to maximize vaccine coverage rates. Due to herd 
protection, increases in coverage beyond 30% would lead to very small changes in the number of 
cases avoided. It may not be a worthwhile investment of resources to try to increase coverage 
rates beyond this rate.  
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A priori, it is difficult to determine whether vaccination benefits should be modeled based 
on WTP benefits or public health measures. For net societal benefit maximization, the value of 
protection is determined by how much people are willing to pay for vaccines, which is 
heterogeneous across the population and which depends on socioeconomic characteristics and 
individual perceptions about the likelihood and severity of contracting cholera. Thus, the 
objective function is greatly influenced by those with higher than average WTP, which may not 
be directly correlated with those who face the greatest risk of cholera morbidity or mortality. On 
the other hand, public health benefits are generally weighted by incidence and case fatality rates, 
which are assumed to be homogenous within subgroups and heterogeneous across subgroups. 
Thus, vaccinations may be easily targeted to vulnerable populations. 
The existence of herd protection effects tends to smooth out the differences in outcomes 
between the Net Benefit and DALY models. For the most of the models, the unvaccinated 
incidence rates are reduced by 45% – 55%. Thus, additional differences in direct protection 
across groups are minor relative to the indirect protection experienced. As a result, differences in 
outcome measures are relatively small even if differences in prices are substantial. When 
estimating the difference in incidence rates for Matlab’s highest incidence villages, I tried to use 
the maximum possible difference in incidence across villages. It is likely that the high-incidence-
village to average-incidence-village ratio for Matlab is smaller than four, in which case there 
would be less incentive to subsidize high incidence villages. Thus, the value of cross-subsidies 
would be further reduced. In practice, it should be much easier to charge the same price to all 
subgroups. While this is likely to be true in many rural areas, more careful consideration may be 
required for urban areas in which slum communities may face drastically higher risks of cholera 
than their middle and upper income neighbors. In the urban case, cross-subsidies might be a more 
useful policy tool.  
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire: Willingness to pay for Cholera Vaccines in Matlab, 
Bangladesh 
 
Cover Sheet 
 
_________________ 
Questionnaire Number 
 
Number  (same as item 1.5) 
CID Number       
 
RID Number 
 
 
Patient's Hospital ID Number (if applicable) 
 
_______________ 
 
 
Block number 
 
 
   
 
Respondent Address ____________________ 
 
   ____________________ 
 
Interviewer, how long did you have to wait, after arriving at the respondent's home, to conduct 
this interview?  (Please fill in below in minutes, if you didn't have to wait, please record "zero") 
 
___________  minute 
 
For manager use only (write initials) 
 
 
 Submitted with consent form  
 
 
 
 Questionnaire ready for data entry 
 
 
For data entry only: 
 
    Entry 1 Code       Entry 2 Code        
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1.0 If the survey is not completed, please indicate the reason why? 
 
 (1)     _______  Respondent seriously ill, cannot reschedule 
 
 (2)     _______  Respondent refused to be interviewed 
 
(3)     _______  Respondent refused to sign consent 
 
 (4)     _______  Respondent decided to stop before finishing interview 
 
 (5)     _______  Respondent absent 
 
(6)     _______  No children under 18 yrs. in the family 
 
(7)     _______  Respondent is not a parent of children less than 18 years of age  
   
 (-95)  _______   ______________________   others, specify 
 
Part 1 Demographics 
 
1.1 Interviewer, when did you meet with the respondent? Mark the time you started and 
finished in the appropriate box. If the survey required a second interview, mark the start 
and finish time of that second interview also, and so on. 1.1 
 
 First visit Second visit Third visit Fourth visit 
1.1A    Date (dd/mm/yy)  
___/___/___ 
   
1.1B    Time start                  
        : 
hours/minutes 
           :           :           : 
1.1C   Time stop  
        :        
hours/minutes 
         :           :          : 
1.1D  Total minutes       _____ 
minutes       
      _____ 
        
        _____ 
         
       _____ 
         
 
1.2                                                            -             -                        -       
 Questionnaire Version Number   Vacc price   VSL eff        VSL price NTT/TTT 
 
1.3 ___________________ 
 Questionnaire Number 
 
1.4  Interviewer Code 
 
1.5  Respondent’s ID Number   
 CID Number 
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 RID Number 
          
 
1.6 Block number 
     
1.7 Respondent's Gender 
  
(1)     _______ Male 
 (2)     _______ Female 
 
1.8  Enumerator:  Do you have a signed consent form for this respondent? 
 
  
(1)     _______ Yes (Skip to 1.9) 
 (2)     _______ No (Continue) 
 
 
Give the consent form to the respondent and allow him/her to read it.  Make sure that he/she 
understands the information.  If the respondent can't read then read out the consent form to the 
respondent and try to make him/her understand.  If the respondent agrees to interview then take 
his/her signature/left thumbprint on the consent form and keep the signed consent form with you. 
 
Fill in the table on your laminated card for all household members.  Then copy the information 
into the table below. 
 
 1.9  Current Age 
 
1.10  Gender 
1=Male, 2= Female 
1.11  Relationship to 
respondent 
Self    
Spouse    
Other 1       
Other 2       
Other 3       
Other 4       
Other 5       
Other 6       
Other 7       
Other 8       
Other 9       
Other 10       
Other 11       
Other 12       
Other 13       
Other 14       
Other 15       
Other 16      
Other 17      
Other 18      
Other 19      
Other 20      
 187 
 
(1.11) Relationship to respondent/patient 
1 = Respondent 7 =  Spouse of the respondent 
2 = Son/daughter of the 
respondent 
8 =  Spouse of the son/daughter of the 
respondent 
3 = Grandchildren of the 
respondent 
9 =  Spouse of the grandchildren of the 
respondent 
4 = Brother/sister of the 
respondent 
10 =  Brother in law/Sister in law of the 
respondent 
5 = Mother/father of the 
respondent 
11 =  Mother/father in law of the respondent 
6 = Extended Family (-95) =  Others 
 
 
1.12 Enumerator:  are there children under 18 years old listed in the table above? 
 
 (1)     _______  Yes 
 (2)     _______  No [Go to 1.0 and check (7)]              
 
1.13 How many married couples are living in this household? 
 
 ___________   couple 
 
1.14 Have you heard anything about this study from your friend, neighbors, or family 
members? 
 
 (1)     _______  Yes 
 
 (2)     _______  No (Skip to section 2) 
 
1.15 What have you heard about this study?  (Enumerator:  record their response below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2: Perceptions and Attitude Towards Cholera 
 
 The next questions I would like to ask you are about the disease cholera. 
 
2.1 Have you ever heard of the disease cholera? 
  
(1)     _______ Yes  
 (2)     _______ No (Skip to statement after 2.2) 
 (-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to statement after 2.2) 
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2.2 What are the symptoms of cholera? (Spontaneous response, more than one response 
permitted) 
 
  (Yes) (No) 
1.   Watery diarrhea many times 
2.   Rice watery stool 
3.   Sunken eyes 
4.   Continuous diarrhea 
5.   Vomiting 
6.   Leg and hand cramps 
7.   Dry mouth 
8.   Crying without tears 
9.   Increasing thirst 
10.   Dehydration 
11.   Weakness 
12.   Fever 
(-95)     ____________________    Others, specify 
(-98)   Don't know/not sure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please read the following description to all respondents: 
 
Cholera is a disease often characterized by severe diarrhea, frequent episodes of watery diarrhea, 
vomiting, and weakness. 
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2.3  How does someone become infected by cholera?  (Spontaneous response, more than 
one response permitted: check all that apply) 
  
  Yes No 
a. drinking unboiled water   
b. eating unhygienic foods   
c. eating food from street vendors   
d. eating unclean, uncooked vegetables   
e. eating unripe fruit   
f. bad weather   
g. using unhygienic latrines   
h. not washing hands before eating   
i. flies touching food   
j. other(s)     specify: 
 
  
k. don't know/not sure   
 
2.4 How common do you think cholera is in your neighborhood? (read all responses before 
taking answer; one response  permitted) 
  
(1)     _______ Not very common  
 (2)     _______ Common  
(3)     _______ Very common  
(-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure  
 
How serious is cholera for the following groups?  (For each group, read all responses: allow 
respondent to answer very serious/serious/not so serious/don't know/not sure) 
 
  (1) 
Very serious 
(2) 
Serious 
(3) 
Not so serious 
(-98) 
Don't know/not 
sure 
2.5 Children (under 18)     
2.6 Adults     
 
2.7 How likely is it that you would get cholera some time in the next five years? (read all 
responses; one response permitted) 
 
(1)     _______ very unlikely 
(2)     _______ unlikely 
  (3)     _______ somewhat likely 
(4)     _______ very likely 
(-98)  _______ don't know/not sure  
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2.8 How likely is it that the young children (under 18) in your household would get cholera 
some time in the next five years? (read all responses; one response permitted) 
 
(1)     _______ very unlikely 
(2)     _______ unlikely 
  (3)     _______ somewhat likely 
(4)     _______ very likely 
(-98)  _______ don't know/not sure  
 
2.9 Has anybody in your household (including yourself) ever had cholera? 
 
(1)     _______ Yes  
 (2)     _______ No (Skip to 2.11) 
 (-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to 2.11) 
 
2.10 Who has had cholera, and when did they have cholera? (Multiple response permitted) 
List Check 
 
When? 
Year Don't know, not sure (check) 
Self    
Spouse    
  Other 1     
  Other 2     
  Other 3     
  Other 4     
  Other 5     
  Other 6     
  Other 7     
  Other 8     
  Other 9     
  Other 10     
  Other 11     
  Other 12     
  Other 13     
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  Other 14     
  Other 15     
 
2.11 Has anyone in your household ever died of cholera?   
(1)     _______Yes (continue)  
 (2)     _______No (Skip to Question 2.13) 
 (-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to 2.13) 
        
2.12 For each person in your household who died of cholera, please tell me how old they were 
when they died. (Spontaneous response; record total number of individuals who died of 
cholera in each group) 
 
 Number of people 
(1)  Infant less than one 
(2)  Child (1 to 5 years) 
(3)  Child (6 to 10 years) 
(4)  Child (11 to 18 years) 
(5)  Other adult (19 to 54 years) 
(6)  Other adult (Over 54) 
(-98)  Don't know/not sure 
 
2.13 Have you known personally anyone (other than a household member) who has been sick 
due to cholera? 
 
(1)     _______Yes   
 (2)     _______ No (Skip to Question 2.15) 
 (-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to 2.15)        
  
2.14 Have you known personally anyone (other than a household member) who has died due 
to cholera? 
 
(1)     _______Yes   
 (2)     _______ No  
 (-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure         
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2.15 Imagine you are sick.  It's not an emergency, but you need to see a doctor.  If you went to 
public hospital, how long would you usually have to wait after arriving there before a 
doctor/nurse would be able to see you?  (i.e., how long is the queue likely to be?) 
[Enumerator: record the respondent's answers in minutes, if you never have to wait, 
record '0'] 
 
         _______ No. of minutes 
 (-93)  _______ I have never visited central hospital 
(-94)  _______ The queue varies in length, it is difficult to say 
(-95)  _______    ____________________      others, specify  
 (-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure  
  
2.16 Imagine you are sick.  It's not an emergency, but you need to see a doctor.  If you went to 
private medical facility (private physician, hospital or clinic) how long would you usually 
have to wait after arriving there before a doctor/nurse would be able to see you?  (i.e., 
how long is the queue likely to be?)  [Enumerator: record the respondent's answers in 
minutes, if you never have to wait, record '0'] 
 
         _______ No. of minutes 
(-93)  _______ I have never visited a private physician/hospital/clinic 
(-94)  _______ The queue varies in length, it is difficult to say 
(-95)  _______  ____________________   others, specify  
 (-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure  
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3: Vaccines and Cholera 
 
 
Next I'd like to talk about the spread and prevention of cholera.  Cholera is spread primarily 
through eating food and drinking water contaminated by the feces of patients.  You can help 
protect yourself from cholera by always consuming only safe, clean food and water and washing 
your hands thoroughly after defecation and before taking food. 
 
Cholera is caused by a type germ.  When someone becomes ill with cholera, he/she can develop 
severe diarrhea that can cause him or her to lose large amounts of fluids and salts.  When the 
body loses too many fluids and salts, it can no longer work properly.  The patient's kidneys can 
stop working, and the patient could die.  The patient with cholera should drink plenty of oral 
saline and when severe, take intravenous saline/ cholera saline. If the patient takes Antibiotics 
right away, the diarrhea should not last as long. 
 
The diarrhea caused by cholera will stop in a few days.  Giving fluids works well to prevent and 
treat the worst problems caused by cholera, and giving fluids also makes the patient feel better.  
However, without treatment a person with cholera can become severely sick or die. 
 
 
3.1 Do you have any questions or anything you are not clear about?  
 
(1)     _______ Yes   
 (2)     _______      No  
  
If yes, record the respondent's questions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 [Enumerator:  If you know the answer to the respondent's questions, please answer them 
truthfully and briefly.  If you are not sure you know the answer, please tell the respondent that 
you are not sure.] 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Have you ever heard about vaccines? 
(1)     _______ Yes   
 (2)     _______  No (Skip to statement after 3.3) 
 
 
I would like to ask you the following questions about vaccines. 
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3.3 In your opinion, what is the purpose of a vaccine?  (Spontaneous response, multiple 
response permitted) 
    (Yes) (No) 
(1)   Prevent disease for children 
(2)   Prevent disease for pregnant women  
(3)   Prevent disease for all people 
(4)   Cure disease 
(-95)    ___________________    other, specify 
(-98)   Don't know/not sure 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Have you been vaccinated before? 
(1)     _______  Yes   
 (2)     _______         No  
 (-98)  _______         Don't know/not sure  
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Has anyone in this household including yourself had either the old cholera vaccine or the 
old combined TABC vaccine? 
 
(1)     _______       Yes   
 (2)     _______        No (Skip to question 3.9) 
 (-98)  _______       Don't know/not sure (Skip to question 3.9) 
 
 
Read the following statement to all respondents 
Vaccine is for "prevention", not for treatment.  You have to take a vaccine before you get sick. 
Read the following statement to all respondents 
Several years ago, an old cholera vaccine and an old combined (cholera and typhoid) vaccine 
called TABC was available to people in Matlab. 
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3.6 Which members of the household had the old cholera or the old TABC vaccine?  
[Enumerator:  Please record the time of vaccination, price paid and whether or not the 
respondent thinks the vaccine is still working. Please record (-98) if they do not 
remember the date for the vaccination or the price paid.] 
 
List Check 
 
TABC 
1= Cholera 
2= TABC  
3= Both 
TABC or Cholera 
(1=Cholera, 2= 
TABC 
vaccine, 3=Both) 
 
When? 
 
(Year) 
 
Price 
paid
? 
Do you believe the 
vaccine is still working 
for this 
Yes No Don't 
know/ 
Not sure 
Self        
Spouse        
  Other 1         
  Other 2         
  Other 3         
  Other 4         
  Other 5         
  Other 6         
  Other 7         
  Other 8         
  Other 9         
 
 
3.7 Were you satisfied with the old vaccine? 
 
(1)     _______ Yes (Skip to question 3.9)   
 (2)     _______  No 
 (-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to question 3.9) 
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3.8 If no, why not? (Spontaneous response, record only the most important) [Enumerator: If 
the respondent gave more than one reason, please ask which is the most important 
reason] 
 
(1) _______ Did not prevent Cholera 
(2)     _______ Was not satisfied with the characteristics of vaccine (i.e. smell or color or 
taste) 
 (3)     _______ Was not satisfied with the method of administering the vaccine 
 (4)     _______ Minor side effects (i.e. diarrhea,  rash, leaves scars on skin, fever, 
headache, loss of appetite, vomiting) 
 (5)     _______  Caused other major health problems  
 (6)     _______  Because the vaccine was locally produced 
 (7)     _______  Injection was very painful 
 (-95)  _______  _________________________   other, specify 
 (-98)  _______  Don't know/not sure  
 
3.9 In your household, who would be primarily involved in making the decision whether or 
not to purchase cholera vaccines for your household members?  (Spontaneous response, 
multiple responses permitted) 
 
  (Yes) (No) 
(1)   myself (respondent) 
(2)   spouse of respondent 
(3)   parents of respondent 
(4)   parents in-law(s) of respondent 
(5)   children of respondent 
(-95)    ___________________    other, specify 
(-98)   Don't know/not sure 
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Cholera CV Scenario 
 
 
Doctors and scientists have developed a new vaccine that can prevent people from getting 
cholera.  We'd like to know what you would do if the new cholera vaccine was available for sale 
at a convenient location like a vaccination camp or vaccination clinic.  This new vaccine could be 
given to individuals to prevent them from having cholera in the future.  It could not be used to 
treat someone who currently has cholera.  This vaccine cannot be used for children under 1 year 
and pregnant women.  This vaccine is different from the old cholera or TABC vaccine that you or 
your household members may have received. 
 
 
Suppose that this vaccine has no side effects, and is safe, that is, after you were vaccinated you 
would have no chance to get cholera from the vaccine.  Suppose that you could drink the vaccine 
(like the polio vaccine) so that the vaccine would be painless.  Assume that two doses of the 
vaccine would be required taken about 2 weeks apart.  Suppose that taking the two doses of 
cholera vaccine would be [50% effective for 3 years]. 
 
Vaccine effectiveness 
 
Now I want to explain exactly what I mean when I say the vaccine would be [50%] effective. 
 
Suppose that each of these little blue or red figures (Enumerator: show the picture) represents a 
person.  (Enumerator: point out the circle).  The 100 figures inside this circle represent 100 
persons who have taken the vaccine, while the figures outside the circle represents those who 
have not taken the vaccine.  The cholera vaccine is not 100% effective; that is the vaccine is only 
(50%) effective.  Therefore, of the 100 people taking the vaccine in the circle, there will be (50%) 
of the people who have taken the vaccine that are protected (i.e., the vaccine works for them) for 
a period of 3 years.  The blue figures inside this circle represent these people. 
 
The rest of the people (the red ones inside the circle) who have been vaccinated [50] will not be 
protected against cholera even though they have taken the vaccine, because the vaccines did not 
work for them.  They will still be at risk of getting cholera just like they were before they got the 
vaccine or just like the people outside the circle who haven't received vaccines.  However, even if 
they get cholera, their symptoms may not be quite as severe compared to someone who has not 
received the vaccine. 
 
The people who receive cholera vaccine will not be able to know if the vaccine works for them.  
Of course, we don't know who would actually get cholera.  A red person outside the circle who 
has not taken a vaccine still has a relatively small risk of being infected. 
 
Now I am going to ask you some questions to make sure that the information I told you is clear. 
 
First round 
 
3.10 Please point to all the people who have taken the vaccine [Interviewer:  put a mark into a 
relevant place] 
 
(1)     _______ respondent did give the correct answer 
(2)     _______ respondent did not give the correct answer 
 (-98)  _______ respondent did not know/not sure 
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3.11 Please point to all the people who have taken the vaccine and it works for them.  
[Interviewer:  put a mark into a relevant place] 
 
(1)     _______ respondent did give the correct answer 
(2)     _______ respondent did not give the correct answer 
 (-98)  _______ respondent did not know/not sure 
 
3.12 How many years would the cholera vaccine work for them? 
 
 _________          If respondent gave incorrect answer, please correct it         
(-98)  _______ respondent did not know/not sure 
 
3.13 How many people have taken the vaccine but can still get cholera?  
[Interviewer:  put a mark into a relevant place] 
 
(1)     _______  respondent did give the correct answer 
(2)     _______  respondent did not give the correct answer 
 (-98)  _______  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
3.14  If an unvaccinated person gets infected by cholera, can the vaccine be used to cure them? 
 
(1)     _______  respondent did give the correct answer 
(2)     _______  respondent did not give the correct answer 
 (-98)  _______  respondent did not know/not sure 
  
⇒     If respondent gave incorrect answer, please correct it.    
 
3.15 Interviewer:  did the respondent give the correct answer to all three effectiveness 
questions (3.10, 3.11 and 3.13)? 
 
(1)     _______ Yes (Skip to 3.19) 
 (2)     _______  No 
 
Enumerator: If No to 3.15 tell the respondent: 
 
"I feel that I need to explain about the effectiveness of the vaccine a little bit more." (explain the 
effectiveness of the vaccine again) "Now I would like to go over the questions again, to make sure 
that the information I told you is clear." 
 
Display card to be explained again. (Re-ask 3 following questions) 
 
Second round 
    
3.16 Please point to all the people who have taken the vaccine [Interviewer: put a mark into a 
relevant  place] 
 
(1)     _______  respondent did give the correct answer 
(2)     _______  respondent did not give the correct answer 
 (-98)  _______  respondent did not know/not sure 
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3.17  Please point to all the people who have taken the vaccine and it works for them. 
[Interviewer: put a mark into a relevant  place] 
 
(1)     _______  respondent did give the correct answer 
(2)     _______  respondent did not give the correct answer 
 (-98)  _______  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
3.18 How many people have taken the vaccines but can still get cholera? [Interviewer: put a 
mark into a relevant  place] 
 
(1)     _______  respondent did give the correct answer 
(2)     _______  respondent did not give the correct answer 
 (-98)  _______  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
Note:  Whether the respondents gave the correct answer or not, please skip to the next page. 
 
 
3.19  Please indicate what you believe to be the most important benefit of the vaccine. 
((Enumerator: read all answers)) 
 
 (1) _____ Prevent pain and suffering of cholera 
 (2) _____ Avoid payments for treating cholera after getting sick 
 (3) _____ Prevent risk of death from cholera 
 (4) _____ Avoid lost wages or time at work because of cholera 
 (-98)____ Don’t know/No answer 
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4.  Willingness to pay for Cholera Vaccine 
 
Suppose that the government will not supply the new vaccine for free.  Those who want a vaccine 
would have to pay a fixed price for it.  Everyone would pay the same price. 
 
Now I'd like to know whether you would buy the vaccine if it was available at a specified price.  
Some people say they cannot afford the price of the vaccine or that they are actually not at risk of 
getting this disease.  Other people say that would buy the vaccine because the protection is really 
worth it to them.  In other studies about vaccines, we have found that people sometimes say they 
want to buy the vaccine.  They think: "I would really like as much protection from this disease as 
possible."  However, they may forget about other things they need to spend their money on.  
Please try to think carefully about what you would actually do if you had to spend your own 
money.  There are no right or wrong answers.  We really want to know what you would do.  
 
 
[No Time to Think Only] 
 
 
When you give your answer about whether you would or would not buy the vaccine, please 
consider the following: yours and your family's income and economic status compared with the 
price of the vaccine, and your risk of getting cholera.  Apart from the vaccine, remember that we 
still have other ways to treat cholera such as oral dehydration solution.  Also, remember that the 
benefit of the vaccine in preventing cholera is [50% effective for 3 years].  Again, the cholera 
vaccine cannot be used by children under 1 year and pregnant women. 
 
[Enumerator: Please hand the laminated reminder card to the respondent, to remind the 
respondent of the important information for their decision.  Also show them the relevant 
effectiveness card.  If a respondent is illiterate, show them only the relevant effectiveness card] 
 
4.1a Do you have any question or anything you are not clear about? 
 
(1)     _______ Yes  
 (2)     _______  No 
 
Record the respondent's questions/comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First I'm going to ask you about your willingness to purchase the vaccine for yourself.  Then I am 
going to ask you about whether you would purchase the vaccine for other member of your 
household. 
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[Time to Think ONLY] 
 
 
We are almost at the end of our first interview, and I want to thank you very much for your time.  
I would like to return again tomorrow to ask you more questions.  I will ask you whether you 
would want to buy this vaccine for yourself as well as for other members of your household if it 
were sold at a certain price.  I would encourage you to think overnight about how much this new 
vaccine is worth to you, and the range of prices you might be willing to pay for this vaccine for 
yourself and for your household members.  You may also want to discuss these decisions with 
other members of your household. 
 
This card summerizes this information (Enumerator:  hand respondent laminated card) 
 
Please consider the following: yours and your family's income and economic status, and your risk 
of getting cholera.  Apart from the vaccine, remember that we still have other ways to treat 
cholera such as oral dehydration solution.  Also, remember that the benefit of the vaccine in 
preventing cholera is [50% effective for 3 years].  Again, the cholera vaccine cannot be used by 
children under 1 year and pregnant women. 
 
When is a convenient time for me to return tomorrow? 
 
Date:  ____________ 
 
Time:  ___________ 
 
 (Enumerator:  record the time this interview was completed in Section 1.) 
 
 
[TIME TO THINK ONLY] 
 
Second Interview 
 
 
 (Enumerator:  record the time this interview started in Section 1.) 
 
 
Let's begin where we left off yesterday. Again, suppose that the government will not supply the 
new vaccine for free.   Those who want a vaccine would have to pay a fixed price for it. Everyone 
would pay the same price.  
 
When you give your answer about whether you would or would not buy the vaccine, please 
consider the following: yours and your family's income and economic status compared with the 
price of the vaccine, and your risk of getting cholera.  Apart from the vaccine, remember that we 
still have other ways to treat cholera such as oral rehydration solution.  Also, remember that the 
benefit of the new vaccine in preventing cholera is 50% effective for three years.  Again, the new 
cholera vaccine cannot be used by children under 1 year and pregnant women. 
 
First I'm going to ask you about your willingness to purchase the vaccine for yourself.  Then I am 
going to ask you about whether you would purchase the vaccine for other members of your 
household. 
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4.1b Do you have any question or anything you are not clear about? 
 (1) ______Yes 
 (2) ______No  
 
Record the respondent’s questions/comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Suppose that this cholera vaccine costs (Tk.10, Tk.25, Tk.50, Tk.75, Tk. 300, Tk. 600) 
for the two doses needed for one person.  Would you buy this vaccine for yourself?  
(Spontaneous response; one response permitted) 
(1)_______  Yes (Skip to question 4.3) 
(2)_______   No (Skip to question 4.5) 
 (-98)______ Don’t know/not sure (Skip to question 4.5) 
 
4.3 What is the main reason that you would buy the vaccine? (Do not read choices; record 
only the most important reason) 
 
(1) _____    Vaccine is useful for me because it is good for prevention and safety 
(Skip to question 4.4) 
(2) _______ Price is reasonable, can afford easily (Skip to question 4.4) 
(3) _______ I think I have a chance of getting cholera (Skip to question 4.4) 
(4) _______ Cholera is a dangerous disease (Skip to question 4.4) 
(-95) _____ _________________  Other, specify (skip to 4.4)  
(-98) _____ Don’t know/not sure (Skip to question 4.4) 
 
4.4 Are you certain of your answer that you would purchase the vaccine for yourself if the 
price of the vaccine were (Tk.10, Tk.25, Tk.50, Tk.75, Tk.300) for the two doses needed 
for one person?  (read all responses: one response permitted). 
 
(1)______ Very certain of my answer(skip to 4.9b and mark “Yes”) 
(2)______  Somewhat certain (skip to 4.9b and mark “Yes”) 
(3)______  Not certain; unsure (skip to 4.9b and mark “Yes”) 
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4.5 What is the main reason that you will not pay / you are not sure that you will pay for the 
vaccine for your self (Do not read choices, record only the most important reason)? 
 
(1)______ No money 
(2)______ Too expensive 
(3)______  I am too old 
(4)______  I would buy this vaccine only for someone else (ie children, other family 
members etc.) 
(5)______  I would buy this vaccine only if many people around me get cholera 
(6)______  I would buy this vaccine only if it is very convenient                                  
(7)______  I would take the vaccine only if other people around me took the vaccine. 
(8)______  Do not think that I’d have a chance to get cholera 
(9)______  Afraid that the vaccine might not be safe 
(10)______  Afraid that the syringe/container might be dirty 
(11)______   Do not think that the vaccine can prevent cholera 
(12)______   Concerned that the vaccine will cause the cholera. 
(13)______   Have previously had a cholera vaccine, and therefore do not need this 
vaccine. 
(-95)_____   _______________________  Other   (please specify)    
(-98)_____   Don’t know/not sure 
 
4.6 How certain are you of your answer that you would not pay/you are not sure that you will 
pay for the vaccine for your self? (read all responses, one response permitted) 
 
(1)______ Very certain of my  
(2)______  Somewhat certain  
(3)______  Not certain; unsure  
  
4.7  If you could get vaccine for free, would you want to be vaccinated? 
 
 (1) _____ Yes (Skip to question 4.9a) 
 (2) _____ No (continue) 
 (-98)____  Don’t know/not sure (continue) 
 
4.8 Why would you not want to receive a vaccine if you could get it for free? (Do not read 
choices, record only the most important reason) 
 
(1)_____ Vaccine has little use or not useful (skip to 4.9b and mark “No”) 
(2)_____ I don’t think I have a chance to get cholera (skip to 4.9b and mark “No”) 
(3)______ Afraid that the vaccine might not be safe (skip to 4.9b and mark “No”) 
(4)______ Afraid that the syringe/container might be dirty (skip to 4.9b and mark 
“No”) 
(5)______ Do not think that vaccine can really prevent cholera (skip to 4.9b and mark 
“No”) 
(6)______ Concerned that the vaccine will cause the disease. (skip to 4.9b and mark 
“No”) 
(7)______   Have previously had a cholera vaccine, and therefore do not need this 
vaccine.  (skip to 4.9b and mark “No”) 
(-95)_____  _______________________        other specify (skip to 4.9b and 
mark “No”) 
(-98)_____ Don’t know/not sure (skip to 4.9b and mark “No”) 
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4.9a Would you pay anything for this vaccine? 
 
(1)______ Yes (mark YES for 4.9b) 
(2)______ No (mark NO for 4.9b) 
(-98)_____ Don't know/not sure (mark NO for 4.9b) 
 
4.9b.    Enumerator: You will refer to this question later to determine whether to do "stoplight" 
exercise 
 
(1)______ Yes 
(2)______ No 
 
4.10  [Enumerator: How many people are listening to the  interview?] 
 
Adults:       ________ 
Children:   ________ 
Total:         _________ 
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[Interviewer: explain to respondent] 
The following questions are about your willingness to pay for the cholera vaccine for your 
family members who are living with you.   
 
4.11 Suppose that this cholera vaccine costs (Tk.10, Tk.25, Tk.50, Tk.75, Tk. 300, Tk. 600) 
for the two doses needed for one person (same price for adults and children), how many people in 
your household (not including yourself) would you be willing to purchase vaccines for? 
Remember, the cholera vaccine cannot be used by children under 1 year or pregnant women.   
 
___________ Number of household members (ONLY FOR HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, NOT 
INCLUDING YOURSELF) 
 
[Enumerator: If respondent would pay for 0 vaccines, skip to 4.16] 
 
 
4.12  Who would you buy this vaccine for? (Record whether or not the family member whom 
you want to get the vaccine lives in your house.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[NOTE to the enumerator: If the 
respondent would not buy the 
vaccine for anyone, including 
themselves, skip to 4.16.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List 
Check Live in this house? 
Yes No 
Spouse    
Other 1    
Other 2    
Other 3    
Other 4    
Other 5    
Other 6    
Other 7    
Other 8    
Other 9    
Other 10    
Other 11    
Other 12    
Other 13    
Other 14    
Other 15    
TOTAL    
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 [Enumerator: multiply the total number of household members respondent said they would 
purchase for, plus one if they said they would buy a vaccine for themselves (check 4.2) at the 
specified price, by the price of the vaccine to obtain the total amount].  If the total number of 
people listed in the table above differs from the number of people in the answer to 4.11, use the 
number of people in the table above. 
 
[Enumerator: Please skip this question if the total amount of the vaccine is “zero”] 
 
4.13… You’ve said that you would buy vaccines for a total of ______ household members 
including yourself at this price.  This would amount to a total cost to you of __________.    
 
4.14    How confident are you that you would be able to afford this amount of money (calculated 
above)? (Read all responses, one response permitted) 
 
(1)______ Very confident (skip to 4.16)  
(2)______  Confident (skip to 4.16) 
(3)______  Not confident  
 
4.15 How many vaccines are you confident you could afford to buy?  
 _____________  ¸# vaccines 
 (-98) ______ don't know/not sure   
  
4.16  Enumerator:  Skip to Section 5 if the answer to 4.9b is No. 
 
 Please think about the decision to buy a vaccine for yourself.  There are bad prices, when you are 
completely sure that you would not purchase a vaccine for yourself . There are good prices  when 
you are completely sure that you would definitely purchase the vaccine for yourself .  And then 
there are some prices  at which you are not sure whether you would purchase or not purchase the 
vaccine.    
 
Now I would like to read you a list of prices.  First, I will start with a very high price and I will 
read you lower and lower prices.  I would like you to tell me when we get to a price where you 
are unsure if you will buy it for yourself.  That is, you might purchase the vaccine for yourself at 
that price but you might not.  Then I will tell you a very low price and then read higher and higher 
prices.  Again, tell me to stop when we get to a price when you are not completely sure you 
would pay that price for the vaccine.  Remember, we want to know here about the price you'd be 
willing to pay for the vaccine for yourself—not for other members of your family. 
 
Do you have any questions about anything I've told you? 
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4.17 [Enumerator:  copy the respondent’s marks onto the scale below.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.18.  
 How difficult was this exercise for you? (Enumerator: Read the responses) 
 
(1)_____ Very easy 
(2)_____ Somewhat easy 
(3)_____ Somewhat difficult 
(4)_____ Very difficult 
Price You are 
completely sure 
that you would 
purchase    
Uncertain You are 
completely sure 
that you would 
NOT purchase    
Tk. 5000    
Tk. 1000    
Tk. 500    
Tk. 400    
Tk. 300    
Tk. 200    
Tk. 100    
Tk. 75    
Tk. 50    
Tk. 25    
Tk.15    
Tk. 10    
Tk. 5    
Tk. 1    
Tk. 0    
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5 Value of Statistical Life 
 
The cholera vaccine will protect your child from cholera only. Your child may also become sick 
with pneumonia, cancer, typhoid, or other diseases. The cholera vaccine will not protect your 
child against these other illnesses.  
 
Let us consider your child’s risk of death from a number of different illnesses and other causes. 
This next picture shows many ways that a child might die. (Enumerator: show risk-ladder picture 
and say the name of each cause of death). Some causes of death are more common than others. 
The most common causes of death for children, such as respiratory disease, are shown at the top 
of the scale. The least common causes of death, such as getting struck by lightning, are shown at 
the bottom of the scale. The rest of the causes of death fall in between the risks from respiratory 
disease and from lightning strikes.  
 
5.1  Please point to the cause of death on this list that you think is most common for children 
in your community. (Enumerator: please mark answer) 
 
(1)______   All respiratory disease 
(2)______   Drowning 
(3)______   All diarrhea  
(4)______ Cancer  
(5)______   Infections  
(6)______   Lack of nutrition 
(7)______   Homicide   
(8)______  Gastro-intestinal disease 
(9)______  Lightning strike 
 (-98)____   No response 
 
5.2  Please point to the cause of death on this list that you think is least common for children 
in your community. (Enumerator please mark answer) 
 
(1)______   All respiratory disease 
(2)______   Drowning 
(3)______   All diarrhea  
(4)______ Cancer  
(5)______   Infections  
(6)______   Lack of nutrition 
(7)______   Homicide   
(8)______  Gastro-intestinal disease 
(9)______  Lightning strike 
 (-98)____    No response 
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5.3  Please consider how cholera affects children in your community. Also, consider how the 
risk of death from cholera compares to the other risks of death shown in the picture. 
Some causes of death on the scale may be more likely than cholera. Other causes of death 
may be less likely than cholera. Please point to the cause of death on this list that you 
believe is about the same as the risk of death from cholera for children in your 
community. (Enumerator please mark answer) 
 
(1)______   All respiratory disease 
(2)______   Drowning 
(3)______   All diarrhea  
(4)______ Cancer  
(5)______   Infections  
(6)______   Lack of nutrition 
(7)______   Homicide   
(8)______  Gastro-intestinal disease 
(9)______  Lightning strike 
 (-98)____    No response 
 
Next, I would like to talk about the concept of probability. Later I will talk about how this relates 
to the risk of death. Then we will discuss how a hypothetical nutritional supplement might be 
used to decrease the risk of death and how you would value this decrease. To begin, let's start 
with a coin toss. If you flip a coin, half of the time it will land on “chand”, and half of the time it 
will land on “lota”.    
 
I will be using graphs like this one (Enumerator: show coin picture) to show you the likelihood of 
certain outcomes.  This graph has1000 squares and is colored to represent the chances of flipping 
a coin and it landing on “chand”.   Half of the squares are red- corresponding to the coin landing 
on “chand”. The other half are white- corresponding to “lota”.  This means that if you flipped the 
coin 1000 times, it would land on “chand” about 500 times and it would land on “lota” about 500 
times.  
 
Now, let us examine the chances of throwing a “five” with a die. Since the die has six sides, the 
chance that it lands on one of the sides (such as the “five”) is one out of six. In this diagram 
(Enumerator: show dice picture), the red squares show the number of times that the die would 
land on “five”, and the white squares show the number of times it would land on something else, 
such as “one”, “two”, “three”, “four”, or “six”. If you rolled this die 1000 times, it would land on 
“five” about 170 times on average. The more  red squares that you see, the more likely it is that 
an event will occur. Since, we see more red squares in the coin flip diagram, we know that it is 
more likely to get "chand " in a coin flip than it is to get five in a die throw. 
 
5.4  (Enumerator show both cards side by side) Which is more likely in one throw—getting 
“chand” in one coin flip or getting a “five” in one die throw? 
 
 (1)  ______ respondent did give the correct answer 
 (2)  ______ respondent did not give correct answer 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
(Enumerator: If respondent gets question wrong, say "Remember that the more red squares that 
you see, the more likely an event will occur. Since the coin picture has more red squares, it is 
more likely an event will occur. Since the coin picture has more red squares, it is more likely to 
get chand in a single coin flip than five in a single die throw.") 
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Section 5.2 
 
Now let us consider the risk of death for your child. For this example, we will consider the village 
of Dighaldi. Pretend that Dighaldi has about 1000 households. Assume that each household has 
one child. Some children in Dighaldi will probably die during the next five years. A few children 
may die from disease, such as pneumonia, cholera, or cancer. Other children may die from 
drowning accidents, homicides, or lightning strikes. If each of these 1000 squares represents one 
child in Dighaldi, the 5 red squares (Enumerator: point to squares)  represent the number of 
children that we would expect to die from disease only in the next 5 years. The 995 white squares 
represent the number of children that we expect will not die from disease in the next 5 years.   
 
Again, the causes of death from disease, the red squares, include cancer, heart disease, respiratory 
disease, infections, diarrhea, and gastro-intestinal disease. The number of children that die due to 
accidents not related to disease are not shown in this picture.(Enumerator : point to square 
picture). Additional children may die from drowning, homicide, and lightning strikes.  
 
5.5  We have just covered an imaginary example for a village like Dighaldi. How many 
children (under 18 years) do you think live in your village?  
 
 (1)  ______ number of children 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
5.6  Consider all the children in your village, how many would you expect to die from disease 
in the next 5 years? 
 
 (1)  ______ number of children 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
Of course, we cannot know in advance which children will die in the next 5 years. Please assume 
that your child’s risk of death is the same as that for any other child in your village. The chance 
that your child might die is about the same as the chance that your neighbor’s child might die 
regardless of previous illnesses.  Let’s take another look at this picture. (Enumerator: show risk-
of-death chart)  If none of the squares were colored, you would know with certainty that your 
child would not die from disease in the next 5 years. However, all children have a small risk of 
getting sick and dying. Since only a few squares have color, we know that the chance that your 
child might get sick and die in the next 5 years is much lower than the chance that you would get 
“chand” in a single coin flip or roll a “five” with a single die throw. (Enumerator: compare death 
risk picture to coin and die picture.) 
 
5.7  Which is more likely, your child getting sick and dying in the next 5 years or throwing a 
die one time and getting a “five”? 
 
 (1)  ______ respondent did give the correct answer 
 (2)  ______ respondent did not give correct answer 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
(Enumerator: if answer is correct, proceed to section 5.3. If the answer is incorrect or person 
does not know, please re-read Section 5.2. After second reading, ask question 5.8) 
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5.8  Which is more likely, your child getting sick and dying in the next 5 years or throwing a 
die one time and getting a “five”? 
 
 (1)  ______ respondent did give the correct answer 
 (2)  ______ respondent did not give correct answer 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
Section 5.3 
 
(1 in 1,000 protection) 
Imagine that doctors and scientists are working on a nutritional supplement that would help to 
reduce your child’s risk of death from all diseases. Although this supplement would not prevent 
your child from contracting diseases, it would help to boost your child’s immune system. After 
taking the supplement, your child will be more likely to survive if he/she becomes sick with any 
disease.  The nutritional supplement would have no taste and no side effects. It could easily be 
mixed into meals or drinks. The nutritional supplement would generally not have any effect other 
than reducing your child’s risk of death from disease. 
 
*This picture shows the decrease in risk of death from disease for children who take the 
supplement. If 1000 children took this supplement, only four children, instead of five children 
would die from disease. We see that 1 child would not die, because the supplement helped to 
protect him/her. (Enumerator: point to the difference in the red squares in the charts with and 
without supplement) The supplement would not provide any protection for children from 
accident-related deaths, such as drowning. We see that there are fewer red squares, so we know 
that it is less likely for children to die from disease if they take the supplement. (Enumerator: 
please point to the differences in pictures before and after supplement). Please assume that taking 
this supplement would give your child some protection from death from disease, but not full 
protection. 
 
 
(same as above for 3 in 1,000 protection) 
Imagine that doctors and scientists are working on a nutritional supplement that would help to 
reduce your child’s risk of death from all diseases. Although this supplement would not prevent 
your child from contracting diseases, it would help to boost your child’s immune system. After 
taking the supplement, your child will be more likely to survive if he/she becomes sick with any 
disease.  The nutritional supplement would have no taste and no side effects. It could easily be 
mixed into meals or drinks. The nutritional supplement would generally not have any effect other 
than reducing your child’s risk of death from disease. 
 
*This picture shows the decrease in risk of death from disease for children who take the 
supplement. If 1000 children took this supplement, only two children, instead of five children 
would die from disease. We see that 3 children would not die, because the supplement helped to 
protect him/her. (Enumerator: point to the difference in the red squares in the charts with and 
without supplement) The supplement would not provide any protection for children from 
accident-related deaths, such as drowning. We see that there are fewer red squares, so we know 
that it is less likely for children to die from disease if they take the supplement. (Enumerator: 
please point to the differences in pictures before and after supplement). Please assume that taking 
this supplement would give your child some protection from death from disease, but not full 
protection. 
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5.9  If your child takes the supplement, is he/she less likely to accidentally drown? 
 
 (1)  ______ respondent did give the correct answer 
 (2)  ______ respondent did not give correct answer 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
5.10  If your child takes the supplement, is he/she less likely to die from respiratory disease? 
 
 (1)  ______ respondent did give the correct answer 
 (2)  ______ respondent did not give correct answer 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
5.11 If 1000 children take the supplement, how many fewer children would die from health-
related causes because they were protected by the supplement? 
 
  _________ Number of children 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
5.12  Enumerator:Did the respondent answer questions 5.9,5.10 and 5.11 correctly? 
 (1) ______ respondent did give the correct answers (skip to question 5.16)  
 (2) ______ respondent did not give correct answer please re-read the second 
paragraph (*)  of Section 5.3. After second reading, proceed to question 5.13) 
 
5.13     If your child takes the      
                  supplement, is he/she less likely to accidentally drown? 
 (1)  ______ respondent did give the correct answer 
 (2)  ______ respondent did not give correct answer 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
5.14  If your child takes the supplement, is he/she less likely to die from respiratory disease? 
 
 (1)  ______ respondent did give the correct answer 
 (2)  ______ respondent did not give correct answer 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
5.15   If 1000 children take the supplement, how many fewer children would die from health-
related causes because they were protected by the supplement? 
 
  _________ Number of children 
 (-98)_____  respondent did not know/not sure 
 
5.16  Do you have any questions or anything you are not clear about? 
(1) ______ Yes 
(2) ______ No  
 If Yes, record the respondent’s questions: 
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Enumerator: If you know the answer to the respondent’s questions, please answer them truthfully 
and briefly.  If you are not sure you know the answer, please tell the respondent that you are not 
sure.] 
 
Section 5.4 
 
Suppose that the government will not supply the new supplement for free.   Those who want the 
supplement for their children would have to pay a fixed price for it. Everyone would pay the same 
price. Please imagine that the cholera vaccine mentioned previously is no longer available. In 
other words, if you said you would buy the cholera vaccine, please do not consider this as 
limiting your budget.    
 
Now I’d like to know whether you would buy the nutritional supplement if it was available at a 
specified price. Some people say they cannot afford the price of the supplement or that they do 
not think that the benefit of the supplement is worth the price. Other people say that they would 
buy the supplement because the decrease in risk of death for their children is really worth it to 
them.  Please try to think carefully about what you would actually do if you had to spend your 
own money. There are no right or wrong answers. We really want to know what you would do.  
 
5.17   Suppose that this nutritional supplement costs (Tk.10, Tk.20, Tk.50, Tk.100) for a one 
month supply for one child.  You would have to buy a new supply each month to maintain 
protection for your child. Would you buy this supplement for your youngest child?  
(Spontaneous response; one response permitted) 
 
(1)     _______ Yes  (Skip to question 5.18) 
(2)     _______         No (Skip to question 5.19) 
(-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to question 5.19)  
 
5.18   Now, suppose that this nutritional supplement costs (Tk.20, Tk.40, Tk.100, Tk. 200) for a 
one month supply for one child.  You would have to buy a new supply each month to 
maintain protection for  your child. Would you buy this supplement for your youngest 
child?  (Spontaneous response; one response permitted) 
 
(1)     _______ Yes  (Skip to question 5.20) 
(2)     _______         No (Skip to question 5.21) 
(-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to question 5.21) 
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5.19    Now, suppose that this nutritional supplement costs (Tk.5, Tk.10, Tk.25, Tk.50) for a one 
month supply for one child.  You would have to buy a new supply each month to 
maintain protection for your child. Would you buy this supplement for your youngest 
child?  (Spontaneous response; one response permitted) 
 
(1)     _______ Yes  (Skip to question 5.20) 
(2)     _______         No (Skip to question 5.21) 
(-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to question 5.21) 
 
5.20 What is the main reason that you would buy the supplement?  (Do not read choices; 
record only the most important reason) 
 
(1)     _______ Supplement is useful for me because it is good for prevention and 
safety (Skip to next section) 
(2)     _______        Price is reasonable, can afford easily (Skip to next section) 
(3)     _______        I think my child has  risk of disease-related death (Skip to next 
section) 
(-95)  _______        _____________________Others, specify  (Skip to next section) 
(-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure (Skip to next section) 
 
5.21 What is the main reason that you would buy the supplement?  (Do not read choices; 
record only the most important reason) 
 
(1)     _______ No money 
(2)     _______ Too expensive 
(3)     _______ I would buy this supplement for my child only if other people around 
me took the supplement 
(4)     _______ Do not think that my child will die in the next 5 years anyway 
(5)     _______ Afraid that the supplement might not be safe 
(6)     _______        Do not think that the supplement can prevent death 
 (-95)  _______        _____________________others, specify 
 (-98)  _______       Don't know/not sure  
 
5.22 Would you take the supplement if it were offered for free?  
 
(1)     _______ Yes  
(2)     _______ No  
(-98)  _______ Don't know/not sure  
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6: Socioeconomic questions 
Enumerator:  Please ask these questions in below table for the respondent, spouse, and adult and 
child members of the household that earn income.  If the respondent says “don’t know/not sure” 
record (-98). If the respondent refuses to answer/does not answer, record (-99) 
 
 
List 
 
6.1 
What class of school did 
you complete or what 
degrees have you 
received? 
6.2 
Occupation 
6.3 
        Earnings per 
month 
           (Tk. Per month) 
Self    
Spouse    
Other 1 ********   
Other 2 ********   
Other 3 ********   
Other 4 ********   
Other 5 ********   
Other 6 ********   
Other 7 ********   
Other 8 ********   
Other 9 ********   
Other 10 ********   
Other 11 ********   
Other 12 ********   
Other 13 ********   
Other 14 ********   
Other 15 ********   
 
6.1 
Education level 
6.2 
Occupation List  
1= Have never attended 
school 
2= 1 to 5 years of 
school 
3= 6 to 9 years of 
school 
4= 10 to 12 years of 
school 
5= Vocational 
studies/college 
diploma 
6= University/college  
7= Post-graduate 
studies 
8= Professional course 
9= Madrasha education 
10=Informal education 
11=Others (Specify) 
________ 
1= Student 
2= Retired 
3= Housewife 
4= Unemployed 
5= Professional (Specify) 
______ 
6= Unskilled office 
worker 
7= Owner of business 
8= Unskilled manual 
worker (Specify) 
_________ 
9= Skilled manual worker 
 (Specify) 
___________________ 
 
10= Street seller 
11= Farmer 
12= Chowkider/Village 
Defense Party 
13= Small business 
14= Fisherman 
15= Service worker  (eg. 
driver, servant, cook, hotel 
or restaurant worker) 
16= Other (Specify) 
___________ 
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6.4 How much does your household earn per month? 
   
 ___________ Tk./month 
(-98)____ Don’t know/not sure 
(-99)____ No response 
 
6.5  Can you read a newspaper?  (If no, record 3, if yes, probe to find out if they can read a 
newspaper easily, or with difficulty.) 
  
 (1)______  Yes, Easily 
 (2)______  Yes, with difficulty 
          (3)______  No, cannot read a  newspaper. 
 
6.6   What is your religion? 
  
 (1) ______  Muslim 
 (2) ______  Hindu 
 (3) ______  Christian 
 (4) ______  Buddhist 
 (-95) _____  _________ Other (Specify) 
  
 House Characteristics 
 
6.7  Who owns this house? 
(1) ______ Own  (Go to 6.8) 
(2) ______ Rent  (Go to 6.9) 
(3) ______ Provided by employers (Go to 6.10) 
(-95)_____ Others specify (Go to  6.10)   ___________ 
 
 
6.8  What would someone expect to pay each month to rent a house like yours? 
 
Tk.___________  (Go to 6.10) 
(-98)_____ Don’t know/not sure (Go to 6.10) 
(-99)_____ No response (Go to 6.10) 
 
6.9  What is your monthly rent?   
   
 ___________ Tk./month 
(-98)____ Don’t know/not sure 
(-99)____ No response 
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6.10  How many rooms does your house have (including the kitchen)?   
 
__________________ Number of Rooms 
 (-98)____ Don’t know/not sure 
 
6.11 What is the main fuel used for cooking in the house? (Enumerator:  Read response)   
  
 (1)______ Electricity 
(2)______ Gas/LPG 
(3)______ Firewood 
(4)______ Kerosene 
(5)______ Charcoal 
(6)______ Cow dung 
(7)______      Leaves 
(-95)_____ Others specify _________________________________  
(-98)_____ Don’t know/not sure 
 
Household Assets 
 
6.12 Could you tell me whether or not someone in your household owns a(n) (category name)? 
 
  (yes)  (no)  
   Cot  
   Cabinet (Cupboard) 
   Table/dinning table 
   Wardrobe/showcase 
   Dressing table 
   Radio 
   Ceiling fan (mark (1) for 6.13) 
   Black and White TV (mark (1) for 6.13) 
   Color TV (mark (1) for 6.13) 
   Refrigerator,   (mark (1) for 6.13) 
   Motor-cycle  
   Cycle 
   Engine boat/country-boat 
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Electricity 
 
6.13 Does this household have electricity? 
 
(1) _____ Yes 
(2) _____ No (Skip to Water section) 
 
6.14 Did your household pay the entire electricity bill, or share the bill with anyone outside 
your household? 
 
(1)______   Household paid entire bill  
(2)______  Shared bill with someone else 
 
6.15     How much was your household’s own electricity bill last month? Or, if you share the bill, 
how much was your share?   
  
 __________ Household’s own share of electricity bill  (Rs.) 
 (-93) _____ We pay no monthly charge for electricity 
 (-94) _____ Electricity is included in the rent 
 (-98) _____ Don’t know/not sure 
 (-99) _____ No response 
 
Water  
 
6.16   What is the main source of drinking water in the house?  [Enumerator:  Spontaneous 
response; one response permitted] 
 
(1)______ Own shallow well   
(2)______ Own hand pump  
(3)______ Shared hand pump 
(4)______ Surface water  
(5)______ Rain water 
(6) _____  Communal tap 
(7)______ Communal well  
 (-95) ___  ________________________  Other  (please specify)  
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6.17  Is water generally boiled before drinking? (Enumerator:  read responses)  
 
(1) _____  Always 
(2) _____   Sometimes 
(3) _____    Never 
 (-95) ____  Other (please specify)   ______________________ 
(-98)_____   Don’t know/not sure 
 
6.18   Do you do anything else to the water to make it safer to drink? (Do not read list. Check all 
answers that respondent mentions. 
 
 (1) ______  Add bleach/chlorine 
 (2) ______  Sieve it through cloth 
 (3) ______  Water filter (ceramic, sand, composite)  
 (4) ______  No other treatment 
 (-95) ______  Other, please specify  _______________________ 
 (-98) ______ Don’t know 
 
6.19  How do you store your water? 
  
 (1)______ Overhead tank 
 (2)______  Barrels  
 (3)______  Small Buckets and containers 
 (4)______  Metal/clay containers 
 (5)______  Do not store  
 (6)______    No need for Storage  
 (-95)______ Others (Specify)_________________________________ 
 (-98) _____  Don’t know/not sure 
 
6.20 What kind of toilet do the household members usually use?  (Enumerator: spontaneous 
responses) 
 
(1)______  Go into the bush, river, lake or canal?   
(2) _____   Public flush toilet 
(3)______ Sanitarylatrine 
(4) ______    Open pit toilet/latrine 
(5)______     Hanging latrine 
 (-95) _____  Other  (please specify)   _____________________ 
 
6.21    Is the flush toilet/latrine shared or private? (Check only one answer) 
 
 (1)_____ Private 
 (2)_____ Shared 
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Telephone 
 
6.22  Does your household have a telephone or mobile phone? 
  
 (1) _____ Yes 
 (2) _____ No  (Skip to “Health Behavior” section) 
 
6.23. How much was your household’s last own monthly telephone + mobile bill?  Or, if you 
share the bill, how much was your share? (Ask only if respondent has land line)  
  
 ________________ Tk. 
 (-98) _____ Don’t know/not sure 
 
Health Behavior 
 
6.24  How often does your family eat food sold by street vendors?  (Enumerator:  read 
responses) 
 
(1)____  Never /Rarely 
(2)____  1-2 Times per week 
(3)____  3-5 Times per week 
(4)____  6 or more times per week 
(-98)___  Don’t know/not sure 
 
6.25  In the last month, how much did your household spend on health care?  (Treatment costs, 
including pharmacy, purchase of medicine, hospital fees) 
 
 ________________ Tk. 
 (-98) _____ Don’t know/not sure 
 
Economic Status and Access to Credit 
 
6.26 How would you classify the economic status of your household relative to others in this 
neighborhood? (Enumerator:  read responses) 
 
(1)_____ Much better than most people  
(2)_____ Better than most people  
 (3)_____  About average 
 (4)_____  Below average 
(5)_____  Much worse than average  
 (-98)___    Don’t know/not sure 
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6.27 Over the next five years, how do you think your household’s economic situation will 
change? (Enumerator:  read responses) 
 
  (1)_____  Certainly improve greatly 
  (2)_____  Probably improve somewhat 
  (3)_____ No change 
  (4)_____  Probably decline somewhat 
  (5)_____  Certainly get much worse 
  (-98)____ Don’t Know / Not sure 
 
6.28  Does anyone in your house have a bank account? 
  
 (1) _____ Yes 
 (2) _____ No   
(-98)____ Don’t Know / Not sure 
 
6.29   How easy would it be to borrow Tk.1000?  (Enumerator:  read responses) 
(1)_____ Very easy 
(2)_____ Somewhat easy 
(3)_____ Somewhat difficult 
(4)_____ Very difficult 
(5)_____  Impossible   (Skip to Next section) 
  (-98)____ Don’t Know/Not sure (Skip to Next section) 
 
6.30  If you want to borrowTk.1000 and cannot borrow it from a family member, where would 
you want to go to borrow it? (Enumerator:  spontaneous response; only one answer) 
(1)_____ Relative/neighbor Neighbor/Friend 
(2)_____      Bank  
(3)_____ Market money lender  
(4)______ Pawn shop 
(-95) _____  Other (please specify)   ______________________  
(-98)_____ Don’t Know / Not sure 
 
 
6.31 If you borrowed Tk. 1000 from the place you mentioned in 7.48, how many additional 
Taka would you have to pay back after one month? 
  
 Tk._______________________ (additional) 
 (-98) _____ Don’t know/not sure 
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[TIME TO THINK ONLY] 
Section 7 
 
7.1 How long did you spend discussing or thinking about the decision to buy these vaccines?  
 
 _______________ minutes 
 
7.2 Did you discuss with anyone in your household about the choice to buy vaccines? 
 
(1)______ Yes 
 (2)______ No (Skip to question 7.5) 
 
7.3  Who did you discuss your decisions with in your household? 
 
List Check 
Spouse  
Other 1  
Other 2  
Other 3  
Other 4  
Other 5  
Other 6  
Other 7  
Other 8  
Other 9  
Other 10  
Other 11  
Other 12  
Other 13  
Other 14  
Other 15  
 
7.4 How long did you spend in discussions with them? 
  
 _______________ minutes 
 
7.5 Did you discuss with anyone else outside your household? 
 
(1)______ Yes 
 (2)______ No (Skip to question 7.7) 
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7.6 Who did you discuss with outside your household? (Record the relationship of the 
person(s) to the respondent, open-ended question) 
 
 ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.7  How difficult did you find it to make your decision? (Read all responses) 
 
(1)_______ Very difficult 
(2)_______ Difficult 
(3)_______ Easy 
(4)_______  Very easy 
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Section 8:  "End"   End of questionnaire 
This is the end of the interview.  Thank you very much for your participation. We’d like to stress 
that it is necessary for you to protect yourself from contracting cholera and typhoid.  The 
objective of this survey is to learn about your willingness to pay for cholera and typhoid vaccines 
either for yourself or your household members.  We need to ask different households their 
willingness to purchase at different prices.  Thus, don’t worry if you hear that other people in 
your community have been asked about purchasing the vaccines at different prices. 
 
Interviewer’s opinion 
 
8.1  Time Finish (record in 1.1C)  __________________ 
 
8.2  How reliable do you think is the information you got from the respondent? 
 
(1) ______  Very reliable 
(2) ______  Reliable 
(3) ______  Fairly reliable 
(4) ______  Not reliable 
(5) ______  Very unreliable 
 
8.3  Do you think the respondent understood about the vaccine efficacy scenario? 
 
(1) ___________ Did not understand 
(2) ___________ Understood 
(-98) _________  Don’t know/not sure 
 
8.4  Did the interview finish? 
 
(1) ___________ Not complete  (Make sure you check the option (6) in 1.0.) 
 (2) ___________ Yes, complete  (Skip to 8.6) 
 
8.5  Were you able to make another appointment to finish the interview? 
 
(1)______  Yes 
(2)______  No  
 
8.6  Enumerator:  Please note the type of flooring material 
  
 (1)______ Mud 
 (2)______ Cement 
 (3)______ Mosaic[floor tiles] 
 (4)______ Brick 
 (-95)____  Others, Specify_____________________ 
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8.7  Enumerator:  Please note the type of material used in the Wall 
  
 (1)______ Thatch/ bamboos 
 (2)______ Mud 
 (3)______ Corrugated tin 
 (4)______ Plastic/polythene 
 (5)______ Brick 
 (6)______ Wood 
 (-95)____ Others, Specify_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
8.8  Enumerator: Please note the type of material used in the Roof 
  
 (1)______ Thatch/bamboo/wood etc. 
 (2)______ Plastic/polythene 
 (3)______ Corrugated tin 
 (4)______ Concrete 
 (-95)____ Others, Specify_______________________________________  
 
8.9     What type of house does the respondent live in? 
  
 (1)______  Own homestead  
 (2)______  Government quarters 
 (3)______  Single-family home in good condition  
 (4)______  Flat/home shared by multiple families 
 (5)______ Single-family home in poor condition 
 (-95)_____ Others, specify _______________________________  
 
8.10  Other suggestions/ comments 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________  
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Appendix 2. Private Demand for Cholera Vaccines in Rural Matlab, Bangladesh 
 
 Abstract  
 
Objectives: To estimate household willingness to pay (WTP) for cholera vaccines in a rural area 
of Bangladesh, which had participated in a 1985 oral cholera vaccine trial. 
Methods: An in-home contingent valuation study was undertaken in Matlab, Bangladesh in 
summer 2005. All respondents (N = 591) received a description of a cholera vaccine that was 
50% effective for three years and had negligible side effects. Respondents were asked how many 
vaccines they would purchase for their household at randomly pre-assigned prices. Negative 
binomial regression models were used to estimate the number of vaccines purchased by each 
household and to calculate average WTP. 
Results: On average, respondents were willing to pay about US$9.50 to purchase vaccines for all 
members of their household (i.e. US$1.70 per vaccine). Average WTP per person is US$2.40 for 
young children (1 to 4 years), US$1.20 for school-age children, and US$1.05 for adults. Median 
WTP estimates are significantly smaller: US$1.00 for young children, US$0.05 for 
schoolchildren, and less than US$0 for adults.  
Conclusions: There is significant demand for cholera vaccines in Matlab at low prices. Recent 
herd protection research suggests that unvaccinated persons would also experience reduced 
incidence via indirect effects at low coverage rates. 
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Private Demand for Cholera Vaccines in Rural Matlab, Bangladesh (publiahed in Health 
Policy) 
 
1.  Introduction 
In many less developed countries, cholera remains a serious public health problem. Most 
cases are concentrated in the “cholera belts” of coastal and delta areas in the tropics, of which 
Bangladesh is a classic example [1]. Incidence of cholera can be reduced through access to clean 
drinking water and proper disposal of sewage. However, infrastructure additions and 
improvements are expensive and progress has been slow, especially in rural areas. In Bangladesh 
oral rehydration solution (ORS) has successfully reduced the case fatality rate of cholera to less 
than 1% [2, 3]. While the widespread use of ORS has limited the risk of death in areas with 
quality health care, it does not reduce the risk of contracting cholera upon exposure.  
New-generation oral cholera vaccines were tested in Matlab, our research area, during 
1985 and found to have protective efficacies of approximately 50% over three years [4, 5]. 
Additionally, Ali et al. [6-7] reanalyzed the data from the Matlab trial and found reduced disease 
incidence among unvaccinated individuals in localities with high coverage (i.e. herd protection 
effects).  
Despite evidence of vaccine effectiveness, policy makers in Bangladesh reported that 
they did not place a high priority on providing cholera vaccines, even in areas with high endemic 
incidence rates [8]. The reasons for the lack of interest include 1) the success of ORS in reducing 
cholera mortality, 2) a desire to spend limited resources on other interventions, 3) the limited 
duration and effectiveness of cholera vaccines, 4) the higher cost of cholera vaccines relative to 
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others included in World Health Organization’s Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI), and 
5) the inability to administer the cholera vaccine as part of the existing EPI schedule.   
Given the lack of public sector support for a cholera vaccination program in Bangladesh, 
a key issue in developing a successful vaccination program is whether it can be financially 
sustainable. Our research attempts to quantify private willingness to pay for cholera vaccines in a 
highly endemic area, where free, high quality treatment facilities already exist. This study 
attempts to determine how much families are willing to pay for vaccines and how household 
decision makers would allocate vaccines among family members. Because residents of the 
Matlab area have previous experience with oral cholera vaccines, this area should offer useful 
evidence of the private value of the cholera vaccine. 
Our research group surveyed a sample of 591 households in the Matlab area, where 
cholera is prevalent. In our in-home interview with the representative of each household, we 
presented a description of a hypothetical cholera vaccine that was 50% effective for three years 
and had negligible side effects; then, we asked if that individual would be willing and able to 
purchase the vaccine at a single specified price (preassigned from an array of six) for personal 
immunization and for immunization of other household members. This technique, known as the 
contingent valuation method, permits measurement of demand for goods that are not widely 
available or do not have markets; it has been used frequently to measure the demand for vaccines 
in developing countries [9-13], as well as for environmental goods and services [14-16].  
 
1.1 Background 
Centered at the town of Matlab, the Matlab Health Research Centre study area lies some 
55 km southwest of Dhaka and has a population of approximately 224,000 [17]. The International 
Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) operates a hospital in Matlab 
town whose services include free treatment to anyone with diarrhea. ICDDR,B also provides 
basic health services to approximately 111,000 people in Matlab town and 67 outlying villages. 
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Once a month, ICDDR,B’s Health and Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS) gathers 
information from each person in the ICDDR,B service area as well as from an additional 113,000 
people in 75 other nearby villages who receive basic health care services from government 
facilities.33 ICDDR,B has collected this information for more than 35 years, and the sample frame 
for the present study was generated from that database.  
From 1963 through 1996, ICDDR,B conducted a number of health intervention studies in 
the area, many of which included the free provision of products aimed at improving the health of 
participants. In addition to the 1985 cholera vaccine trial, residents of the government service area 
were included in 30 to 35 studies while residents of the ICDDR,B service area participated in 55 
to 65 studies. These studies may have conditioned people in the area to believe that public health 
programs should be provided free of charge.  
According to data from ICDDR,B’s hospital surveillance records, the annual incidence of 
cholera ranges from 1 to 5 cases per 1,000 persons. Because not all cases arrive at the hospital 
and some are misdiagnosed, the actual cholera incidence rate is unquestionably higher; 
epidemiological studies have estimated that the annual incidence rate could be 4 to 20 cases per 
1,000 persons in the Matlab area [18]. The most recent records, from 2003, show that 62 people 
among the HDSS population died from all diseases related to diarrhea, including cholera, 
corresponding to a mortality rate of 2.8 deaths per 10,000 persons [17]. Cholera transmission 
occurs year-round and peaks during April–May and September–October (i.e. just before and after 
the summer monsoon [19]).  
Using the Matlab area as an example, Sack [18] compares the cost effectiveness of 
cholera treatment versus vaccination by performing break-even analyses of the cost per cholera 
death avoided using different incidence rates and vaccination costs. Sack estimated the treatment 
cost per death avoided at about US$350 (based on a 20% case fatality rate without treatment 
versus 0.5% with treatment). He reports that vaccines might be more cost effective per death 
                                                 
33The ICDDR,B hospital will provide free treatment for anyone that travels to the hospital, including people 
that reside outside of the MHRC. 
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avoided than the provision of free treatment if per capita vaccine cost is less than US$1 and if 
annual incidence exceeds 1 in 1,000. However, this analysis ignores the disutility and financial 
costs of illness prevented through vaccination. Also, it may not be necessary to choose between 
vaccination and treatment. Instead, we might assess the marginal benefits of adding vaccination 
efforts to existing treatment programs.   
Although cholera vaccines are not currently available, people in the Matlab area have had 
experience with the new-generation oral vaccine and a combined typhoid, paratyphoid A and B, 
and cholera (TABC) vaccine that was administered during the 1950s and 1960s. ICDDR’B’s 
1985 field trial administered two distinct oral cholera vaccines and a placebo. The vaccination 
program targeted children and mothers. More than 62,000 people took three doses, approximately 
27,000 took one or two doses, and about 31,000 were absent or refused to participate [5].  
Ali et al. [6] used a GPS database in combination with vaccine trial records to examine 
herd immunity benefits for the first year after the 1985 Matlab trial. They found a significant 
inverse monotonic relationship between local coverage rates and disease incidence in 
unvaccinated persons. The raw data showed that at coverage rates greater than 50%, disease 
incidence was about the same for vaccinated and unvaccinated persons and roughly 80% less than 
the incidence for placebo recipients in areas with low vaccination rates (i.e. less than 28% 
coverage). These results also suggest that researchers may have underestimated vaccine 
effectiveness in previous evaluations of the Matlab trial. In a separate study, Ali et al. [7] found 
significant herd protection effects for children less than 2 years of age who were not eligible for 
the Matlab trial. The local coverage rate for women greater than 15 years of age was a statistically 
significant correlate for incidence among children less than 2 years. However, the coverage rate 
for children age 2-15 years was not statistically significant.  
People in the Matlab area also have access to vaccines from EPI, which are distributed by 
ICDDR,B’s community health workers once per month [20]. The private market for vaccines in 
the area is minimal, with only a few pharmacies in Matlab town providing tetanus vaccines 
(US$0.30–$1.34, Tk 20–Tk 90) and rabies vaccines (US$5.95–$6.40, Tk 400–Tk 430). This is 
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based on a conversion rate of US$1 = 67.2 Bangladeshi Taka (1 August 2005). Unless otherwise 
noted, we present price information and results in 2005 US dollars using this exchange rate.  
These numbers are, however, unadjusted for purchasing power parity.  Nationwide, Levin et al. 
[20] report that the private sector only accounts for about 2% of vaccines delivered in 
Bangladesh. 
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2.  Materials and Methods 
2.1 Sampling procedure 
The survey respondents were chosen via a two-stage cluster sample without replacement 
based on a household sample frame from ICDDR,B’s HDSS database. The first stage selected a 
total of 3,000 households, each with at least one child less than 18 years of age. Two-thirds of 
these households were located in the government service area, and one-third in the ICDDR,B 
service area. We oversampled the government service area because we believed that it might be 
slightly more representative of rural Bangladesh than the ICDDR,B service area. This split also 
allowed us to test for differences in demand between service areas. The sample was then 
subdivided into 120 clusters of 22 to 28 households located within small geographic areas ranging 
about 1–4 km2 depending on population density. This clustering reduced travel time between 
interviews.  
In the second stage we randomly selected two sets of 15 clusters of households and 
assigned one cluster from each set to each enumerator. We required enumerators to interview the 
mother or father of children in the household and to allot half their interviews to fathers.34 Only 
two households refused to grant interviews. However, it proved difficult to interview male 
parents, because many reside and work outside the Matlab area.  Nonetheless, we wanted to 
obtain a fairly even gender split between male and female parents. As a result, we chose not to 
interview 160 households where female parents or grandparents were available for interview, but 
males were not. This approach may present some bias toward households for which males remain 
in the Matlab area, but allows us to test for differences in preferences for mothers and fathers.  
  
                                                 
34We interviewed two respondents who were grandparents, because the parents had died. 
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2.2 Survey instrument 
The survey instrument was approved by the Institutional Review Boards at the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and at ICDDR,B. The instrument had six sections of questions 
and is included as an appendix. The first section recorded demographic information about the 
respondent and members of the household. The second section had questions regarding the 
respondent’s perceptions of and experiences with cholera. The third section discussed how 
cholera was contracted, spread, prevented, and treated; it also included questions about the 
respondent’s previous experience with the oral cholera and TABC vaccines. This section also 
introduced the cholera vaccine contingent valuation scenario, including descriptions of the 
vaccine’s effectiveness and duration. Next, the respondents’ understanding of the concept of 
vaccine effectiveness was tested. The fourth section contained the valuation questions that were 
used to estimate demand and willingness to pay (WTP) and is described in Research Design, 
below. The fifth section included questions to determine the value of a reduction in the risk of 
death for the respondent’s youngest child [22].  The sixth section included socioeconomic 
questions about education, income, housing characteristics, assets, disease-averting behaviors, 
economic status, and access to credit.  
Two sets of 60 pretest interviews helped us to adapt our survey to local conditions and to 
set an appropriate range of prices for the hypothetical cholera vaccine. We employed 20 local 
enumerators to conduct the interviews. These enumerators had experience working on other 
ICDDR,B public health studies, but had not administered contingent valuation surveys. They 
received two weeks of training according to the guidelines recommended in Whittington’s review 
of CV practices in developing countries [16]. 
 
2.3 Research design  
First, we explained that vaccine effectiveness was based on the joint probability of (1) 
being exposed to illness and (2) being protected by the vaccine. The explanation used a picture 
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with 50 blue and 50 red figures representing persons who would or would not be protected from 
disease after vaccination. After educating about effectiveness, each respondent was presented 
with a single price from an array of six randomly assigned prices (US$0.15, $0.37, $0.74, $1.12, 
$4.46, $8.93)35 and asked if he or she would be willing to pay that price for a vaccine for personal 
immunization. Then, respondents were asked how many vaccines they would purchase for family 
members and which family members would receive those vaccines. Prior to the purchasing 
decision, respondents were instructed to consider their budget constraints and that there were no 
right or wrong answers. 
The interviews were staged such that respondents were divided into two groups. NTTT 
(no time to think) respondents received the entire questionnaire in one sitting. TTT (time to think) 
respondents answered the first half of the survey, then were given overnight to consider the 
prospective “purchase” of the hypothetical vaccines and to discuss the decision with other family 
members; an interviewer returned the next day to finish the survey.  
 
2.4 Modeling Strategy 
Our household analysis is based on a model of decision making developed by Cropper et 
al. [11]. It is assumed that the decision maker maximizes the household utility function, which is 
a function of each family member’s consumption and health, subject to a household budget 
constraint. Demand depends on nonwage income, the prices of vaccines and other preventive and 
mitigating health products, and a vector of individual and household characteristics.36  
Count models are useful for examining household demand because they employ integer 
estimates for the number of vaccines purchased by each family. We used the negative binomial 
model, which is a variation of the Poisson regression model. The dependent variable (number of 
                                                 
35Equivalent prices in Bangladeshi taka are Tk 10, 25, 50, 75, 300, 600. 
 
36Note that we also analyzed data for individual demand, but do not report results here in order to decrease 
the length of the article. 
 
 235 
vaccines demanded) is a random draw from a negative binomail distribution with a mean λi, 
where
 
i denotes the household. If Vi* is the solution to the maximization problem and ni is 
household size, the model can be written as 
  
,  to1   where!/)(]Pr[ * iiniii nnnenV i === λλ  (1)  
 
where λi = eXiβ + εi and Xi is a vector of characteristics describing household i and the vaccine price 
offered to that family. The term εi is an error with a gamma distribution. The number of 
occurrences are distributed with mean λi and variance λi + α–1λi2 where α is the common 
parameter of the gamma distribution.37 The coefficient estimates can be used to construct a 
demand curve for each respondent. The area underneath the demand curve is the Marshallian 
consumer surplus, which we define as household willingness to pay. The fraction covered can be 
estimated by dividing the estimated number of vaccines purchased by the population size. 
 
                                                 
37A truncated Poisson model was also estimated for this data. This model avoids demand predictions that 
exceed the number of household members for each respondent. Because WTP estimates are similar for 
truncated Poisson and standard negative binomial models, we concluded that the negative binomial model 
should be employed because it allows for overdispersion. 
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3. Results 
Generally, respondents understood the cholera vaccine scenario and provided reasoned 
answers to our valuation questions. Only 9 of the 591 respondents rejected our hypothetical 
description of vaccines or vaccine effectiveness either because they believed that the vaccine 
would not be effective or would have negative side effects. These respondents were dropped from 
further analysis.38 
 
3.1 Sample sociodemographic characteristics 
The sociodemographic characteristics of the sample households are summarized in Table 
1. About 37% of respondents are from the ICDDR,B service area, and their average age is about 
40 years. Average household size is 5.8 persons, including 0.1 infants less than one year old, 0.7 
young children (1–5 years), 1.7 school-age children ( 6–17 years), 3.0 adults (18–65 years), and 
0.2 elderly adults (66 years and up). The average amount of education was about 3.6 years, with 
35% of the sample reporting that they never attended school. The average monthly household 
income was about US$75, which corresponds to an average monthly per capita income of US$13. 
About 39% of respondents received electricity directly from a grid. A few other respondents had 
installed solar panels or used large batteries because connections were not yet available in their 
village. (Insert Table 1) 
 
3.2 Water and sanitation behaviors 
Respondents’ water and sanitation behaviors are reported in Table 2. The primary source 
(85%) of drinking water for most respondents was hand pumps; most (60%) shared pumps with 
their neighbors. Hand pumps have reduced diarrheal disease but have proved problematic because 
of extensive, naturally occurring arsenic contamination in the local groundwater aquifers. Nearly 
                                                 
38Overall, 90% of respondents reported that they were would be “primarily involved” in the cholera vaccine 
purchase decision. By gender, 85% of female respondents and 95% of male respondents would be 
involved. Thus, our sample should be representative of household decision makers. 
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all households (92%) surveyed did not boil their drinking water, though some did treat water with 
bleach (5%), via sedimentation with alum (4%) or with filters made of cloth, ceramics, sand, or 
composite material (7%).39 The respondents primarily used improved pit, unimproved pit, and 
hanging latrines40 for waste removal, the latter two of which may promote increased prevalence 
of pathogens in the environment. (Insert Table 2) 
 
3.3 Previous experience with oral cholera or TABC vaccines 
In our survey 182 of 591 respondents had reported receiving the oral cholera vaccine 
during the 1985 trial. From respondents’ accounts of their household members’ experience with 
vaccines, it appears that about 10% of respondents and their household members had received 
vaccines. (This is likely an underestimate, because respondents may not have been aware of 
vaccines received by others.) Most respondents, 90%, reported that they were satisfied with the 
vaccines received by themselves and their family members. They thought that most of the 
vaccinated persons in their households (72%, including themselves and other members) were still 
protected by the vaccine. 
 
3.4 Attitudes about cholera and vaccines 
The variables thought to influence demand for cholera vaccines are summarized in Table 
2. About 37% of respondents reported that at least one member of their household had suffered 
from cholera in the past; 6% reported a death in the family. Another 27% of respondents knew of 
someone other than a household who had suffered from cholera. The proportion of households 
that had experienced a cholera death was more than twice as high in the government service area, 
                                                 
39An unrelated arsenic health intervention promoted the use of filters and sedimentation to reduce arsenic 
exposure. 
 
40The improved pit latrines had cement floors and solid walls, providing better privacy than unimproved pit 
latrines. Unimproved pit latrines generally consisted of a hole in the ground surrounded by walls made of 
poor materials. 
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possibly because ICDDR,B’s provision of health care and previous research studies have reduced 
cholera-related deaths. More respondents believed that cholera is serious or very serious for 
children (84%) than for adults (64%). Also, more respondents believed that their children would 
be likely to contract cholera in the next five years (40%) than believed that they themselves 
(20%) were at risk. Thus, it appears that respondents consider cholera to be dangerous, especially 
for children; however, most do not believe their risk of contracting the disease is very high. 
Most respondents understood our description of vaccine effectiveness. About 75% 
correctly answered four questions designed to test understanding. With those who did not answer 
correctly, we repeated the vaccine effectiveness description, then repeated the test questions.  
After this second round, the overall success rate rose to about 93%: only some 7% of all 
respondents were unable to answer the test questions correctly. 
A majority (68%) believed that the most important benefit of a cholera vaccine is to 
prevent pain and suffering. Others (24%) cited avoiding the risk of death from cholera as most 
important. Very few (8%) cited avoided treatment costs or lost wages as the primary benefit of a 
cholera vaccine. These answers suggest that economic analyses that rely primarily on cost of 
illness estimates would underestimate vaccine benefits. 
 
3.5 Household demand 
Table 3 shows the raw stated data for the average fraction of household members 
vaccinated at each price. The average fraction of household members vaccinated decreases as the 
price increases and for respondents given time to think. We found that many respondents (74%) 
either decided to purchase vaccines for all family members or for none of their family members. 
Relatively fewer respondents (26%) chose to purchase vaccines for some, but not all of their 
family members. (Insert Table 3) 
Negative binomial regression results for the household demand model are summarized in 
Table 4. Model 2 includes all possible covariates, while Model 1 only considers variables that are 
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unrelated to cholera and vaccine experience. Average marginal effects, which reflect the change 
in population average demand for a unit change in a single variable, are summarized in Table 5. 
Price is highly significant and there is an average marginal decrease in stated demand of 0.58 
vaccines per family for a price increase from US$0.50 to US$1.  Generally, respondents residing 
in the ICDDR,B service area and TTT respondents state that they would purchase fewer vaccines 
for their families; average marginal decreases are about 1.3 vaccines if given TTT and 0.7 for the 
ICDDR,B service area. Male respondents and respondents from wealthier families purchase 
significantly more vaccines; average marginal demand increases by 0.05 vaccines per US$1 
increase in monthly per capita income. Average marginal demand decreases by 0.04 vaccines as 
respondent age increases by one year. As expected, respondents with larger families are shown to 
purchase more vaccines. This is true for all age groups, although the coefficients for the number 
of school-age children are smaller than those for young children or adults. (Insert Tables 4-5) 
Interestingly, we find that the number of vaccines purchased increases significantly for 
respondents who believe that cholera is a serious disease for adults or who believe that adults are 
likely to contract cholera. However, the coefficients for these beliefs for children are smaller and 
less significant. The average marginal increase in demand if respondents believed that cholera is 
likely for adults is 1.2 compared to only 0.25 for the same belief for children. This may occur if 
parents are more risk averse about their children’s health than their own (i.e. they will purchase 
vaccines for children even if they do not think the disease is serious). Respondents that previously 
received a cholera vaccine generally purchase more vaccines for their families, unless they were 
not satisfied with the first vaccine. We also find that respondents that treat their drinking water 
generally purchase significantly more vaccines (average marginal effect is one vaccine), 
indicating common preferences for risk averting behaviors.  
Each model’s estimated average WTP for vaccinating all household members including 
the respondent is shown at the bottom of Table 4. The estimates of WTP are stable among both 
model specifications and vary from US$9.00 for TTT respondents in the ICDDR,B service area to 
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US$14.30 for NTTT respondents in the government service area. Considering the average 
household has 5.7 members, the average household WTP per person varies from US$1.60 to 
US$2.50 depending on location and method of survey administration. 
We can also use separate negative binomial models to estimate vaccine demand for 
discrete age groups. The dependent variable is redefined to represent the demand for each age 
group and separate models are estimated. The estimated average WTP per person for young 
children age 1–5 years (US$2.40) is higher than for school-age children age 5–17 years 
(US$1.20) and adults (US$1.05). Figure 1 shows that the predicted fraction of young children 
vaccinated is higher than that for the other age groups at any price. These findings suggest that 
respondents place precedence on vaccinating young children relative to older children and adults. 
It is also useful to compare mean WTP estimates to median WTP estimates. The median 
WTP by age group corresponds to the price in Figure 1 at which 50% of an age group population 
is vaccinated. The median WTP is about US$1.00 for young children, US$0.05 for school-age 
children, and US$0 for adults. The fairly large differences between mean and median WTP 
estimates indicate that there is great heterogeneity in WTP for cholera vaccines among 
households. In other words, there is a large portion of the population that is only willing to pay 
small amounts of money if any for cholera vaccines, while there is also a small fraction of the 
population with high WTP. Specifically, although the estimated average adult WTP is US$1.05, 
we predict that only about 25% of the adult population would choose to buy vaccines at a price of 
US$1. 
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4. Discussion 
The study reported here provides the first estimates of private demand for cholera 
vaccines in Matlab, an impoverished rural area of Bangladesh where cholera is endemic  
Because many respondents or their family members participated in the 1985 cholera vaccine 
trial, they should be familiar with benefits of the vaccine. They should also be aware that the 
vaccine was not 100% effective. In addition, these respondents have had experience in 
participating in other health surveys and should be less prone to yay-saying. Thus, this 
sample is uniquely suited for valuing the vaccine. Factors associated with vaccine demand 
include age, income, gender, and opinions about the severity and likelihood of contracting 
cholera. Consistent with prior research in other developing countries, we found that 
hypothetical demand estimates were dependent on whether respondents received time to think 
about and discuss the purchasing decision. The provision of time to think reduced average 
household WTP by about 30%, resulting in a best estimate of average household WTP of 
about US$9–$10. We prefer the TTT estimates because we believe the extra time and 
discussion is more consistent with actual purchasing decisions. 
According to our model estimates, there is considerable heterogeneity in demand. The 
fraction of young children (age 1–5) vaccinated would be higher than that of school-age 
children or adults. In addition, the mean WTP per person is much higher than the median for 
all age groups. This indicates that some households are willing to purchase vaccines at very 
high prices, while many have little demand even at very low prices.  
The ICDDR,B diarrhea hospital located at the center of our study site is nationally 
renowned for excellence in providing free treatment for cholera and other diarrheal disease. 
This may result in lower demand for cholera vaccines relative to other areas in rural 
Bangladesh. In fact, we found that, on average, people in the ICDDR,B service area 
expressed less demand for cholera vaccines than those in the government service area. But 
 242 
our interviewees in the government service area resided within only a moderate distance 
(within 2.5 hours by traditional methods of transportation) of the ICDDR,B hospital, and 
many had participated in prior ICDDR,B studies (though they probably participated in fewer 
studies than those residing inside the ICDDR,B service area). As a result, our estimates from 
the government service area are also likely affected by ICDDR,B’s imprint. Other 
communities in Bangladesh that experience high incidences in the absence of ICDDR,B 
services may have higher willingness to pay. 
While beyond the scope of this paper, our cholera vaccine demand models can be used in 
combination with recent herd protection findings to aid policy development. At present, 
cholera vaccine herd protection models are not very well defined. Ali et al. [6-7] provide only 
five data points to show the coverage-incidence relationships for population clusters that are 
either 0.5 km [6] or 2 km [7] in radius. In addition, the 1985 campaign targeted women and 
children only; we do not know how adult male coverage rates would impact results. We are 
not aware of more comprehensive cholera herd protection modeling efforts, which might 
examine how vaccination rates within subgroups (e.g. age groups, gender, sanitation method) 
affect herd protection.  
Patel et al. [23] found that targeting influenza vaccines for school-children relative to 
other age groups would result in proportionately greater herd protection for the community. 
In contrast, Ali et al. [7] found that cholera vaccine coverage rates for women over 15 years 
were more important than coverage rates among children for effecting herd protection in 
children less than 2 years (who were excluded from the Matlab campaign). As 
epidemiological models for cholera vaccine herd protection become available, the demand 
relationships (e.g. demand by age and gender) presented in this paper could help set vaccine 
pricing if government and non-profit groups choose not to fully subsidize campaigns. 
Demand, incidence and herd protection data could be used to examine tradeoffs between the 
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number of cases avoided, public investment, and the vaccine price charged. In addition, we 
could also examine the potential for cross-subsidies to enhance herd protection effects. Our 
findings suggest that households would place precedence on vaccinating young children; 
however, the community might be better served to prioritize women over 15 years based on 
herd protection evidence. 
With these reservations, we can see that a cholera vaccination program in the Matlab area 
could possibly charge a small fee for cholera vaccines and still achieve some herd protection. 
Ali et al. [6] observed herd protection effects at coverage rates as low as 30% of the target 
population and very large effects at coverage rates greater than 50%. We predict that a 
cholera vaccination program could achieve a 30% coverage rate with a US$1.50 user fee and 
a 50% coverage rate with a US$0.50 user fee. (Note that these coverage predictions are for 
the whole population rather than the target population as presented in [6-7].) If poorer 
households are co-located with wealthier ones, there is potential for these poorer households 
to experience a reduction in cholera incidence when wealthier households purchase vaccines. 
However, if the wealthy households that purchase vaccines are geographically distant from 
poor, high incidence neighborhoods, herd protection effects will be less significant. Thus, we 
have to evaluate the spatial patterns of demand to fully understand the potential for herd 
protection. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (Respondent and household 
characteristics)                              
 
Variable name Description Mean (SD) 
 (N = 591) 
 
Respondent characteristics 
 
Male            Gender =1 if male, = 0 if female 0.49 (0.50) 
Age Age (yrs), continuous 40 (9.7) 
Practice Hinduism  Religion = 1 if Hindu, 0 = else 0.06 (0.25) 
Education 1–5 years 
= 1 if respondent completed 1–5 years of 
school 0.36 (0.48)          
Education 5–10 years, 
vocational 
= 1 if respondent completed 5–10 years of 
school, vocational school, or madrassa 
0.18 (0.38) 
Education more than 10 
years 
= 1 if respondent completed university, 
postgraduate or professional course 
0.12 (0.32) 
Unable to read 
= 1 if respondent is not able to read a 
newspaper 0.53 (0.50) 
 
Household characteristics 
 
Infants number of infants (<1 year), continuous 0.12 (0.34) 
Young children number of children age 1–5, continuous 0.7 (0.72) 
School-aged children number of children 6–17, continuous 1.7  (1.11)          
Adults number of adults age 18–65, continuous 3.0  (1.45)          
Elderly adults number of elderly adults age >65, continuous 0.20 (0.43)          
Monthly income per 
capita 
Household income divided by number of  
household members (US$ per month), 
continuous 
13.7 (11.5) 
a
 
Log income per capita 
Natural log of household income divided by 
number of  household members, continuous 
6.8 (0.7) 
a
 The average household monthly income was US$75 (Tk. 5000). 
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Table 2.  Variable definition and descriptive statistics (Perceptions of disease, vaccine history and 
characteristics of research design)  
 
Variable name Description Mean (SD) 
 
Risk behavior, perceptions of disease, vaccination history 
 
Treat drinking water = 1 if household treats water for drinking; 0.15 (0.36) 
Someone in household 
has had cholera 
= 1 if someone in household has had 
cholera 
0.37 (0.48)          
Know person who has 
had cholera (outside hh) 
= 1 if knows someone outside hh who has 
had cholera, but not some in hh    
0.27 (0.50) 
Cholera is very serious 
for adults 
= 1 if respondent believes cholera is (very) 
serious for adults  
0.64 (0.48) 
Cholera is serious for 
children = 1 if cholera (very) serious for children   
0.84 (0.50)          
Cholera likely for 
respondent 
= 1 if respondent believes he or she is 
likely or very likely to contract cholera in 
next 5 years 
0.20 (0.40) 
Cholera likely for 
respondent’s child 
= 1 if respondent believes his or her child 
will likely contract cholera in next 5 years 
0.40 (0.49) 
Believes cholera is 
common in community 
= 1 if respondent believes cholera is 
common in his or her community 
0.20 (0.40) 
Respondent believes 
vaccine is still working 
= 1 if respondent had oral cholera vaccine 
and believes that it is still effective 
0.24 (0.43) 
Respondent had cholera 
vaccine satisfied, not 
working 
= 1 if respondent had oral cholera vaccine 
was satisfied, but does not think vaccine 
still works 
0.06 (0.25) 
Respondent unsatisfied 
with vaccine 
= 1 if respondent was not satisfied with 
previous vaccine for self or family member 
0.03 (0.16) 
 
Characteristics of research design 
 
 
Time to think 
= 1 if given time to think overnight, =0 
else 
 
0.47 (0.50) 
ICDDR,B 
Health service area; = 1 if ICDDR,B, = 0 if 
government 0.37 (0.48) 
Price 
Referendum price (Bangladeshi Tk), 
continuous 157 (198) 
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Table 3. Household demand for vaccines (raw data) 
 
Price US$ (Tk) $0.15 
(10) 
$0.37 
(25) 
$0.74 
(50) 
$1.10
(75) 
$4.50 
(300) 
$9.0 
(600) 
Household demanda       
NTTT Sample size 54 54 57 52 54 39b 
Avg. no.of  vaccines per family 4.4 4.4 3.2 2.8 0.8 0.2 
TTT Sample size 51 48 47 46 46 38b 
Avg. no. of  vaccines per family 4.1 3.1 1.8 1.6 0.3 0.5 
NTTT       
% family members vaccinated 76% 75% 60% 53% 16%   4% 
TTT       
% family members vaccinated 63% 53% 31% 27%   4% 10% 
 
a
 Number of vaccines purchased divided by number of persons in household 
b Sample size was smaller for the highest price, because it was only used to choke off 
demand.  
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Table 4. Household negative binomial regression results and WTP estimates 
 
 Household Model 
Model  1 2 
Price (Tk) –0.005*** –0.005*** 
 (–6.5) (–13) 
Time to think –0.38*** –0.44*** 
 (–3.85) (–4.3) 
Male 0.27*** 0.27** 
 (2.64) (2.4) 
Resident from ICDDR,B service 
area 
–0.18* –0.25** 
 (–1.78) (–2.1) 
Age –0.008 –0.009 
 (–1.40) (–1.4) 
Education 1–5 yrs. 0.18 0.16 
 (1.48) (1.3) 
Education 6–10 yrs. 0.28* 0.22 
 (1.92) (1.5) 
Education >10 yrs. 0.12 0.14 
 (0.83) (0.81) 
Log income per capita 0.37*** 0.39*** 
 (4.43) (4.5) 
No. of hh members   
   
No. of infants < age 1 0.041 –0.020 
 (0.29) (–0.14) 
No. of children age 1–5 0.19*** 0.21*** 
 (2.59) (2.8) 
No. of children age 6–17 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (2.75) (2.7) 
No. of adults age >18 0.17*** 0.17*** 
 (5.32) (5.2) 
Practice Hinduism 0.30 0.034 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
Serious or very serious for children  –0.26** 
  (–1.9) 
Serious or very serious for adults  0.32*** 
  (3.0) 
Cholera likely for respondent  0.30** 
 252 
  (2.2) 
Cholera likely for children  0.079 
  (0.72) 
Someone in hh has had cholera  0.023 
  (0.20) 
Know someone other than hh member 
that has had cholera 
 –0.13 
 (–1.0) 
Resp had prior vaccine; was satisfied 
and  
 0.050 
thinks vaccine still works  (0.42) 
Resp had prior vaccine; was satisfied 
but  
 0.33* 
thinks vaccine no longer works  (1.7) 
Resp. had prior vaccine; not satisfied  –0.38 
  (–0.97) 
Treats water  0.23* 
  (1.8) 
Constant –1.8*** –1.9*** 
 (–2.9) (–2.8) 
R2 0.093 0.11 
Estimated average WTP, NTTT 
Govt. Service Area  (US$) 
14.30 14.30 
Estimated average WTP,  NTTT 
ICDDR,B service area  (US$) 
12.30 12.30 
Estimated Average WTP,  TTT 
govt. service area  (US$) 
10.00 10.00 
Estimated Average WTP, TTT 
ICDDR,B service area  (US$) 
9.00 9.00 
  
    * indicates significance at the 10% level 
  ** at the 5% level 
*** at the 1% level 
T–statistic in parentheses  
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Table 5. Average marginal effects for household negative binomial regression  
 
 Household Model 
Variable (change in variable) Price = US$0.50 Price = US$1.00 
Price (US$; 1 unit US$0.50) –0.58 (0.000) –0.45 (0.000)  
Time to think –1.3 (0.000) –1.1 (0.000) 
Male 0.84 (.005) 0.71 (0.005) 
Resident from ICDDR,B service 
area 
–0.73 (0.068) –0.62 (0.068) 
Age (yrs) –0.037 (0.048) –0.031 (0.050) 
Education (category- 0, 1—5, 6—10, 
>10)1 
0.29 (0.098) 0.25 (0.10) 
Monthly income per capita (US$1 per 
cap) 
0.045 (0.000) 0.032 (0.000) 
No. of infants < age 1 –0.12 (0.79) –0.10 (0.79) 
No. of children age 1–5 0.58 (0.018) 0.49 (0.19) 
No. of children age 6–17 0.39 (0.012) 0.33 (0.11) 
No. of adults age >18 0.55 (0.000) 0.47 (0.000) 
Practice Hinduism –0.07 (0.91) –0.06 (0.91) 
Cholera likely for respondent 1.2 (0.023) 1.0 (0.025) 
Cholera likely for children 0.16 (0.66) 0.13 (0.66) 
Someone in household has had 
cholera 
0.25 (0.49) 0.22 (0.49) 
Unsatisfied with previous vaccine –1.2 (0.15) –1.0 (0.15) 
Treats water 0.99 (0.09) 0.84 (0.092) 
 
(p-value in parentheses) 
       a As opposed to the educational dummy variables used in the negative binomial regression, an 
education categorical variable is necessary for average marginal effect analysis. The same 
educational levels used are used to differentiate the category variable, which increases from 
lower to higher education (i.e. 1= no formal education, 2= 1—5 years, 3= 6—10 years, 4= 
greater than 10 years). 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Predicted coverage rates as a function of price by age group  
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Abstract 
An Estimate of the Economic Value that Parents in Rural Bangladesh Place on Ex-
ante Mortality Risk Reductions for their Children  
 
Empirical estimates of parents’ willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce mortality risk for 
their children were derived from a contingent valuation survey of 591 parents in rural 
Bangladesh. The interviewer introduced a hypothetical nutritional supplement that would reduce 
the risk of death from disease and asked if respondents would purchase it for their youngest child. 
Average WTP for large reductions (20% to 60%) in risk of death from disease was about 1-2% of 
average household income, resulting in estimates of the value of statistical life between 
US$10,000 and US$25,000 for children between one and seventeen years.  
 
Keywords: children, VSL, WTP, CV  
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Parents constantly make decisions that reveal their attitudes toward health and mortality 
risks for themselves and their children, including how to protect children from accidents in the 
road or near water bodies or whether to purchase preventative health products. These decisions 
involve trading off mortality and morbidity risks with monetary expenditure (e.g., for a safety 
helmet or a vaccine) and/or allocation of parents’ time (e.g., transportation choice, amount of 
direct child supervision). By observing these tradeoffs, economists can estimate the economic 
values that parents place on risk reductions for their children.  
Such estimates are useful for analyzing the benefits of many types of health and 
environmental programs that aim to reduce mortality risks. We postulate that health 
improvements offer four principal economic benefits: (1) avoided direct medical treatment costs, 
such as medicine and doctor fees, (2) avoided indirect costs, such as lost productivity 
(e.g., wages, school, housework) of patients and their caretakers, (3) avoided disutility of the pain 
and suffering of illness, and (4) reduced risk of death. Many studies have estimated the direct and 
indirect costs of illness per case (1 and 2) via surveys with patients (Cookson et al. 1997; Bahl et 
al. 2004; Cropper et al. 2004; Fischer et al. 2005). These cost of illness estimates provide lower 
bounds of the monetary benefits from disease reduction. But this approach ignores the values 
attached to reduced pain and suffering or mortality risk (3 and 4), which are especially difficult to 
quantify. Ideally, mortality risk benefits could be standardized across interventions for economic 
analysis of public policy options.  
Data from a contingent valuation (CV) survey were used to estimate parents’ willingness 
to pay (WTP) for mortality risk reductions for their children. Specifically, we compared an 
estimate of the value of a generic mortality risk reduction (derived from responses to an offer of a 
hypothetical nutritional supplement that would reduce risk of death from all diseases) to the 
implicit value of mortality risk reduction via a hypothetical cholera vaccine.  
Our respondents, parents from 591 households in the Matlab area of rural Bangladesh, 
were individually interviewed during the summer of 2005. They were provided with information 
 258 
about the relative risks of death that children in the community face, illustrated with pictures 
showing the most likely causes of death for the children and their average risk of death. 
Interviewers then asked whether respondents would purchase a hypothetical nutritional 
supplement that would reduce the risk of death for the youngest child in the household if it were 
available at a specified price. Their replies provided estimates of WTP for mortality risk 
reduction for the households’ youngest children; these data were also used to calculate an average 
value of statistical life (VSL) for children. A second CV scenario for a new-generation cholera 
vaccine (50% effective for 3 years) was also presented to respondents in the same interview. 
Although the vaccine valuation questions did not directly elicit mortality risk information from 
the respondents, we used the average WTP for a cholera vaccine in addition to expected cholera 
mortality risk to calculate implicit VSL estimates for comparison with the nutritional supplement 
scenario. 
Our results show that parents are willing to spend a portion of their income to reduce 
mortality risk for their youngest child. Average WTP for the hypothetical supplement was about 
US$1 to US$2 per month, 1% to 3% of average monthly household income (US$75). Our best 
VSL estimate is a range from US$10,000 to US$25,000, and is based on large risk reductions 
(20% or 60% of all disease-related risk of death). Because these estimates involve large changes 
in risk, it is less likely that they are overstated relative to estimates derived from smaller changes.  
The VSL estimates for the hypothetical nutritional supplement were similar to the 
implicit VSL estimates based on cholera vaccine demand. Our results are also similar to a recent 
VSL study for commuters in Delhi, India (Bhattacharya, Alberini, and Cropper 2007), but smaller 
than those calculated via hedonic wage studies performed in India (Simon et al. 1999; 
Shanmugam 2000, 2001). Overall, our estimates generally fall in line with other values in the 
literature after adjusting for income.  
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1. Background  
The three methods commonly employed for estimating VSL include (1) hedonic wage or 
compensated wage studies, (2) stated-preference techniques, and (3) averting-expenditure studies. 
The literature includes examples of VSL estimates from each type of methodology that may be 
compared to our results. The hedonic wage literature is the most widely implemented and 
includes studies in some less developed countries. The averting-expenditure studies include some 
estimates of parents’ valuations of risk reduction for their children, but there are few if any 
studies available from less developed countries. Estimates from stated preference studies are 
available for some less developed countries, but generally focus on adults and may introduce bias 
if respondents misunderstood risk magnitudes or because people did not actually pay for the 
hypothetical risk intervention.  
The average WTP per person divided by the magnitude of risk reduction per person is the 
normalized value of a statistical life (VSL) or statistical life year (VSLY). Table 1 presents results 
from illustrative hedonic wage, stated preference, and averting expenditure studies, with special 
emphasis on meta analyses, studies conducted in developing countries and of parents’ valuations 
for reducing their children’s mortality risks. If available, we report the magnitude and type of risk 
reduction considered, average or median annual household income, as well as the ratio of VSL to 
annual household income. The VSL to income ratio is useful for identifying trends amongst high 
and low income countries and for identifying outlier estimates. 
 Generally, the highest VSL estimates (both in value and ratio) have been obtained from 
hedonic wage studies. Thus far, few hedonic wage VSL studies have focused on the developing 
world, although there are estimates for India and Taiwan. The Indian VSL estimates range from 
US$150,000 in 1991 USD (Simon et al. 1999) to US$3 million in 1990 USD (Shanmugam 2001). 
The VSL to income ratios for the Indian studies, especially those by Shanmugam, are much 
higher than most others in Table 1. Both Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Mrozek and Taylor (2002) 
report VSL income elasticity estimates in the range of 0.45 to 0.6 based on a review of 
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international studies. The estimates from Simon et al. and Liu et al. are consistent with other work 
after adjusting for income (this is not true of Shanmugam’s studies41). 
(Table 1 here)  
 Relative to the hedonic wage studies, the stated preference VSL estimates tend to exhibit 
more variation between and within studies, often depending on the magnitude of risk reduction 
presented in the hypothetical scenario. The North American and European scenarios from 
Alberini et al. (2004) and Alberini, Hunt, and Markandya (2006) presented “general purpose” 
scenarios in which the hypothetical product reduced risk of death from all causes. In contrast to 
the “general purpose” studies, with the exception of Mahmud (2005), the studies from less 
developed countries were based on hypothetical products/interventions that would reduce risk 
from one or more specific causes of death. While the use of specific interventions (e.g., air 
pollution, SARS, etc.) would provide a more realistic valuation scenario (i.e. it is unlikely that 
any intervention would reduce risk from all causes simultaneously), the risk for any single cause 
is usually just a small fraction of the risk from all causes. It is difficult to communicate smaller 
magnitudes in risk, especially for populations with limited education. In addition, the use of 
specific causes of death might have influenced results if those causes were dreaded, like cancer, 
or somewhat avoidable, like traffic accidents (Subramanian and Cropper 2000). Thus, there is a 
tradeoff between providing a more realistic scenario versus an easier to understand change in 
mortality risk when choosing between general and specific intervention scenarios.  
 The study by Mahmud (2005) is the only known stated preference study for mortality risk 
reductions in Bangladesh. The hypothetical intervention (a series of vaccinations) reduced 
respondents’ baseline risks of death from all causes by either 25% or 50%, which is a much larger 
change in risk than for any other studies. In addition, the scenario required an up-front payment 
                                                 
41Shanmugam (2001) extended the work in Shanmugam (2000) by adjusting for individuals’ abilities to 
select their jobs based on the assumption that some may have unobserved attributes that allow them to work 
more efficiently in risky occupations. Using a different econometric procedure, his VSL estimate increased 
about three-fold to US$3.0 million. This approaches the US estimates and demonstrates the sensitivity of 
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for five years of protection, while other studies typically used annual payment mechanisms. The 
large changes in risk and up-front payment requirements probably contributed to the very small 
VSL estimates, US$1,300 to 2,500 in US$2003. Mahmud’s VSL-to-annual-income ratios are 
easily the smallest observed among those reported in Table 1. 
 Bhattacharya, Alberini, and Cropper (2007) estimated VSL for commuters in Delhi, India 
to reduce their risk of death from road traffic accidents. As might be expected, they found that 
people who traveled from home on a daily basis had the highest WTP for improved safety. They 
estimated average VSL at about PPP$150,000 (US$30,000). The ratio of VSL to average 
household income (US$3,000) in Delhi is low relative to other studies, but within the general 
range. Other estimates from Thailand (Vassanadumrongdee and Matsuoka 2005) and Taiwan 
(Hammit and Liu 2004; Liu et al. 2005) generated much higher VSL estimates relative to annual 
income. However, the VSL estimate based on reduction of risk in SARS requires special 
consideration, because the surveys were performed during an epidemic.  
Overall, the ratios of VSL to annual household income tend to be lower for the stated 
preference studies relative to other methods, with the exception of the SARS study. The ratios 
also appear to be sensitive to the magnitude of risk reduction; the use of smaller hypothetical risk 
reductions typically result in larger VSL estimates within a given study.  The only known stated 
preference study that examined parents’ willingness to pay to reduce their children’s risks of 
death is from the United States (Dickie and Gerking 2003; Dickie and Gerking 2006).42 However, 
this work examines latent mortality risk. Thus, estimates are not comparable to other results in 
Table 1.  
                                                 
42Dickie and Gerking estimated parents’ WTP for protective sunscreen that would reduce morbidity and 
mortality risks of skin cancer for themselves and their children. They found that parents were willing to pay 
about twice as much to protect their children than to protect themselves. They could not develop a VSL 
estimate comparable to those above, because of the latent nature of mortality risk from skin cancer, 
especially for children. The results from this study are similar to two studies that examine parents’ WTP to 
avoid an episode of illness for their children. Liu et al. (2000) and Dickie and Messman (2004) both found 
that parents were willing to pay more for one of their children to avoid an episode of illness than for 
themselves.  
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Most estimates of parents’ WTP to reduce their children’s mortality risk come form the 
averting behavior literature. These studies attempted to estimate parents’ willingness to purchase 
of products that reduce their children’s risk of death. Blomquist (2004) summarized averting 
behavior VSL estimates for the US market. The VSL-to-annual-income ratios for these studies 
were generally lower than the hedonic wage estimates summarized in Viscusi and Aldy (2003). 
However, the ratios from studies that accounted for the disutility of time spent using safety 
equipment or that made adjustments for perceived versus actual risk (e.g., (Blomquist, Miller, and 
Levy 1996; Mount et al. 2001)) approach hedonic wage estimates. Although definitive 
conclusions cannot be drawn from these few studies, it appears that VSL estimates for children 
are similar in magnitude to those for adults. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any studies 
performed in less developed countries. 
 
2. Study Site and Research Methods 
2.1  Study area and mortality statistics 
Centered on the town of Matlab, the study area lies some 55 km southwest of Dhaka and 
has a population of approximately 224,000 ((ICDDRB) 2005). The International Centre for 
Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) operates a hospital in Matlab town whose 
services include free treatment to anyone with diarrhea. ICDDR,B also provides basic health 
services to approximately 111,000 people in Matlab town and 67 outlying villages. Once a 
month, ICDDR,B’s Health and Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS) gathers information 
from each person in the ICDDR,B service area as well as from an additional 113,000 people in 75 
other nearby villages who receive basic health care services from government facilities. 
ICDDR,B has collected this information for more than 35 years. Over the years, a number of 
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health intervention studies have been conducted in both the ICDDR,B and government service 
areas.43  
The HDSS data includes annual mortality rates for a number of causes by age group, as 
summarized in Table 2 (ICDDRB 2002, 2003, 2004). The most common causes of death differ by 
age group. For children less than 1 year of age, respiratory disease is the most likely cause of 
death; next most common are diarrhea and nutritional deficiency. For children age 1 to 4, 
drowning is the most likely cause of death; next are diarrhea and respiratory disease. Mortality 
rates drop significantly for children age 5 to 9 years relative to younger children. Mortality rates 
for children age 10 to 19 drop again by half relative to children age 5 to 9 and are six times less 
than among children age 1 to 4 years. In comparison to the United States, mortality rates in the 
Matlab area are about 6.5 times greater for children less than one year of age, about 14 times 
greater for children age 1 to 4 years and about 5 times greater for children age 5 to 14 years 
((NCHS) 2005). The mortality rates for older children and young adults are similar for the two 
countries. 
(Table 2 here) 
 
2.2 Field work and data collection 
2.2.1 Sampling procedure 
Survey respondents were chosen randomly from the HDSS surveillance database via a 
two-stage cluster sample without replacement. The first stage selected a total of 3,000 
households, each with at least one child less than 18 years of age. Two-thirds of these households 
were located in the government service area, and one-third in the ICDDR,B service area. The 
sample list was subdivided into clusters of 22 to 28 households located in small areas ranging 
about 1 km2 to 4 km2 depending on population density. In the second stage we randomly selected 
                                                 
43From 1963 through 1996, ICDDR,B conducted 30 to 35 studies in the government service area and 55 to 
65 studies in its own ICDDR,B service area. Many of these studies included the free provision of products 
aimed at improving the health of participants.  
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clusters of households and assigned one each to enumerators. Enumerators were instructed to 
allot half their interviews to males and to restrict interviews to the primary caretaker of the 
children in the household, typically one of the parents.44 The second stage sampling was 
implemented twice to coincide with staging of the interviews. In total, 591 households granted 
interviews and only two households refused. Another 160 households were dropped because the 
selected male parents lived and worked outside the village and were not available.  
 
2.3 Survey instrument: overview  
The survey instrument included two sets of questions designed to accomplish two 
separate research objectives. One set of questions investigated the value of a new-generation 
cholera vaccine, as reported in Islam et al. (2008). The other set assessed the respondent’s 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a hypothetical nutritional supplement that would reduce the 
mortality risk of the household’s youngest child. Throughout the survey, the respondent was 
asked questions to test comprehension of what was being said and to maintain interest in the 
interview.45  
The survey instrument had seven sections of questions. The first section recorded 
demographic information about the respondent and members of the household. The second, third 
and fourth sections dealt with perceptions of cholera and with the vaccine valuation scenario as 
discussed in more detail by Islam et al. (2008). After receiving information about cholera and 
vaccines (50% effective for 3 years), respondents were asked if they would purchase vaccines for 
themselves and for their family members at a single price (preassigned to each respondent from 
an array of six). The interview then proceeded to the hypothetical nutritional supplement CV 
                                                 
44Two respondents were the grandparents of children.  
45We used two iterations of 60 pretest interviews to help us to adapt our survey to local conditions in the 
Matlab area and to set an appropriate range of prices. We employed 20 local enumerators to conduct the 
interviews. They received two weeks of training according to the guidelines recommended in Whittington’s 
recent methodological review of CV practices in developing countries (2002).  
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scenario, our focus here (detailed below).46  The sixth section included socioeconomic questions 
about education, income, housing, assets, and disease-averting behaviors. The seventh section 
recorded the enumerator’s assessment of the quality of the interview. 
 
2.4 The survey instrument: mortality risk instruction and nutritional supplement scenario 
The fifth section of the questionnaire informed respondents about children’s risk of death, 
presented a hypothetical nutritional supplement that would reduce the risk, and elicited 
respondents’ willingness to pay for such a supplement in terms of its efficacy (two levels) and 
price (from five possible sets of paired amounts). Although the primary causes and numerical 
risks of death are different for children younger than 5 years compared to older children (Table 
2), we used the same CV nutritional supplement scenario for all ages of children because of the 
length and complexity of the survey instrument, the distances traveled by interviewers to 
respondents’ households, and other limitations of working in rural areas. For respondents with 
more than one child less than 18 years, the questions always referred to the youngest child. 
Younger children were the focus because they are often targeted for vaccination and public health 
campaigns. 
The entire CV nutritional supplement scenario is available from the authors. The first 
objective of this section was for respondents to consider all possible risks of death for children 
and the relative likelihood of each. Following Corso et al. (2001), we presented a scale that 
showed pictures of a number of different causes of death such that the most common causes 
appeared at the top of the scale and the least common at the bottom (Figure A-1 of the survey). 
Next, using techniques similar to Mahmud (2005), the enumerator instructed the respondent about 
probability using coin flips and die rolls as examples.  
                                                 
46In the survey interviews, the set of cholera vaccine questions was always presented prior to the nutritional 
supplement scenario. Thus it is possible that the vaccine valuation scenario affected respondents’ answers 
to the mortality risk reduction scenario.  
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Next, the enumerator introduced the notion of average risk of death for children in the 
Matlab area. The respondent was asked to imagine a large village in the Matlab area that had 
1,000 children, then was told that about 5 children out of 1,000 would be expected to die from 
disease in the next 5 years (Figure A-2 of the survey). (This estimate was lower than the actual 
risk for children less than 5 years old and higher than the risk for older children.) The enumerator 
further explained that the risks of death from drowning and other accidents were not included in 
this representation. To calculate perceived risk of death from disease, the enumerator asked the 
respondent to estimate how many children lived in his or her own village and how many of those 
children the respondent thought might die from disease in the next 5 years. The enumerator 
proceeded to relate the risk of death for children in the village to the risk of death for the 
respondent’s own child and told the respondent to assume that all children in the village had the 
same risk. To demonstrate that the likelihood of the child’s dying from disease was much smaller 
than the chances of rolling a die or flipping a coin, the enumerator placed a grid showing 5 red 
squares in 1,000 (Figure A-3 in the survey) next to similar 1,000 square grids introduced for coin 
flips and die rolls.  
Next the enumerator introduced the hypothetical nutritional supplement that would 
reduce the child’s risk of death. Each respondent received a randomly assigned scenario such that 
the supplement reduced the child’s risk of death from disease from 5 in 1,000 to either (a) 2 in 
1,000 or (b) 4 in 1,000 over 5 years.47 These figures represent (a) a 60% reduction and (b) a 20% 
reduction in the child’s risk of death. Respondents were shown another figure (Figure A-4 in the 
survey) to visualize how the supplement would decrease the already small baseline risk for their 
child. We chose to use large risk reductions in our scenarios to improve respondent 
comprehension and because large changes in risk generate conservative VSL estimates. Most 
                                                 
47Although we realized the challenge of explaining the notion of mathematical reduction in risk to our 
respondents, we hoped that our visual presentations would clearly show that the baseline risk of death was 
quite small and that the hypothetical nutritional supplement would reduce that small risk of death 
significantly. 
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other VSL studies use smaller risk reductions relative to baseline.48 The magnitude of risk 
reduction was post-corrected to an age-specific risk reduction prior to analysis. This was 
accomplished by multiplying the percentage change in risk by the baseline risk specific to a 
particular age group. Before proceeding to the valuation questions, respondents received a short 
“cheap talk” script to remind them of budget constraints and to dissuade them from trying to 
please enumerators. These reminders have decreased yea-saying in other studies (Cummings and 
Taylor 1999). 
We chose a monthly payment mechanism because of Matlab’s low average income and 
because many respondents were farmers and did not have large amounts of cash on hand. Thus, 
the enumerator explained that the parent would need to continue buying the supplement every 
month to maintain protection for the child. Respondents were not required to commit to a stream 
of payments. They could choose to stop purchasing the supplement at any time. Each respondent 
was asked if they would purchase the hypothetical supplement at a monthly price that was 
randomly assigned from an array of five: US$0.15, $0.30, $0.75, $1.50, and $7.50. Next, the 
respondent was asked if they would purchase at a specified follow-up price, which was either 
higher or lower, depending upon whether the respondent agreed to the initial price.49  
Before the interviews began, respondents were divided into two groups for the cholera 
vaccine scenario. NTTT (no time to think) respondents received the entire questionnaire in one 
sitting. TTT (time to think) respondents answered the first half of the survey, then were given 
overnight to consider and discuss the prospective “purchase” of the hypothetical vaccine; an 
interviewer returned the next day to finish the survey. Because the VSL section was always 
presented after the vaccine scenario, it always occurred in a single session—either in the single-
day NTTT interview, or in the return-visit portion of the TTT interview. Several recent studies 
                                                 
48Mahmud (2005) also used a very large mortality risk reduction for Bangladeshi adults.  
49Equivalent prices in Bangladeshi taka (Tk) are Tk 10, 25, 50, 75, 300, 600, where 1 US dollar = Tk 67.2 
in August 2005. These prices were not adjusted for purchasing power parity.  
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have shown that TTT yields lower average WTP results (Whittington et al. 1992; Lauria et al. 
1999; Cook et al. 2006). Although TTT considerations were not directly applied to the nutritional 
supplement purchase decision, TTT would have allowed respondents to carefully consider their 
budget constraints prior to hearing the supplement scenario.  
  
2.5 Modeling strategy 
Theoretical approaches for modeling parents’ willingness to pay to reduce mortality risk 
for children turn on whether parents value mortality risk reductions for children due to altruistic 
intentions, or paternalistic intentions. As Jones-Lee (1991; 1992) explains, a purely altruistic 
concern would optimally result in a direct wealth transfer from giver(s) to receiver(s), who could 
then freely choose to purchase an optimal level of risk reduction without further involvement of 
the giver. A purely paternalistic approach assumes that the giver only values mortality risk 
reduction for the receiver, being indifferent to the preferences of the receiver. Of course parents’ 
regards for children are somewhere between pure altruism and pure paternalism. Parents are 
concerned about a variety of aspects of their children’s well-being besides their mortality risk. 
However, parents’ interests in reducing their children’s mortality risk is likely to be greater than 
that of the children themselves, owing to children’s lack of experience with causes and risks of 
death (Jones-Lee 1991; 1992; Cropper and Sussman 1988).50  
 For our analysis, we simplified Jones-Lee’s unitary decision maker approach (1992) to 
modeling familial WTP for a public good that reduced mortality risk for all family members 
simultaneously (as well as for the public at large). In our model the household decision maker 
decides whether to purchase a private good that would reduce the mortality risk only for one 
member of the family. Unlike Jones-Lee’s model, our hypothetical nutritional supplement was a 
                                                 
50An additional complication is introduced when comparing a mother’s and a father’s separate valuations 
for a mortality risk reduction for one of their children. Some authors (e.g., Mount et al. 2001) have 
developed game theoretic constructs to explore how parents make joint decisions. Others (e.g., Cropper et 
al. 2004; Dickie and Gerking 2003) use a simpler unitary household model where a single decision-maker 
optimally allocates resources among family members. 
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private good that would only affect the survival probability of the family member that used it, 
(i.e. the youngest child). We assume that the decision maker maximizes the household utility 
function, which includes the family’s consumption of a numeraire good w, the probability of 
death for each of n family members prior to the next period (πi), and a vector of socioeconomic 
characteristics of each family, X. The representative utility function is represented as  
 ),, . . . ,,,( 21 XwuU nπππ= . (1) 
We assume that the utility function is increasing in w and decreasing for each πi, and that 
the marginal willingness to trade off a decrease in current consumption, w, for a decrease in πi, 
can be obtained by simple differentiation. The marginal rate of substitution between the 
numeraire good and a one-month risk reduction for one member can be considered as the VSL. 
iii wwUUVSL ππ ∂∂=∂∂∂∂= /)/(/)/( . (2) 
 This calculation assumes that VSL is constant regardless of the magnitude of mortality 
risk reduction. Given the large mortality risk reductions (20% or 60% of total health-related 
mortality risk) specified in our VSL scenario, our results may be limited by this assumption. 
Our econometric model is based on a stochastic utility function v(h,y;X) + εh, with h = 1 
if the respondent wanted to purchase the supplement and h = 0 if not. The other components are 
household income y and a vector of socioeconomic variables X expected to influence preferences. 
The stochastic term εh is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. Similar to other 
studies (Alberini 1995; Alberini, Boyle, and Welsh 2003), we found that answers to the follow-up 
price question in our survey were influenced by presentation of the initial price, and suffered from 
starting point bias issues.51 As a result, we only used the first price to model the decision to 
purchase. The probability that an offer was accepted at price Ai is 
                                                 
51A bivariate normal model was used to jointly model the responses to the first and second prices. The 
coefficients estimates for the two questions were statistically different at the 1% level. We also estimated 
interval models based on normal, lognormal, and Weibull distributions. The Weibull distribution best fit 
the data and provided average WTP estimates that were very similar to those from the probit models. 
(Median WTP estimates from the interval model were smaller.)  
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We used the probit model (Haab and McConnell 2002) to evaluate equation 4 such that εi 
was assumed to be independent and identically distributed following a normal distribution with 
mean zero and variance σ2 ( ),0(~ 2σε Ni ). The parameter estimates from the probit regression 
can be used to calculate expected WTP according to 
)//()/(),E(
^^
σβσββ priXWTP = , (4) 
where 
^
β r is the coefficient estimate for the magnitude of risk reduction and p
^
β
 is the coefficient 
for price.   
 As discussed in Islam et al. (2008), household demand for cholera vaccines was modeled 
with negative binomial count models. Separate models and WTP estimates were developed for 
children age 1 to 4 years, children age 5 to 18 years, and adults.  
 
3. Results 
Generally, respondents seemed to understand the nutritional supplement CV scenario and 
provided reasoned answers. Only 13 of the 591 respondents rejected our description of the 
nutritional supplement as a vehicle for reducing mortality risk. These respondents already 
received nutrition supplements from the government or thought that their children were well fed. 
A few did not believe that the supplement could reduce mortality risk in children. These 
respondents were dropped from further analysis. We also excluded households in which the 
youngest child was less than one year old. We were unsure how parents would interpret the 
scenario for children that were breastfed. The baseline risk of death also decreases considerably 
during the child’s first year; thus the average risk presented to parents would have been much 
different than the actual risk faced by their infants. In addition, the cholera vaccine is not 
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considered safe for children less than one year, and the comparison to the cholera vaccine WTP 
would be compromised. After excluding households with children less one year old, the final 
sample size was 532 households.  
 
3.1 Sample sociodemographic characteristics 
The sociodemographic characteristics of the sample households are summarized in Table 
3. Slightly over one-third of respondents (37%) were from the ICDDR,B service area, and about 
half were male. Average household size was about 5.8 persons, including on average 0.1 infants 
less than one year old, 0.7 young children (1 to 5 years), and 1.7 school-age children (6 to17 
years). Average respondent age was about 40 years and the youngest child was 7 years old; about 
45% of the children were less than 5 years of age. The gender split for the youngest child was 
almost even, with slightly more males than females.  On average, respondents had about 3.6 years 
of education; about 35% of the sample reported that they had never attended school. Average 
monthly household income was about US$75 and median income was US$60.52 The average risk 
reduction presented to respondents was about 4.1 x 10-4 per year. 
(Table 3 here) 
 
3.2 Respondents’ understanding of nutritional supplement CV scenario 
Respondents generally seemed to understand that some causes of death were more likely 
than others. When asked to identify the most common cause of death for children in their village, 
about 98% pointed to one of the four highest causes listed in the HDSS surveillance report 
(respiratory disease, drowning, diarrheal disease, or malnutrition). A majority of respondents 
(72%) correctly chose lightning strikes as the least common cause presented in the figure. When 
                                                 
52The following variables are significantly correlated at the 5% level. Older children are correlated with 
older respondents and lower education levels. Older respondents are correlated with lower education, lower 
income, being male, and larger households. Income is highly correlated with education. Male respondents 
have lower income. Households with more school-age children have lower income per capita. Respondents 
with more education and younger children are more likely to treat their water. 
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respondents were asked to place risk of death from cholera within the scale of other causes, more 
than half (51%) believed that risk of death from cholera was most similar in magnitude to risk of 
death from one of the two most frequent causes (respiratory disease or drowning). However, the 
actual risk of death from cholera is much smaller than that; we assumed that 15% of all diarrheal 
deaths are due to cholera.53 This apparent overestimation of the risk of death from cholera may 
have resulted in overstated WTP for cholera vaccines.  
Our respondents provided estimates of the number of children that lived in their village 
(mean 2,300, SD 22,000) and then estimated how many might die from disease in the next 5 years 
(mean 62, SD 500). Many respondents (22%) were unable to answer one or both of the questions, 
despite encouragement to venture a “best guess”. The median estimated risk of death based on 
these answers was 10 in 1,000, which is about 25% higher than the actual risk of death from 
disease for children age 1 to 4 years and about 400% higher than the risk of death from disease 
for older children (See Table 2).54 We discovered than another 40% of the respondents reported 
that there were 500 or less children in their village. These small estimates of the child population 
would limit the resolution in respondents’ estimates because the expected number of children that 
would die was always an integer.  
Most respondents correctly answered questions designed to test comprehension of our 
explanations of probability and risk of death. For a series of three questions regarding whether the 
supplement was effective for reducing the risk of death from respiratory disease (yes) and from 
drowning (no) and the risk reduction effected by the supplement (either 1 or 3 in 1,000 over 5 
years depending on the scenario); 65% answered all three correctly on the first try, and a total of 
                                                 
53This is based on the percentage of diarrhea patients with cholera-positive stool samples treated at the 
Matlab hospital. The actual relative risk of death from cholera varies by village, but should fall near the 
middle of the scale. 
 
54Note that all answers were made in whole numbers and that some respondents reported a small number of 
children in the village. Thus, these estimates are somewhat imprecise. 
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87% had succeeded after a second try. These findings suggest that respondents were well 
instructed.55  
 
3.3 Willingness to pay for a nutritional supplement 
3.3.1 Raw data 
The raw data for the proportion of respondents who were willing to “purchase” the 
hypothetical supplement for the household’s youngest child at the initial preassigned price are 
shown in Table 4. The variation in baseline risk of death from disease varied from 0.4 deaths per 
1,000 children older than 10 years to 2.1 deaths per children between 1 and 3 years of age. The 
effective risk reduction is the baseline risk for that age group multiplied by the percentage risk 
reduction that was randomly assigned. Generally, the willingness to purchase is greater for lower 
prices and for larger effective risk reductions. With eight different effective risk reduction values, 
the sample size for each risk reduction-price cell is very small. As a result, there would appear to 
be some kinks in the demand curve; however, these disappear when results are averaged over 
larger sample sizes. 
(Table 4 here) 
It is easier to visualize trends by combining these data into large risk reduction and small 
risk reduction subgroups. Figure 1 shows the expected fraction of the population that would 
purchase the hypothetical supplement as a function of price for these two subgroups. The first 
subgroup consists of respondents for which the risk reduction was greater than 4 x 10-4 and the 
second group consists of respondents with an effective risk reduction smaller than that. This 
figure shows that there distribution of WTP for the large risk reduction may have a large tail, and 
that a small fraction of the population has a very WTP for mortality risk reduction. The tail 
                                                 
55Communication of low probability risk is problematic in most settings, even in industrialized countries. 
Alberini et al. (2004a) report that 16% of respondents from the United States and 7% from Canada stated 
they poorly understood the probability description. Alberini et al. (2004b) report that 11% to 22% of 
respondents incorrectly answered a question designed to test understanding. 
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appears to be much smaller for the lower effective risk reduction. Although stated demand is 
greater for the group that received the larger risk reduction, the difference in demand is smaller 
than would be expected if WTP were linearly correlated with risk reduction magnitude.  
(Figure 1 here) 
Nonparametric Turnbull lower-bound estimators (Haab and McConnell 2002), can be 
calculated based on the raw demand reported in Table 4. The average WTP per month varied 
between US$0.6 and US$3, and generally decreased as the effective risk reduction decreased. It 
should be noted that these estimates are very sensitive to uptake at the highest price. Given the 
small sample sizes associated with each cell, a single affirmative response to the highest price 
will have a large impact on the Turnbull estimator. These Turnbull estimates can also be used to 
calculate VSL for each subgroup by dividing the average monthly WTP by the annual risk 
reduction (after adjusting units appropriately). Though WTP estimates are generally greater for 
larger risk reductions, VSL estimates are greater for the smaller risk reduction scenarios. This 
suggests that WTP was not linearly related to size of risk reduction. Although these estimates 
serve as a starting point for analysis, their accuracy is limited by the small sample sizes used per 
cell. 
Next, we examine the most common reasons that respondents gave for not purchasing the 
supplement at either the initial or the follow-up price. These reasons included (1) no money 
available to make the purchase (61%) and (2) price is too expensive (30%). The most common 
reasons that respondents gave for purchasing the supplement included (1) supplement is good for 
prevention of death (91%) and (2) believe that child has a risk of death (4%). These results 
suggest that respondents generally understood the scenario and gave thoughtful answers. 
 
3.3.2 Multivariate analysis 
Coefficient estimates and cluster corrected standard errors from three multivariate probit 
models are shown in Table 5. Table 6 shows the marginal changes in the probability of purchase 
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for a 1-unit change in each variable after averaging over the sample. Because child age is directly 
correlated with respondent age (i.e. older respondents have older children), respondent age was 
strongly correlated with the estimated risk reduction and omitted from Model 1 to avoid 
endogeneity problems. The first model omits the potentially endogenous variable for water 
treatment. The second and third models include variables for water treatment and respondent age, 
and allow for comparison between continuous and dummy variables for income and respondent 
age.  
Consistent with the raw data results, the analysis revealed that price was strongly 
correlated with the decision to purchase the supplement. As shown in Table 6, the probability of 
purchase decreased by about 5% for a US$0.50 increase in price. The effective risk reduction was 
also significantly correlated with the decision to purchase the supplement. The marginal 
probability of purchase would increase by about 2% if the risk reduction were to be increased by 
1/10,000 per year. When respondent age is added to the model, the coefficient for effective risk 
reduction becomes smaller but remains significant. The coefficient for respondent age was of 
marginal significance in Models 2 and 3. This suggests that older parents would be less likely to 
purchase the supplement; however, this finding may be an artifact of the collinearity between 
respondent age and effective risk reduction. The predicted marginal decrease in probability is 
about 0.5% per additional year of respondent age or about 10% if all respondents were older than 
55 years. 
(Tables 5 and 6 here) 
The coefficients for male respondents were consistently positive and the average 
marginal effect (4-7%) was quite large; however, these findings were not significant at the 10% 
level. There was no difference in demand among respondents living inside versus outside the 
ICDDR,B service area. All models showed that respondents with more education and higher 
income were significantly more likely to purchase the supplement. Average marginal probability 
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of purchase increased by about 10% for a one-category increase in education compared to 5% 
increase for a one-income-quartile increase.56  
Respondents who were given time to think (TTT) overnight about the hypothetical 
cholera vaccine had significantly lower stated WTP for the hypothetical nutritional supplement, 
possibly because they had more time to consider budgetary constraints prior to approaching the 
supplement section of the interview. Giving respondents TTT produced a 16% average marginal 
decrease in the probability of agreeing to purchase the hypothetical supplement. The coefficient 
estimate for male children was positive for all three models, but of borderline significance. The 
average marginal increase in probability of purchase would be about 7% if the entire sample had 
male children. 
Respondents’ estimates of baseline risk of death for children in their villages were not 
included in the multivariate analysis because so many respondents were unable to provide 
estimates. In addition, we learned that respondent estimates of mortality risk were compromised 
by the way the question was presented as discussed in Section 3.2. As a result, we decided to 
focus exclusively on the actual risk reductions faced by children. 
Average willingness to pay for a nutritional supplement was estimated from the 
parameter estimates for the first probit model. The population average WTP for the supplement 
was about US$1.50 per month for all three models. This estimate is within the range of Turnbull 
estimates presented in Table 4. The probit estimate is an average across all age groups and 
effective risk reduction scenarios. Thus, the probit estimate is not directly comparable to any of 
the Turnbull estimates presented in Table, but should fall within the range of estimates.  
Approximate VSL estimates can be calculated by dividing the coefficient for risk 
reduction by the price coefficient. Although the average WTP per month was constant across 
                                                 
56For marginal effects, we had to estimate a model that combined dummy categorical variables into a single 
ordered categorical variable for income quartiles and education categories.  
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models, VSL estimates varied from US$16,000 to US$22,000 because the coefficient for risk 
reduction varied across the model specifications depending on whether respondent age was 
included and how respondent age was specified.  
These VSL estimates represent the average tradeoff between mortality risk reduction and 
price in the demand equation. As demonstrated in Table 4, it is likely that WTP for a nutritional 
supplement would not be a linearly function of the magnitude of risk reduction. Rather, VSL 
estimates depend on the magnitude of risk reduction presented. We believe this is generally the 
case for this population. Thus, parents appear to be more willing to purchase the supplement for 
younger children that face greater baseline risks of death. However, they are still willing to 
purchase the product for older children with much smaller risks of death as long as the price is 
reasonable.  
 
3.4 Comparison to implicit VSL from the cholera vaccine willingness to pay 
We were also able to compare our nutritional supplement VSL results with implicit VSL 
estimates developed from the cholera vaccine scenario. As reported in Islam et al. (2008), 
analysis of negative binomial household demand models revealed that male respondents, high-
income respondents, and respondents residing in the government service area had the highest 
demand for cholera vaccines. Results also showed that giving respondents time to think about the 
purchasing decision reduced demand considerably. Average WTP per vaccine was highest for 
young children (US$2.40 to $3.80), followed by school-age children (US$1.20 to $2.30), then 
adults (US$1.05 to $1.60). 
Because the ICDDR,B diarrhea hospital provides free treatment for cholera patients, the 
patients’ ex ante private costs of illness (COI) for cholera are very low. From a coinciding study 
of cholera disease burden we estimated that annual incidences of cholera were about 1.3 cases per 
1,000 children less than 5 years old and about 0.7 cases per 1,000 children age 5 to 17 years. 
Private COI per case was about US$7 for children less than 17 years old. These correspond to 
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annual ex ante private cholera COI estimates of US$0.010 for children less than 5 years old and 
US$0.004 for children age 5 to 17 years. Thus, ex ante private COI estimates are much smaller 
than estimated average WTP per vaccine. We postulate that stated WTP for cholera vaccines is 
primarily due to the avoided risk of death and avoided risk of pain and suffering.57 Given our 
assumption that cholera caused 15% of the deaths from diarrhea reported in Table 2, the 
estimated mortality risk reduction from a 50% effective 3-year cholera vaccine would be about 
1.0 x 10-4 for children age 1 to 4 years and 8.4 x 10-6 for older children. The resulting implicit 
VSL estimates were about US$28,000 to $37,000 for younger children and US$170,000 to 
$230,000 for older children.  
The implicit VSL for younger children is quite similar to the estimate for the nutritional 
supplement. This might seem surprising, as the number of deaths due to cholera comprise a 
relatively small fraction of the total number of child deaths in the Matlab area. However, the 
valuation scenario for the cholera vaccine required an up-front payment of the entire cost of the 
vaccine, which was then effective for 3 years. As a result, the total mortality risk reduction from a 
one-month supply of the nutritional supplement is similar to the protection provided by the 
cholera vaccine over a 3 year period (i.e. the risk of death from cholera was about 1/36 of the 
total risk of death from disease for young children). The implicit cholera VSL estimate for older 
children was much larger than that for the nutritional supplement. When considering the vaccine 
purchase decision for older children, parents might have overestimated the risk of death. Parents 
may also have been concerned about mitigating the potential pain and suffering that their older 
children might endure as a result of becoming ill. Similar to the nutritional supplement results, we 
find that parents are less willing to purchase vaccines for older children (i.e. WTP is lower); 
however, parents would still purchase the vaccine at a reasonable price for their older children. 
                                                 
57
 One of the questions in the survey asked respondents to identify the most important benefit of cholera 
vaccine. Most respondents believed that the most important benefit of a cholera vaccine was to prevent 
either pain and suffering or risk of death (24%). Very few (8%) cited avoided treatment costs or lost wages 
as the primary benefit. 
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After adjusting for the difference in mortality risk, the VSL estimate for older children would 
appear to be larger, but the estimate should be considered independently from the magnitude of 
risk reduction.   
 
4. Conclusions 
The results of this study are unique in three aspects: (1) they provide an estimate of VSL 
from a very low-income rural area in a developing country; (2) they provide one of the first 
estimates of parental WTP for reducing risk of death for a child (the youngest in the household), 
and (3) they provide a comparison of the value of a mortality risk reduction from a generic risk-
reduction product (a hypothetical nutritional supplement) with the value of mortality risk 
reduction from a specific intervention (a hypothetical cholera vaccine). Our results show that 
parents are willing to spend about US$1 to US$2 per month, which was 1% to 3% of average 
monthly income (US$75). These results correspond to VSL estimates of about US$10,000 to 
US$25,000 for children age one to seventeen years. We would generally expect WTP to be 
greater for younger children, but VSL estimates to be larger for older children because the 
difference in WTP is not large enough to offset the much smaller baseline mortality risk faced by 
older children. This finding appears to be consistent across the nutritional supplement and cholera 
vaccine scenarios and is also consistent with the findings of other studies that calculate VSL 
based on variable risk levels (see Table 1).  
We do not claim that respondents had full comprehension of the mathematical risk of 
death discussed in our scenario. Given the widespread lack of education among our respondents, 
we did not think it was possible to provide in-depth instruction in probability theory in the context 
of a short, in-person interview. Rather, we wanted our nutritional supplement scenario to (1) 
encourage respondents to consider the different causes of death for children that are common in 
their immediate neighborhoods, (2) convey that children’s baseline risk of death was small 
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relative to other random events (such as coin flips or die rolls) and (3) present a hypothetical 
nutritional supplement that would reduce the already small risk significantly.  
The baseline risk of death for children varied by the age of the youngest child, but 
logistical concerns prevented our interviewers from presenting respondents with baseline 
mortality risks specific to the child of interest. Thus, all respondents received the same 
description with a baseline risk that was averaged across age groups. The magnitude of effective 
risk reduction was then post-corrected for the model estimation. This approach was not ideal and 
we concede that we could have achieved better results if the baseline risk presented to 
respondents varied with the age of the youngest child.  
Despite this limitation, we believe that our VSL estimates are useful for three reasons. 
First, our estimates were based a large decrease in baseline risk. This makes it less likely that they 
are overstated than if we had used small percentage reductions. Unless parents grossly 
overestimated their children’s risk of death, our results should be fairly accurate as long as 
parents understood the visual depiction of the percentage risk reduction.  
Second, our study population was unique in a number of aspects. We believe that because 
our study involved adults accustomed to participating in local public health surveys (ICDDR,B’s 
systematic efforts over several decades), respondents would be less likely to engage in yea-saying 
to please our interviewers. This impression was reinforced by highly significant income, 
education, and price effects on demand, which imply that respondents considered their budget 
constraints carefully. In addition, we had very good data on the numerical risk of death for 
children in the community and the primary causes of death. 
Third, the VSL estimates for the hypothetical nutritional supplement were similar to 
implicit VSL estimates for a WTP study of cholera vaccines involving the same population in a 
separate component of the survey. We can also calculate the ratio of our VSL estimates to 
respondent income for comparison with the studies presented in Table 1. Our ratio varies from 10 
to 30. This range is smaller than those calculated via hedonic wage studies performed in India 
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(Simon et al. 1999; Shanmugam 2000, 2001), but similar to findings from a stated preference 
study performed in India (Bhattacharya et al. 2007). Overall, the ratios fall in the lower range of 
studies presented in Table 1. 
In conclusion, as scientists aim to increase the number of vaccines and other health 
interventions available for children in developing countries, public health providers with limited 
budgets will be forced to make difficult decisions regarding the needs of their population. The 
results present in this paper should help them assess the tradeoffs between the cost and mortality 
risk reductions of different interventions. It also demonstrates that parents are willing to devote a 
portion of their limited incomes to interventions that improve their children’s health. Thus, the 
implementation of private user fees may help to increase the ability of public health systems to 
provide new interventions and to broaden the intervention choice sets of households.  
  
Table 1. Summary of relevant literature for VSL hedonic wage and stated preference studies 
Researcher Location, date, and data source 
 
Average risk      
(10-5) 
Average annual  
wage (US$) 
VSL estimate 
 (US$) 
VSL to annual 
wage ratio ($/$) 
Hedonic Wage Studies      
Viscusi and Aldy 2003 US subsample, 2000a 0.1 – 2 30,000 7 million 230 
Summary of studiesa     
Liu et al. 1997 Taiwan, 1982-1986 2.25 - 3.82 4,100 - 5,100 135,000 - 600,000 33 - 130 
 Taiwan Labor Force Survey     
Simon et al. 1999 India, 1985-1991 1.5 1,150 150,000 - 360,000 130 - 310 
 Occupational Wage Survey and 
Annual Survey of Industry 
    
Shanmugam 2000 Madras, India, 1987-1990 1.0 600 0.75 - 1 million 1,250 - 1,700 
 Survey of blue-collar workers     
Shanmugam 2001 Madras, India ,1987-1990 1.0 600 3 million 5,000 
 Survey of blue-collar workers     
Averting Behavior Studies      
Blomquist 2004 US subsample, 2000 Not reported 30,000 c 1.7 - 7 million 60 - 240 
 Summary of studies b     
Mount et al. 2001 US hedonic study of 1997 vehicle  7 - 50d 34,000 3.4 - 6.4 million 100 - 190 
 fatality rates and costs (adults)     
Mount et al. 2001 US hedonic study of 1997 vehicle  7 - 50d 34,000 2.6 - 7.7 million 75 - 230 
 fatality rates and costs (children)     
Blomquist et al. 1996 Adult car seat belt use  5 22,000 1.7 - 2.8 million 75 - 130 
 with time and disutility costs, 1983     
Blomquist et al. 1996 Child seat use (under 5 years of age)  10 22,000 2.3 - 3.7 million 100 - 160 
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Researcher Location, date, and data source 
 
Average risk      
(10-5) 
Average annual  
wage (US$) 
VSL estimate 
 (US$) 
VSL to annual 
wage ratio ($/$) 
 with time and disutility costs, 1983     
Carlin and Sandy 1991 US, 1985 IN survey of child car 10 23,000 c 430,000 - 550,000 19 - 24 
 seat use; crash safety data in WA     
Jenkins et al. 2001 US, 1997, aggregate bicycle helmet  0.55 37,000 c 2.0 - 4.0 million 54 - 108 
 price, use, and protection (adult)  (lower bound)   
Jenkins et al. 2001 US, 1997, aggregate bicycle helmet  0.4-0.6 37,000 c 1.1 - 2.7 million 30 - 70 
 price, use, and protection (children)  (lower bound)   
Stated Preference Studies      
      
Alberini et al. 2004a Canada, 1999 and US, 2000 1 47,000 - 53,000 0.9 - 1.5 million 19 - 28 
 General 5 47,000 - 53,000 3.7 - 4.8 million 79 - 90 
Alberini et al. 2004b UK, Italy, France, 2002 1 41,000 2.5 million 60 
 General 5 41,000 1.1 million 28 
Vassanadumrongdee and  Bangkok, 2003 0.3 9,000 1.4 - 1.5 million 150 - 170 
Matsuoka 2005 Traffic accidents and air pollution 0.6 9,000 0.9 million 100 
Bhattacharya, Alberini, and  Delhi, 2005  4 – 30 3,000 30,000 10 
Cropper 2007 Traffic accidents     
Hammitt and Liu 2004 Taiwan, 2001 0.2 - 0.8e 14,000 0.5 - 2.2 millione 36 - 160 
 Lung and liver cancer/ non-cancer     
Liu et al. 2005 Taiwan and Taipei, 2003 0.18 13,000 - 21,000 4.7 - 11 million 220 - 850 
 SARS 0.6 13,000 - 21,000 2.8 - 6 million 130 - 460 
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Researcher Location, date, and data source 
 
Average risk      
(10-5) 
Average annual  
wage (US$) 
VSL estimate 
 (US$) 
VSL to annual 
wage ratio ($/$) 
 
Mahmud 2009 
Bangladesh, 2003 7.5 - 45f 1,200 2,300 2 
 General 15 - 90f 1,200 1,300 1 
      
a Viscusi and Aldy compile a number of studies. The risk reduction, average wage and VSL are ranges shown after conversion to 2000 US$. 
b Blomquist compiles a number of studies. The risk reduction, average wage and VSL are ranges shown after conversion to 2000 US$ 
c Average household income is not reported in the study. The income reported in the table is taken from (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2004). 
d Risk of death is calculated based on the sum of risks from 1-car, 2-car, and multi-car crashes. The differences in risk are based on the average risk for 
different categories of vehicles. 
e Estimated VSL is calculated by average VSL for 2 in 100,000 and 8 in 100,000 risk reductions. Separate estimates for each magnitude of risk 
reduction are not available. Only median VSL values are reported 
f The risk reduction used was either 25% or 50% of the baseline risk by age group. Hence, different age groups received different magnitude 
reductions. Estimates based on subjective risk were also made, but I only include estimates for objective risk 
283
 
 284 
Table 2. Average annual number of deaths for children in Matlab area by cause (based on 
data from HDSS annual reports (ICDDR,B, 2002; ICDDR,B 2003; ICDDR,B, 2004) 
Age range <1 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 Total 
(Population) (5,764) (21,024) (24,985) (27,024) (23,944) (102,741) 
Disease related             
Respiratory 70 8.7 2.0 1.0 1.3 83 
Diarrhea 17 9.3 2.0 1.0 0 29 
Cancer 0.0 2.0 1.3 2.0 0.7 6.0 
Infectious 7.0 2.7 1.0 1.3 1.3 13 
Nutritional 12 4.3 1.3 1.0 0.3 19 
Gastro-intestinal 2.3 0.3 1.0 0.7 1.0 5.3 
Cardio-vascular 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.7 1.3 
Neonatal 130 0 0 0 0 130 
Avg. no. deaths due to 
disease 
245 34 14 11 9 314 
Rate of death  
(per 1,000 children per 
year)a 
43 1.6 0.57 0.41 0.39 3.1 
Accidents, Injuries 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Drowning 3.3 49 8.0 1.3 0.7 63 
Homicide/Suicide 1.0 1.0 0.3 1.0 3.0 6.0 
Other accident 2.3 1.3 2.0 2.3 1.3 9.3 
Avg. no. deaths due to 
accident/injurya 
17 58 16 8 9 108 
Rate of deatha  
(per 1,000 children per 
year) 
 2.9 2.8 0.6 0.31 0.38 1.1 
Other/Unknown 19.7  13.3  11.0  7.4  8.0  59  
Avg. no. of deaths (all 
causes)a 
260 92 30 19 18 420 
Rate of death (all causes)a 
(per 1,000 children per year) 
45 4.4 1.2 0.72 0.77 4.1 
 
a
  Deaths attributed to other/unknown were split evenly between disease and accident/injury. 
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Table 3.  Variable definition and descriptive statistics 
Variable name Description Mean (SD) 
 (N = 532) 
 
 
Respondent characteristics  
Male  = 1 if male,  = 0 if female 0.49 (0.50) 
Age Age (yrs), continuous 41 (9.8) 
Hindu  Religion = 1 if Hindu, 0 = else 0.06 (0.25) 
Education 1-5 years = 1 if respondent completed 1-5 years of school 0.36  (0.48) 
Education 5-10 years, 
vocational 
= 1 if respondent completed 5-10 years of 
school, vocational school, or madrassa 
0.18 (0.38) 
Education more than 10 
years 
= 1 if respondent completed university, 
postgraduate or professional course 
0.12 (0.32) 
Unable to read = 1 if respondent is not able to read a 
newspaper 
0.53 (0.50) 
Household characteristics  
Infants number of infants age <1 year, continuous 0.12 (0.34) 
Young children number of children age 1-5, continuous 0.7  (0.72) 
School-age children number of children 6-17, continuous 1.7   (1.1) 
Adults number of adults age 18-65, continuous 3.0  (1.5) 
Elderly adults number of elderly adults age >65, continuous 0.20 (0.43) 
Log income per capita Natural log of household income divided by 
number of household members, continuous 
6.6 (0.7) 
Age of youngest child Age (yrs), continuous 7.0 (4.6) 
Gender of youngest child =1 if male, = 0 if female 0.52 (0.50) 
Risk behavior, perceptions of disease, vaccination history  
Treat drinking water = 1 if household treats water for drinking; 0.15 (0.36) 
Estimated risk reduction 
(1/1,000 per year) 
= baseline risk (as a function of age) multiplied 
by the risk reduction presented to the 
respondent 
 
0.41 (0.36) 
Characteristics of research design  
Time to think = 1 if given time to think overnight, =0 else 0.47 (0.50) 
ICDDR,B Health service area; = 1 if ICDDR,B, = 0 if 
government 
0.37 (0.48) 
Initial supplement price referendum price (Bangladeshi Tk), continuous 104 (150) 
Follow-up price referendum price (Bangladeshi Tk), continuous 80 (160) 
   
 
  
Table 4. Raw demand data as a function of price and risk reduction and associated Turnbull VSL estimates 
Age group Baseline 
risk 
Percentage 
risk 
reduction 
Effective 
risk 
reduction 
(1/1,000 yr) 
Coverage 
Price = 
US$0.15 
Coverage 
Price = 
US$0.30 
Coverage 
Price = 
US$0.74 
Coverage 
Price = 
US$1.49 
Coverage 
Price = 
US$7.44 
Turnbull 
Avg. WTP 
per month 
VSL 
Age 1-2.9 2.1 20% 0.42 0.9 (n=9) 0.7 (n=17) 0.8 (n=16) 0.4 (n=21) 0.2 (n=6) US$2.0 US$58,000 
 2.1 60% 1.26 0.9 (n=10) 0.6 (n=22) 0.7 (n=13) 0.6 (n=16) 0.1 (n=8) US$1.5 US$15,000 
Age 3 -4.9 1.1 20% 0.22 1 (n=9) 0.6 (n=14) 0.4 (n=8) 0.6 (n=8) 0.1 (n=11) US$1.3 US$72,000 
 1.1 60% 0.66 0.9 (n=7) 0.7 (n=16) 0.4 (n=15) 0.4 (n=5) 0.4 (n=8) US$3.1 US$56,000 
Age 5 - 9.9 0.6 20% 0.12 0.6 (n=11) 0.8 (n=15) 0.5 (n=21) 0.3 (n=18) 0.1 (n=7) US$0.9 US$92,000 
 0.6 60% 0.36 0.8 (n=16) 0.7 (n=18) 0.6 (n=20) 0.2 (n=19) 0 (n=10) US$0.6 US$21,000 
Age > 10 0.4 20% 0.08 0.7 (n=15) 0.6 (n=18) 0.3 (n=20) 0.3 (n=16) 0 (n=7) US$0.6 US$83,000 
 0.4 60% 0.24 1 (n=10) 0.6 (n=9) 0.4 (n=18) 0.4 (n=22) 0 (n=9) US$0.7 US$36,000 
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Table 5. Multivariate regression results from the probit models 
Model  1 2 3 
T-statistic in parentheses 
   
Supplement price -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** 
 (-6.9) (-6.8) (-6.9) 
Male respondent 0.11 0.20 0.12 
 (0.75) (1.3) (0.76) 
Resident from ICDDR,B service area -0.036 -0.041 -0.04 
 (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.20) 
Received time to think for  -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.40*** 
Cholera vaccine experiment (-3.7) (-3.4) (-3.4) 
Respondent age  -0.011  
  (-1.5)  
Respondent older than 55 years   -0.25* 
   (-1.7) 
Risk reduction (annual*1000) 0.45** 0.32* 0.39** 
 (2.6) (1.9) (2.3) 
Education 1-5 yrs. 0.36** 0.35** 0.33** 
 (2.2) (2.1) (2.0) 
Education 6-10 yrs. 0.61*** 0.53** 0.60*** 
 (3.0) (2.5) (2.8) 
Education >10 yrs. 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.82*** 
 (3.0) (2.7) (2.9) 
Log income per capita 0.31*** 0.31***  
 (4.6) (4.4)  
HH income quartile 2   0.30 
   (1.6) 
HH income quartile 3   0.36*** 
   (2.8) 
HH income quartile 4   0.37** 
   (2.0) 
Youngest child is male 0.17 0.17 0.15 
 (1.6) (1.5) (1.4) 
Treats water  0.15 0.16 
  (0.65) (0.77) 
Hindu respondent -0.55* -0.58** -0.57** 
 (-1.8) (-2.0) (-2.0) 
Constant -2.1*** -1.6** -0.21 
 (-4.7) (-2.5) (-1.2) 
Log likelihood -296 -297 -297 
    
Average WTP per month US$1.50 US$1.50 US$1.50 
VSL estimate US$22,000 US$16,000 US$19,000 
    
 
    * indicates significance at the 10% level 
  ** at the 5% level 
*** at the 1% level 
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Table 5. Average marginal effects estimated from probit models dsfdsafdasfsdfsd 
Model  1 2 3 
    
Supplement price (increment $0.50) -0.048 (.0071) -0.049 (.0071) -0.0048 (0.0072) 
Male respondent (yes/no) 0.040 (0.059) 0.074 (0.059) 0.051 (0.059) 
Resident from ICDDR,B service 
area  (yes/no) 
-0.012 (0.081) -0.0014 (0.082) -0.0038 (0.082) 
Received time to think for 
cholera vaccine experiment  
(yes/no) 
-0.16 (0.043) -0.16 (0.046) -0.16 (0.046) 
Respondent age (increment 1 year)  -0.0047 
(0.0032) 
 
Respondent older than 55 years  
(yes/no) 
  -0.094 (0.058) 
Estimated risk reduction (1/10,000 
annually)  
0.018 (0.69) 0.0013 (0.068) 0.16 (0.068) 
Education (increment 1 education 
category) 
0.11 (0.035) 0.10 (0.035) 0.11 (0.037) 
Log income per capita (increment 1 
log unit) 
0.12 (0.027) 0.12 (0.028)  
HH (increment 1 income quartile)   0.053 (0.22) 
Youngest child is male  (yes/no) 0.066 (0.042) 0.069 (0.045) 0.061 (0.044) 
Hindu respondent -0.21 (0.10) -0.22 (0.10) -0.22 (0.10) 
Treats water  (yes/no)  0.058 (0.090) 0.063 (0.085) 
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Figure 1. Willingness to pay for hypothetical nutritional supplement 
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Appendix 4. The development of a marginal cost per DALY function that better 
incorporates herd protection and herd immunity into cost utility analysis 
 
**DRAFT April 28, 2009** 
**DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE** 
 
 
Introduction 
As more and more new vaccines and other health interventions are developed, public 
health practitioners and international donor agencies face increasingly difficult decisions for 
investing limited resources to improve health in less developed countries. Health economists 
commonly use cost utility analysis to compare health improvement benefits (as expressed in non-
monetary health utility units) and program costs of various interventions via a standardized 
methodology. Disability adjusted life years (DALYs) or quality adjusted life years (QALYs) are 
the two most common types of units used to quantify health improvements. The results of these 
analyses are commonly expressed as the cost per unit change in health utility (i.e. the cost per 
DALY/QALY saved).  
It is commonly known that many health interventions, especially vaccination programs, 
provide indirect protection effects (i.e. herd protection). For example, when a school-age child 
receives an influenza vaccine, the child is less like to become ill when exposed (e.g., to infected 
classmates at school). Since this child is protected by the vaccine, she is also less likely to expose 
her family or her uninfected classmates to the disease. Thus, the child’s vaccination indirectly 
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protects others from exposure to the disease. The aggregated effect of this reduction in exposure 
is herd protection. 
This herd protection effect leads to a non-constant relationship between coverage and 
DALYs saved. Thus, the average cost per DALY depends on the coverage rate achieved. 
Especially for non-infant vaccination campaigns, it would be more informative to report a 
functional relationship between average cost per DALY and coverage in place of the point 
estimates or ranges that are commonly reported. It is also useful to define a marginal cost per 
DALY relationship, which examines the rate of change in cost per DALY as a function of 
coverage. This marginal cost per DALY function should be useful in targeting efficient coverage 
rates for vaccination programs. In a developing country context where budgets are extremely 
limited, these marginal considerations may help program planners to target interventions more 
efficiently to stretch limited resources. This appendix examines how to estimate cost utility 
functions rather than cost utility values to better demonstrate the impacts of herd protection for 
vaccination programs. I present both average and marginal cost functions, based on empirical 
herd protection relationships for cholera and influenza vaccination programs.  
 
Background 
There are many example of cost utility studies available in the literature; however, there 
appears to be little consensus about how to account for herd protection. Many cost utility analyses 
have omitted herd immunity effects entirely (Beutels et al., 2002; Beutels et al., 2007; Cook et al., 
2008; Kim et al., 2009). Other analyses incorporate herd protection data from other sites for a 
pre-specified coverage rate (Armstrong et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2007; Lloyd et al., 2007; Jeuland 
et al., 2009). The pre-specified coverage rate usually represents universal coverage for a 
particular subgroup.58 Many vaccination analyses are undertaken for infant vaccination programs, 
                                                 
58Both the Jeuland et al. and Cook et al. analyses examine three scenarios in which different groups receive 
vaccinations: 1) young children less than 5 years of age, 2) all children less than 14 years of age, and 3) 
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in which population coverage rates increase over time as successive cohorts of infants participate. 
Herd protection effects are then estimated as the coverage rates of young children gradually 
increases with time from the initiation of the vaccination program. Vaccination benefits are 
aggregated based on incidence reductions for both vaccine recipients and for non-recipients. By 
properly accounting for herd protection effects, the estimated cost per DALY saved may be 
reduced considerably. This is especially important when incidence is indirectly reduced for 
elderly age groups who may be most at risk from disease mortality (Lee et al., 2007; Lloyd et al., 
2007).59  
While cost utility analysis is the most common tool used to judge the economic 
attractiveness of vaccination programs, most of the published literature that examines how to 
target vaccinations in the presence of herd protection uses alternative frameworks. 
Epidemiologists and economists have used optimization models to examine the optimal 
distribution of vaccines given either a predetermined limitation in the number of vaccines 
available or an economic constraint. For example, Patel et al. (2005) examined the optimal 
allocation of influenza vaccines across age groups in the event of a shortage. They found that 
prioritization of vaccines for school-age children could maximize the number of cases and deaths 
avoided, even though the risk of death is greatest for elderly adults. This finding suggests that 
school-age children have the much greater capacity to spread influenza relative to other age 
groups.   
Brito et al. (1991) examine the optimal tax or subsidy required to achieve a socially 
optimal vaccine coverage rate. They assume that 1) vaccines are 100% effective, 2) benefits are 
homogenous across the community, and 3) that costs vary across the community. They also prove 
                                                                                                                                                 
universal vaccination of all age groups. 
59It is important to note that herd protection effects may be detrimental for some diseases if vaccine 
protection wanes with age and if the disease is more serious for adults than children, such as the varicella 
vaccine M. Brisson and W. J. Edmunds (2002), 'The cost-effectiveness of varicella zoster virus (VZV) 
vaccination in Canada', Vaccine 20: 1113-1125, M. Brisson and W. J. Edmunds (2003), 'Economic 
Evaluation of Vaccination Programs: The Impact of Herd-Immunity', Medical Decision Making 23: 76-82..  
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that compulsory vaccination is always non-optimal compared to a tax/subsidy scheme. Francis 
(1997; 2004) expands upon this work by incorporating a common mathematical model of 
epidemic disease spread, the susceptible-infected-recovered or SIR model. This dynamic model is 
applicable to epidemic disease spread, for which prevalence increases until the number of 
susceptible individuals is offset by the number of recovered (i.e. immune) individuals. At this 
point, prevalence begins to decline back to zero. Unlike Brito, Francis assumes that both vaccine 
costs and benefits are homogenous across the community. Francis solves for a threshold 
prevalence such that 1) when prevalence is below the threshold, no one is vaccinated and 2) when 
prevalence is above the threshold, everyone is vaccinated. Francis also examines a static 
equilibrium for which an optimal price is derived. Boulier et al. (2007) also employ the SIR 
model, but focus on how SIR parameters impact the optimal coverage rates. They also assume 
homogenous vaccine benefits and costs in the community. The optimal coverage rate depends 
primarily on the infectiousness of disease.   
 
Methodology 
Empirical herd protection data is available for both cholera and influenza vaccination 
programs. The relationships between coverage and community incidence reduction for cholera 
and influenza vaccination programs are shown in Figure 1. The community incidence reduction 
represents the combined impacts of direct and indirect vaccination protection across the entire 
community. Thus, it represents a weighted average of incidence reductions for vaccinated and 
unvaccinated subgroups. The cholera data corresponds to reported herd protection from a 1985 
cholera vaccination trial conducted in Matlab, Bangladesh (Clemens et al., 1990; Longini Jr. et 
al., 2007). The influenza data is taken from an article that examines the optimal vaccine 
distribution across age groups to protect against pandemic influenza similar to the 1968–1969 A 
(H3N2) Hong Kong influenza pandemic (Patel et al., 2005). It is important to note that the 
cholera data are based on observed results from a community vaccination trial that targeted 
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children and adult females while the influenza data are based on stochastic optimization 
simulations. In other words, the cholera data are based on actual uptake rates, while the influenza 
data are taken from scenarios in which vaccinations are optimally distributed across age groups. 
Non-optimized influenza vaccination would probably result in considerably reduced herd 
protection effects. 
The protection-coverage relationships shown in Figure 1 are quite similar. The rate or 
change in community incidence reduction is slightly greater for influenza, but differences are 
never greater than 10%. According to the models, it should be possible to achieve at least 80% 
reductions in community incidence with coverage rates of less than 50%, even though neither 
vaccine is 100% effective. Further increases in coverage from 50% to 100% would result in 
minor changes in community incidence, as shown by the near horizontal trajectory of the 
functions in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 11. Community average herd protection as functions of cholera and influenza 
vaccination coverage rates (cholera data is from Longini et al. 2007; influenza data is from 
Patel et al. 2005) 
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The cost per DALY saved depends on a number of considerations, including disease 
incidence, vaccine effectiveness, case fatality rate, life expectancy, fixed and marginal costs of 
vaccination, and herd protection. I first develop a generalized model that is flexible enough to 
deal with a number of population subgroups that may be heterogeneous in incidence, case fatality 
rate, life expectancy or in herd protection impact. Assume that a population can be subdivided 
into n homogeneous subgroups, each with baseline incidence INC0i for i = 1 to n. After the 
initiation of a vaccination program, the incidence in subgroup i (INC
 i) depends on the joint 
coverage rates of the individual subgroups based on a series of functions, V
 i.  
(1) For each i=1 to n, INC
 i = INC0i · V i (COV 1, COV 2, … COV n) 
where V
 i translates observed vaccination coverage rates into expected incidence rates by 
subgroup. 
The changes in incidence rates can be used to calculate the number of cases avoided 
through vaccination. This number of cases avoided must then be converted into saved DALYs by 
subgroup. The total number of saved DALYs incorporates both reductions in morbidity (years of 
life lost to disability, YLD
 i) and mortality (years of life lost, YLL i). The number of life years 
saved per case avoided for subgroup i is estimated via eq. 2 where CFR
 i is the case fatality rate 
for subgroup i and LEi is the average remaining life expectancy for subgroup i.  
(2) YLLi saved per case = (CFRi / 0.03 · (1 – exp(–0.03 ·  LEi)) 
 The number of life years saved per death avoided is greater for younger subgroups, which 
have more life years remaining. However, these future life years are discounted at a 3% rate, 
which reduces differences across age groups. The number of years lost to disability, YLDi, is 
calculated based on the disability caused by disease. These calculations depend on the duration of 
illness, DURi, and severity weight, W. Severity weights depend on the disutility caused by 
disease; illnesses that completely incapacitate sufferers have larger weights than those with minor 
symptoms. Acute illnesses that cause long term disability (e.g., blindness or paralysis) tend to 
have larger estimates of YLDi per case.  
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(3) YLDi saved per case = (1 – CFRi) · DURi ·  W 
Since neither cholera nor influenza tend to cause long term disability, consideration for 
long term disability is omitted from eq. 3. The total DALYs saved per case avoided is the sum of 
YLLi and YLDi. 
(4) DALYi saved per case avoided = (YLLi+ YLDi)/ (1 + 0.03)t 
The total number of DALYs saved is equal to the number of cases avoided multiplied by 
the average DALYs saved per case. This can be calculated as a function of coverage based on   
(5)  Total DALYs = ∑ = −⋅⋅⋅
n
i niiii
COVCOVCOVVINCPOPDALY
1 21
0 ))],...,,(1([  
where POPi is the population of group i and ),...,,(1 21 ni COVCOVCOVV−  represents the change 
in incidence inclusive of direct and herd protection effects.  
The cost per DALY saved is calculated by dividing the total cost of the intervention by 
the total number of DALYs saved. The accounting of costs depends on the perspective taken 
(e.g., government, insurance provider, social). If the government or insurance provider 
perspective is taken, the cost calculation should subtract expected treatment expenditure savings 
from total costs of the vaccination program. If the social perspective is used, one should add 
recipient time and travel costs to receive vaccinations as well as subtract private treatment 
savings. This analysis takes the public health care provider perspective and subtracts public 
treatment savings from total costs to calculate a net public cost. This net public cost is expressed 
non-parametrically as 
(6) Cost = C(COV1, COV2, …, COVn) –  
PWF · ∑ = −⋅⋅⋅
n
i niiii
COVCOVCOVVINCPOPCOI
1 21
0 )}],...,,(1{[  
where COIi is the average public COI per case avoided, PWF is the present worth function, which 
discounts future public treatment cost savings over the duration of vaccination protection, and 
C(COV1, COV2, …, COVn) is a cost function. The average cost per DALY saved is eq. 6 divided 
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by eq. 5 as shown below. Note that the average cost per DALY may be negative if the public 
treatment savings exceed the cost of providing vaccinations. 
(7) DALYCOST(COV1, COV2, …, COVn) = [C(COV1, COV2, …, COVn) - 
∑ = −⋅⋅⋅
n
i niiii
COVCOVCOVVINCPOPCOI
1 21
0 ))],...,,(1((  /  
∑ = −⋅⋅⋅
n
i niiii
COVCOVCOVVINCPOPDALY
1 21
0 )),...,,(1(  
Rather than reporting a function, most authors report point values for vaccination 
programs. However, eq. 7 would only be independent of coverage if 1) there is no herd 
protection, 2) the marginal cost per vaccination delivered is constant, and 3) there are no fixed 
costs. In general, all three of these conditions would rarely be met. The cost function may have a 
fixed cost component and either an increasing or decreasing variable cost component, depending 
on advertising requirements, population density and other considerations. The herd protection 
functions shown in Figure 1 indicate exponentially decreasing returns to scale with regard to 
incidence reduction. This herd protection function impacts both the public COI savings and saved 
DALYs components of equation 7.  
The marginal cost per DALY saved can be calculated by taking a partial derivative of eq. 
7 with respect to coverage by subgroup. It can also be numerically approximated by specifying a 
small change in coverage (by subgroup) and measuring the corresponding changes in program 
costs and DALYs saved that result.  
Given a portfolio of various types of vaccinations and a fixed budget, the maximum 
number of DALYs saved would be achieved if the marginal cost per DALY saved were 
approximately equal across interventions and subgroups. This could be accomplished using 
numerical optimization, but that approach is not the focus of this appendix. When considering a 
portfolio of interventions, the following considerations should be included in marginal cost per 
DALY calculations by disease and by subgroup: 1) relative differences in the number of DALYs 
saved per case avoided, DALYi 2) expected baseline incidences, INCi0 3) relative differences in 
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herd protection impacts, V
 i ( · ) and 4) relative differences in the costs of vaccine provision and 
distribution .  
Thus, diseases with large disability impacts per case, high baseline incidences, large herd 
protection effects, and low vaccination costs would be targeted. The herd protection effects 
(δVi(·) / δCOVi) are likely to express the greatest changes as functions of coverage. According to 
Figure 1, the marginal herd-protection-induced changes in incidence are likely to decrease 
considerably as coverage increases. In contrast, the number of DALYi and INCi0 are constants. 
The marginal cost of vaccination may vary with coverage, but this variation is likely to be small 
relative to the expected variation in herd protection. 
 
Results 
In this section, I present empirical simulations based on literature estimates of 
parameters. The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine DALY calculations as functions of 
coverage in consideration of herd protection effects. A number of important parameters for 
cholera and influenza vaccination programs are summarized in Table 1. These parameters are 
either taken from literature estimates or assumed.  
These cholera vaccination parameters are based on endemic infection rates and common 
treatment practices in the rural Matlab, Bangladesh area. The influenza vaccination parameters 
are taken from the United States. The infection rate and herd protection parameters are based on 
an influenza pandemic similar to the 1968 Hong Kong influenza pandemic, while the treatment 
and vaccination costs are estimated based on existing practices for influenza in the United States. 
Note that treatment costs for pandemic influenza likely exceed those for common influenza, but 
pandemic-specific data are not available.  
The populations under consideration for both programs are assumed to be 1,000,000 
people. The fixed costs of the programs are assumed to be about US$0.10 per person or 
US$100,000 in total (Lauria et al., 2009). The marginal cost per influenza vaccination in the 
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United States is assumed to be US$60, based on a consultation cost of US$50 and a vaccine 
procurement cost of US$10 (Jordan et al., 2006). This is much greater than in Bangladesh where 
delivery cost is estimated at US$0.50 per dose and procurement cost is estimated US$0.60 per 
dose. The total cost is estimated to be US$2.2 for two doses of cholera vaccine (Jeuland et al., 
2009).  
The costs of these vaccination programs could be partially offset by the public savings 
from treating fewer cases of illness at public clinics. The public cost of treating cholera in 
Bangladesh is estimated at US$20 per case based on operating costs at a non-profit hospital in 
Matlab, Bangladesh (Poulos et al., 2008). Influenza treatment cost per case is estimated at US$25, 
assuming that 27% of infected patients would seek treatment at an average cost of US$125 per 
outpatient case in American hospitals (Jordan et al., 2006). 
The attack rate for the 1968-69 Hong Kong influenza pandemic was about 34%, resulting 
in about 340 cases per 1,000 persons in one year (Patel et al., 2005). Incidence rates were 
consistent across age groups. The cholera incidence rate is based on a passive surveillance study 
conducted at the Matlab hospital (Deen et al., 2008). Cholera incidence is greater for young 
children age 1-5 years than for school-age children or adults. The average annual incidence across 
age groups is about 1.6 cases per 1000 persons. The average durations per illness are assumed to 
be 7 days for influenza and 3 days for cholera. The DALY weight is 0.27 for influenza, which is 
based on the value for malaria and other febrile diseases. The DALY weight for cholera is 
assumed to be 0.105, which corresponds to the weight for diarrheal disease ((WHO), 2003). A 
cholera-specific weight is not available from the WHO; it is likely that cholera is more severe 
than other types of diarrheal disease. 
The influenza case fatality rate is a weighted average of the mortality rates observed for 
the 1968-69 Hong Kong influenza pandemic (Patel et al., 2005). The influenza mortality rate is 
greater for elderly adults (2%) than for other adults (0.3%) or children (0.025%). The cholera case 
fatality rate is assumed to be 1% because it is usually possible to reduce cholera case fatality rates 
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below 1% at hospital (Ryan et al., 2000). However, it is unlikely that all cholera patients would 
arrive at hospitals for treatment. The remaining life expectancy is based on life expectancy tables 
for Bangladesh and for the United States. The remaining life expectancies reported in Table 1 
represent weighted averages of the age-specific case fatality rates, incidences and life 
expectancies across age groups. The average remaining life expectancy is greater for cholera 
fatalities because influenza deaths are concentrated among the elderly. Cholera deaths are more 
evenly spread across age groups with a slight concentration among children who are more likely 
to contract the disease.  
These data can be used to calculate the average number of life years saved per case 
avoided (YLL) and the average number of disability years saved per case avoided (YLD). Since 
neither disease leads to long term disability, the number of life years saved are significantly 
greater than the number of disability years saved, YLL > YLD. For influenza, the average YLD 
saved per case avoided are about 0.005, compared to about 0.030 YLL per case. For cholera, the 
difference is even larger (about 0.001 YLD per case compared to 0.26 YLL per case). Overall, the 
number of DALYs saved per cholera case avoided are considerably greater for cholera (0.26) 
than for influenza (0.035). This would indicate that about 7.4 influenza cases would be 
approximately equal to one cholera case in terms of the number of DALYs saved. 
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Table 8. Cholera and influenza parameter inputs for DALY calculations 
Variable Cholera 
vaccination 
program 
parameters 
Influenza 
vaccination 
program 
parameters 
Literature estimated values   
Baseline annual incidence, INC0, cases 
per 1,000 persons 
1.6 340 
Variable cost, C, US$ 2.2 60 
Herd protection coefficient, γ 5.1 6.6 
Public COI per case- PUBCOI, US$ 20 25 
Duration of vaccine protection (years) 3 1 
DALY weight, W 0.105 0.27 
Case fatality rate, CFR (%) 1 0.3 
Expected remaining life years, LE 52 12 
Assumed parameters   
Population, POP 1,000,000 1,000,000 
Fixed cost, F, US$ 100,000 100,000  
Length of illness (days) 3 7 
DALY discount rate (%) 3 3 
Present worth factor, PWF 2.58 1 
Calculated parameters   
YLD saved per case 0.001 0.005 
YLL saved per case 0.26 0.030 
DALYs saved per case 0.26 0.035 
   
 
The empirical relationships between coverage and incidence are approximately calculated 
from the data presented in Figure 1. It is possible to fit exponential functions to these 
relationships via transformed linear regression. The intercept is fixed such that the baseline 
incidence would be observed at zero coverage. The resulting functions are  
(8) Cholera Vc(COVc) = INCc0 · exp(-5.1 · COVc) 
(9) Influenza Vf(COVf) = INCf0 · exp(-6.6 · COVf) 
where COVc and COVf are included as the fractions of the total population receiving cholera or 
influenza vaccinations. These relationships suggest that the rates of decrease in incidence rates 
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decline exponentially as coverage rates increase. Thus, the greatest rates of change occur at low 
coverage rates. 
The total cost, public COI savings, and DALYs saved are shown as functions of coverage 
rates in Figures 2 and 3 for cholera and influenza vaccination programs. The total cost functions 
have intercepts at the fixed costs of vaccination and increase at a constant marginal cost per 
vaccination. The public COI savings are small relative to total costs for both diseases. For 
cholera, public treatment cost savings are not even sufficient to cover the fixed costs of the 
vaccination program, even at 100% coverage. Since the number of DALYs saved and public COI 
savings are linear projections of the changes in incidence rates, the shapes of these functions are 
similar to the herd protection curves shown in Figure 1. Thus, while total costs increase linearly, 
public COI savings plateau at higher coverage rates. The public COI savings are greater as a 
percentage of total costs for influenza vaccination than for cholera vaccination. 
For both vaccination programs, there are rapid increases in the numbers of DALYs saved 
for coverage rate increases from 0-30%. The DALY functions appear to plateau at coverage rates 
greater than 50%, such that additional vaccinations result in very small changes in DALYs. This 
is because incidence rates have already been reduced to almost zero at 50% coverage. 
 303 
 
Figure 12. DALYs saved, total costs, and public COI savings as functions of coverage for 
cholera vaccination 
 
Figure 13. DALYs saved, total costs, and public COI savings as functions of coverage for 
influenza vaccination 
 
The average net costs per DALY with and without consideration for herd protection are 
shown in Figures 4 and 5 for cholera and influenza respectively. Without herd protection, the 
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average net costs per DALY decline to asymptotic values as coverage rates increase. The average 
net cost per DALY is very high at low coverage rates because fixed costs must be absorbed by the 
small fraction of the population that is vaccinated. As coverage increases, the net costs per DALY 
decrease to asymptotic values of about US$3,000 per DALY for cholera vaccination in Matlab 
and about US$8,000 per DALY for vaccination against pandemic influenza in the United States.  
With consideration of herd protection, the average net costs per DALY are much more 
variable as functions of coverage. For cholera, the average net cost per DALY decreases at very 
low coverage rates because of the impact of fixed costs (i.e. because the average cost per 
vaccination is very high at low coverage rates). At coverage rates greater than 5%, the average net 
cost per DALY increases as coverage increases due to the diminishing returns of herd protection. 
The average net cost per DALY for cholera vaccination increases from US$600 at 15% to 
US$1,800 at 95%.  
These increasing costs per DALY are demonstrated more clearly by the marginal cost per 
DALY function. The marginal net cost per DALY is independent of fixed costs and increases 
exponentially based on the shape of the herd protection function. The marginal net cost per 
DALY increases from about US$500 at 10% coverage to about US$900 at 20% coverage to about 
US$40,000 at 80% coverage for cholera vaccination. Thus, it would cost about 80 times more to 
achieve a marginal increase of one saved DALY at 80% coverage than at 10% coverage. 
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Figure 14. Average and marginal cost per DALY for cholera vaccination 
 
 The trends in the average net cost per DALY and marginal net cost per DALY functions 
are similar for influenza vaccination. The average net cost per DALY increases from about 
US$1,300 at 15% coverage to about US$4,000 at 95% coverage for influenza vaccination. The 
marginal net cost per DALY increases from about US$1,300 at 15% to about US$380,000 at 80% 
coverage, a 300-fold increase.  
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Figure 15. Average and marginal cost per DALY for influenza vaccination 
 
 
 The average and marginal net cost per DALY functions can be compared to commonly 
used thresholds for cost-effective interventions. According to the World Bank, a ‘very cost-
effective’ intervention has a net cost per DALY ratio less than per capita GDP. A ‘cost-effective’ 
intervention has a ratio less than three times per capita GDP (Jeuland et al., 2008).  Note that the 
average GDP per capita is much greater in the United States (about US$ 46,000) than in 
Bangladesh (about US$ 510).  
Given pandemic influenza incidence rates in the United States, vaccination would be 
considered ‘very cost effective’ at any coverage rate based on the average cost per DALY 
functions (with or without accounting for herd protection). Using the marginal cost per DALY 
function instead of the average cost per DALY function, influenza vaccination would be 
considered ‘very cost effective’ at any coverage rate less than 60%. Thus, program planners could 
maximize coverage rates with little fear of misallocating resources; however, special effort should 
not be made to increase coverage beyond about 80%. 
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The cost effectiveness of vaccination against endemic cholera in Matlab, Bangladesh 
requires more careful consideration. The average cost per DALY is almost equal to the ‘very cost 
effective’ threshold at low coverage rates (10-30%). The marginal cost per DALY is less than the 
‘very cost effective’ threshold at coverage rates less than 10% and less than the ‘cost effective’ 
threshold at coverage rates less than 30%. At 50% coverage, the marginal cost per DALY is three 
times greater than the ‘cost effective’ threshold. These findings demonstrate that the marginal 
cost per DALY calculation is highly sensitive to the coverage rate under consideration. While a 
cholera vaccination program can be considered ‘cost effective’ at low to moderate coverage, there 
should be little incentive to increase coverage rates beyond 50% based on the parameters included 
in this simulation. 
 
Conclusions 
 This appendix examines the relationship between coverage rates and cost utility metrics 
in the presence of herd protection impacts. The calculations incorporate actual incidence-
coverage relationships from epidemiological studies of endemic cholera in Bangladesh and for an 
influenza pandemic similar to the 1968-69 Hong Kong strain observed in the United States. Both 
epidemiological studies suggest an exponential relationship between vaccination coverage rates 
and reductions in disease burden, which infer that it is possible to achieve substantial reductions 
in incidences at modest coverage rates. These studies further show that increases in coverage 
beyond 30-50% have very little impact on disease burden because incidence rates have already 
been reduced considerably. 
 Cost utility metrics are useful for prioritizing across health interventions. When the 
average cost per DALY metric falls between the ‘very cost effective’ and ‘cost effective’ 
thresholds, but this does not guarantee that a vaccination program should be implemented. 
Financial resources for health interventions are likely to be extremely limited in many developing 
countries. There may be many interventions are considered ‘cost effective’, but for which funding 
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is unavailable. It is necessary to check if other health interventions that pass these thresholds may 
have more attractive ratios (Jeuland et al., 2008). With many ‘cost-effective’ options, it becomes 
especially important to consider the marginal cost per DALY as well as the average cost per 
DALY metrics. As shown in Figure 4, vaccination against endemic cholera in Matlab, 
Bangladesh is likely to fall between the ‘very cost effective’ and ‘cost effective’ thresholds based 
on average cost per DALY calculations. However, the marginal cost per DALY is almost certain 
to be excessive at any coverage rate greater than 50%. Thus, any vaccination portfolio would 
probably improve efficiency by diverting resources to other health interventions rather than try to 
boost cholera vaccination coverage rates beyond 50%.  
These findings suggest that it might be more efficient to introduce more types of vaccines 
at lower coverage rates than to introduce a smaller number of vaccinations at high coverage rates. 
For example, given a refugee setting with limited resources, it might be better to introduce two 
vaccines at 50% coverage than to introduce a single vaccine at 100% coverage. If one endeavors 
to take advantage of herd protection, it is important to ensure that vaccines are distributed 
uniformly across an area. In a best case scenario, a program administrator would attempt to 
evenly split different types of vaccinations within households (i.e. half of the household members 
would receive vaccine A while the other half would receive vaccine B). This should better retard 
disease spread for both diseases relative to a program in which coverage rates vary widely from 
one neighborhood to the next. 
Given a pandemic influenza strain that invades the United States, it may be ‘very cost 
effective’ to maximize vaccination coverage rates because disease prevalence is likely to be very 
high. In this situation, it is important to continue to provide vaccinations beyond 50% because the 
threat is so great. This situation may be similar to the provision of the low cost vaccinations 
included in the Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI) already available in low income 
countries. Thus, it is important not to assume that all vaccinations should be provided at lower 
coverage rates, only vaccinations that are considered marginally cost effective.  
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Although I merged age groups to allow for better visualization of trends, it is also 
important to note that this approach should allow for efficient allocations of vaccinations across 
age groups. For example, Patel et al. (2005) report that the influenza mortality rate is much 
greater for elderly adults than for other groups. Thus, the number of DALYs saved per case 
avoided is greatest for elderly adults. However, the number of DALYs saved per case is only one 
important parameter (shown in eq. 7). Patel et al. also find that vaccination of children has a much 
greater impact on herd protection than vaccination of other groups. In the marginal calculations, 
this greater influence of herd protection from child vaccination relative to DALYs saved per case 
avoided for elderly vaccinations should be evident. In other words, the marginal cost per DALY 
saved for the child subgroup should be less than the marginal cost for the elderly subgroup across 
a range of coverage rates. 
 There are some limitations to the model developed in this chapter. First, the relationships 
between coverage rates and herd protection effects are not well-studied for many vaccines. Even 
in cases where linkages between herd protection and vaccination coverage are well established, 
differences across subgroups or across locations may not be well understood (e.g., it may not be 
known if adult or child vaccinations have greater impacts on herd protection for a particular 
vaccine). Second, it may be difficult to achieve the ‘optimal’ coverage rates calculated from the 
marginal cost per DALY analysis. It may be possible to introduce different pricing or rationing 
schemes to achieve these coverage rates, but there may be considerable uncertainty in predicting 
populations’ responses to these policies.  
In spite of these limitations, I believe this model should be useful. When incidence 
changes are converted to health utility units, the cost effectiveness of a particular intervention is 
heavily dependent on the coverage rate achieved. While herd protection is a well known attribute 
of vaccination and other health intervention programs, it is rarely rigorously considered in 
economic evaluations. This chapter develops a new method of accounting for herd protection in 
cost utility analysis and also demonstrates the need for better research in regard to the empirical 
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relationships between coverage and herd protection. I believe that the marginal cost per DALY 
metric is better suited for determining appropriate coverage levels and for targeting vaccinations 
across population subgroups in comparison to commonly used analyses.  
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